Instantiation Is Not a Process

In systemic functional linguistics (SFL), instantiation is often casually described as “the process by which a system becomes a text.” This formulation, however, is both misleading and philosophically precarious. Once we examine it through a relational-ontological lens, it becomes clear that instantiation is not a process at all—it is a perspectival relation between potential and instance within a stratum.

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1. Canonical Halliday: System and Instance

In Halliday’s framework:

• System = a structured potential, a network of possible choices, never a physical or temporal entity.

• Instance = a particular construal of that potential, such as a text (language) or a situation (context).

Crucially:

System is potential, instance is actualisation.

Nothing “moves” from one to the other, and nothing unfolds in time simply by virtue of being instantiated.

Instantiation does not cross strata. A text is an instance of the content potential of language, not of context. Similarly, a situation is an instance of contextual potential, not of language. Each plane has its own potential–instance relation.

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2. Why Instantiation Is Not a Process

Text generation studies, particularly Matthiessen’s work on logogenesis, have framed instantiation as a temporal process:

• The system “exists” beforehand.

• The text “draws from” the system.

• Choices are “made” in a sequence, flowing from potential to instance.

This historical framing originates in computational and text-generation contexts, where it was convenient to treat system selection as sequential. However, this reflects algorithmic modelling requirements, not Halliday’s canonical ontology. Treating instantiation as a process outside these contexts introduces conceptual confusion.

Conceptually, instantiation is atemporal and perspectival:

1. System is not temporally prior. The potential exists as a relational cut, not a stored precondition.

2. Instance is not produced. It is a perspectival actualisation: an event construed as an instance of a system.

3. No literal unfolding occurs. “Sequence” is explanatory or procedural; the theoretical relation itself remains atemporal.

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3. Instantiation as Perspectival Relation

Instead of a process, instantiation is:

• Token–type relation within a stratum:

  • Context → situation

  • Semantic potential → text

• A perspectival cut: The observer construes an instance as an actualisation of potential.

This formulation preserves the canonical stratification and respects the independence of potential and actualisation.

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4. Distinguishing Instantiation from Semogenesis

Halliday identifies three major time-frames of semogenesis:

1. Phylogenetic: Evolution of human language; species-level potential

2. Ontogenetic: Individual development of semiotic potential

3. Logogenetic: Actualisation of meaning in the act of producing or interpreting a text

Semogenesis describes temporal unfolding of meaning, but it is not the same as instantiation. Instantiation remains atemporal, stratum-bound, and perspectival, while semogenesis describes how instances occur within human time, interact, and accumulate.

Including semogenesis clarifies that temporal processes exist in meaning-making, but they are orthogonal to the ontological relation of potential to instance. This resolves the confusion introduced when instantiation is mistakenly treated as a process.

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5. Implications for SFL Theory

1. No cross-stratal instantiation: A text cannot be an instance of context; register cannot instantiate situation types.

2. Preserves the purity of strata: System networks, semantic potential, lexicogrammar, and phonology remain distinct.

3. Clears up common misconceptions: Logogenetic generation, semantic drift, and “realisation pipelines” are explanatory aids, not ontological facts.

4. Grounds relational ontology: System = theory of possible instances; instance = perspectival actualisation; construal = constitutive.

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6. Conclusion

Instantiation is a relational cut, not a process.

Understanding it in this way aligns SFL with relational ontology, keeps the canonical architecture intact, and prevents the category errors and representational slippage that have proliferated in derivative models.

Once we accept that instantiation is atemporal, perspectival, and stratum-bound, and that semogenesis describes temporal unfolding of meaning separately, the architecture of SFL becomes both conceptually cleaner and philosophically coherent.