The Spectrum Of Circumstances According To The Different Types Of Expansion And Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 174):

Doing & Being As Complementary Perspectives On Change

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 161):

Expansion Relations Between Ergative Functions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 158):

Delicacy, Realisation And Instantiation As Modes Of Relational Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145):

The Orientations Of The Different Types Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144):

The Overall Semantic Space Of Figures With Principal Areas Of Indeterminacy And Complementarity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137):

Rallying The Discourse Analysts To The Latest Cause

Process Types In Clause Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 136):

Types Of Figure As Domains Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

The Possibilities Of Projecting Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 116):

Consciousness In Projection And The Two Levels Of Metaphenomena

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 108):

Congruent Lexicogrammatical Realisations Of Semantic Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 55):

Congruent Lexicogrammatical Realisations Of Semantic Phenomena

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 49):

Consensus Vs Truth

Ideational Semantic System

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 67):

Trying To Explain Theory To A Wally

Judgement

Grammar Checker

Measuring Semantic Density

Dreyfus And Hao On Circumstantial Meaning

A multi-stratal perspective on circumstantial meaning

Shoshana Dreyfus (with Jing Hao in absentia)

This presentation provides a ‘broader’ understanding of what is previously known from a grammatical perspective as ‘circumstantial meaning’ or circumstantiation. This ‘broader’ perspective takes into account more abstract meanings beyond grammar, considering both field (at the register stratum) and discourse semantics, in addition to lexicogrammar. The paper shows how the lexicogrammar alone is not able to adequately account for the meaning potential of ‘circumstantial meaning’, and how by examining this region of meaning from three strata, a fuller account of circumstantial meaning is made possible. A richer account of circumstantial meaning is necessary because, while circumstances may be considered structurally peripheral, earlier explorations of circumstantial meaning (such as Dreyfus & Jones 2008, 2011; Dreyfus & Bennett 2017) show that this area of meaning often makes important contributions to the register of any given text and to the building of disciplinary knowledge. This exploration is demonstrated through two texts: a student’s high scoring piece of creative writing from the subject of English in the final year of schooling and a synopsis of a history book on the Chinese fishing industry in colonial Australia. These texts reveal the significantly different ways in which circumstantial meanings are used in different subject areas – i.e. to contribute to setting up an ‘ambience’ in literary texts and to developing knowledge in history.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as Halliday & Matthiessen (1999) have argued, the 'broader', 'more abstract' meanings that are manifested in circumstantiation are the highly generalised categories of expansion and projection, which they term 'transphenomenal' because they 'operate across the various categories of phenomena' (p223), and generate patterns that constitute 'fractal types' because:

… they are principles of construing our experience of the world that generate identical patterns of semantic organisation which are of variable magnitude and which occur in variable semantic environments.

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, 'field' is the ideational dimension of context — from the culture as potential to varying institutions/situation types to varying situations as instances.  Register, on the other hand, as a functional variety of language, is a sub-potential of language, not the systemic potential of context.  Here the authors are merely repeating Martin's (1992) misunderstandings of field, context and register, as demonstrated here (field), here (context), and here (register).

[3] To be clear, in SFL theory, it is the grammar that construes ('intellectually constructs') the semantics.  That is why understanding the grammar (wording) of a language is the means of understanding its semantics (meaning).

[4] Here the authors misinterpret the peripheral status of circumstances in terms of ergativity as peripheral status in terms of semogenesis (making meaning), and use this misinterpretation as a straw man against which to argue.

[5] To be clear, in SFL theory, knowledge is meaning, and 'disciplinary knowledge' is the meaning (semantics) that realises an institution (context sub-potential).  Both levels of symbolic abstraction involve all metafunctions, and so are not limited to field (context) and ideational meaning (semantics).

Student And Supervisor

Circumstantiation: One Of The Many Manifestations Of Expansion And Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 669-73, 676):

Let us now present a systematic and comprehensive summary of the different grammatical environments in which elaboration, extension and enhancement are manifested: see Table 10-3. As the table shows, the environments of manifestation can be differentiated in terms of (i) metafunction – textual (CONJUNCTION), logical (INTERDEPENDENCY; MODIFICATION) and experiential (CIRCUMSTANTIATION; PROCESS TYPE: relational), and (ii) rank – clause and group/phrase. (The table could, in fact, be extended downwards along the rank scale to take account of patterns below the rank of group/phrase within the logical metafunction: word and morpheme complexes also embody interdependency relations that combine with expansion.) 

From a grammatical point of view, the environments set out in Table 10-3 are, of course, all different. But seen from above, from the vantage point of semantics, they are all agnate ways of construing expansion. Collectively they thus construe expansion as a semantic system. This means that for any given type of expansion we want to express, we have at our disposal a range of resources. For example, if we want to express an enhancing relationship of cause, the opportunities made available by the grammar include the one set out in Table 10-4. 

… Let’s now turn to the semantic domain of projection. Like expansion, projection is manifested both logically and experientially within the ideational metafunction; but outside the ideational domain, it is manifested interpersonally rather than textually, thus contrasting with the textual manifestation of expansion: see Table 10-5.

 

When Data Challenges Theory…

Complementarity: Managing Contradiction

Mental vs Material Processes

ESL Prac Exam

Sounding Human

The World Of Bluff And Counter-Bluff

Modality: Usuality As Obligation

Punctuated Disequilibrium

The Epistemological Orientation Of SFL Theory

Categories

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: xi):

… we stress that the categories and relations of experience are not “given” to us by nature, to be passively reflected in our language, but are actively constructed by language, with the lexicogrammar as the driving force.

Knowledge

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 3):

We contend that the conception of ‘knowledge’ as something that exists independently of language, and may then be coded or made manifest in language, is illusory. All knowledge is constituted in semiotic systems, with language as the most central; and all such representations of knowledge are constructed from language in the first place.

Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 3):

Our contention is that there is no ordering of experience other than the ordering given to it by language. We could in fact define experience in linguistic terms: experience is the reality we construe for ourselves by means of language.

Epistemology

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 17):

The view we are adopting is a constructivist one, familiar from European linguistics in the work of Hjelmslev and Firth. According to this view, it is the grammar itself that construes experience, that constructs for us our world of events and objects. As Hjelmslev (1943) said, reality is unknowable; the only things that are known are our construals of it — that is, meanings. Meanings do not ‘exist’ before the wordings that realise them. They are formed out of the impact between our consciousness and its environment.

Categorising Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 68):

Categorisation is often thought of as a process of classifying together phenomena that are inherently alike, the classes being as it were given to us by the nature of the experience itself. But this is not what really happens. Categorising is a creative act: it transforms our experience into meaning, and this means imposing a categorical order rather than putting labels on an order that is already there.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 68):

There would be indefinitely many ways of construing analogies among different elements in the total flux of experience; what our semantic resources enable us to do is to construe those analogies which yield categories resonating with what as a species, and as members of a particular culture, we have found to carry material and symbolic value.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 97):

To construe experience of concrete phenomena as meaning is thus to construe some signification which lies outside the ideation base as a value which is internal to the ideation base system.

Typological Variation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 318-9):

In general, wherever there is indeterminacy within a language, we may expect to find this reflected in typological variation. … The phenomena of human experience are held in tension by so many intersecting analogical lines that, while all of us have the same brains and live on the surface of the same planet, such diverse ways of semiotic mapping are not only possible but inevitable.

The Construction Of Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 353):

… our metatheoretic position is that the construction of meaning is both a discourse–semantic and a lexicogrammatical process.

Epistemology

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 423-4):

… reality is not something that is given to us; we have to construct an interpretation of it — or, as we prefer to put it, we have to construe our experience. Interpretation is a semiotic process, and our interpretation takes into account not only the concrete natural world but also the socio-cultural realm that is brought into existence as a semiotic construct …

Modelling The Relation Of Semiotic To Material Systems

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 439):

… the relationship has to be modelled in such a way that we can show how people as biological organisms and socio-semiotic persons interact with their material environment.

The Central Integrative Rôle Of Language

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 444):

… all of our experience is construed as meaning. Language is the primary semiotic system for transforming experience into meaning; and it is the only semiotic system whose meaning base can serve to transform meanings construed in other systems (including perceptual ones) and thus integrate our experience from all its various sources.

The Problem With Designed Systems

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 557)

Our “reality” is inherently messy; it would be hard to construe experience, in a way that was beneficial to survival, with a semiotic system whose typical categories were well-defined, clearly bounded, and ordered by certainty rather than probability. This is the problem with designed systems, including semiotic ones: as a rule, they fail to provide adequately for mess.

Language Creates Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 602):

Language is not a second–order code through which meanings created in some higher–order realm of existence are mysteriously made manifest and brought to light. To borrow the conceit that Firth was fond of caricaturing, there are no “naked ideas” lurking in the background waiting to be clothed. It is language that creates meaning, in the sense that meaning has for us as human beings (which is the only sense of it that we can know).

Location In Metasemiotic Space

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 603):

… our interpretation of meaning is immanent, so that meaning is inside language, not some separate, higher domain of human experience.

A Broadly Materialist Position

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 608-9):

… the human brain has evolved in the construction of a functioning model of “reality”. We prefer to conceptualise “reality construction” in terms of construing experience. This is not so much because it avoids metaphysical issues about the ultimate nature of reality — we are prepared to acknowledge a broadly materialist position …

Why ‘Construing Experience’ Rather Than ‘Reality Construction’?

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 609):

… what is being construed by the brain is not the environment as such, but the impact of that environment on the organism and the ongoing material and semiotic exchange between the two.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 609):

… we want to emphasise the evolutionary perspective, since this allows us to start from what human beings have in common with other species rather than always insisting on our own uniqueness: when we talk of “construction of reality” it is almost impossible to avoid taking our own construction as the norm, whereas parakeets, pythons, and porpoises have very different experiences to construe — different both from each other’s and from those of people.

∞

For applications of SFL theory to philosophy, quantum physics and mythology, see Informing Thoughts.