How To Distinguish Theme From Subject In A Free Declarative Clause

Theme comprises everything in the clause up to the end of the first experiential unit.
Subject is what is picked up by a Mood Tag.

For example:

A little further on is the Rijksmuseum (isn't it?)

Theme: a little further on
Subject: the Rijksmuseum 

Yaegan Doran On Sundanese Nominal Groups

Sundanese nominal groups: A textual grammar

Yaegan Doran

The Australian Catholic University

This talk considers the nominal group in Sundanese, a Malayo-Polynesian language of West Java, Indonesia. In particular, it builds a meaning-based description of Sundanese nominal groups, focusing in particular on textual meaning. Born of educational concerns associated with literacy programs, this talk describes the nominal group not only in terms of the formal syntagms at play, but also their functions; not only the paradigmatic choices that are available, but how they are taken up in text; and not only the grammar by itself, but how it realises meanings in discourse. The aim is to develop a richly co-textualised and metafunctional description of Sundanese nominal groups that can explain text patterns from a range of genres and registers.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this paper did not discuss the textual meaning of the nominal group. Instead, it was concerned with reference, which is not a system of the nominal group, though the nominal group, along with the adverbial group, is a grammatical domain in which reference items are located.

One reason why reference is not a system of the nominal group is that it is not realised by a structural relation within the nominal group. Instead, reference is realised by a non-structural relation between a reference item and a referent which may not even be in the text (exophoric reference), let alone in the same nominal group.

This confusion was compounded by the fact that Doran used Martin's model of reference (identification), though without acknowledging the fact, which is (purportedly) discourse semantics, not grammar. Moreover, as explained in great detail here, Martin's model mistakes nominal groups for reference items, mistakes ideational denotation for textual reference, mistakes interpersonal deixis for textual reference, and mistakes non-reference ("presenting reference") for reference.

Ellipsis And Textual Prominence

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 635):

Ellipsis marks the textual status of continuous information within a certain grammatical structure. At the same time, the non-ellipsed elements of that structure are given the status of being contrastive in the environment of continuous information. Ellipsis thus assigns differential prominence to the elements of a structure: 

if they are non-prominent (continuous), they are ellipsed; 

if they are prominent (contrastive), they are present. 

The absence of elements through ellipsis is an iconic realisation of lack of prominence.

Textual Meaning In The Nominal Group

Halliday (1985: 170):

Textual meaning is embodied throughout the entire structure, since it determines the order in which the elements are arranged*, as well as patterns of information structure just as in the clause (note, for example, that the unmarked focus of information in a nominal group is on the word that comes last, not the word that functions as Thing: on pantographs, not on trains [in those two splendid old electric trains with pantographs]). 

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 387-8) add to the foregoing as follows: 

This means that there is a certain potential for assigning experientially similar meanings different textual statuses within the structure of the nominal group. In particular, they may be presented either as Classifier or as Qualifier (e.g. wooden table ~ table of wood) and as either Deictic or as Qualifier (e.g. my brother’s house ~ house of my brother), with the Qualifier having the greater potential as news.

* On the order in which the elements are arranged, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 381) explain:

So there is a progression in the nominal group from the kind of element that has the greatest specifying potential to that which has the least; and this is the principle of ordering that we have already recognised in the clause. In the clause, the Theme comes first. We begin by establishing relevance: stating what it is that we are using to introduce this clause into the discourse, as ‘this is where I’m starting from’ – typically, though by no means necessarily, something that is already ‘given’ in the context. In the nominal group, we begin with the Deictic: ‘first I’ll tell you which I mean’, your, these, any, a, etc. So the principle that puts the Theme first in the clause is the same as that which puts the Deictic first in the nominal group: start by locating the Thing in relation to the here-&-now – in the space-time context of the ongoing speech event. From there we proceed to elements that have successively less identifying potential – which, by the same token, are increasingly permanent as attributes. By and large, the more permanent the attribute of a Thing, the less likely it is to identify it in a particular context.

The Function Of Thematic Equatives

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 95-6):

A thematic equative (which is usually called a ‘pseudo-cleft sentence’ in formal grammar) is an identifying clause which has a thematic nominalisation in it. Its function is to express the Theme-Rheme structure in such a way as to allow for the Theme to consist of any subset of the elements of the clause. This is the explanation for the evolution of clauses of this type: they have evolved, in English, as a thematic resource, enabling the message to be structured in whatever way the speaker or writer wants.

Let us say more explicitly what this structure means. The thematic equative actually realises two distinct semantic features, which happen to correspond to the two senses of the word identify. On the one hand, it identifies (specifies) what the Theme is; on the other hand, it identifies it (equates it) with the Rheme.

The second of these features adds a semantic component of exclusiveness: the meaning is ‘this and this alone’. So, the meaning of what the duke gave my aunt was that teapot is something like ‘I am going to tell you about the duke’s gift to my aunt: it was that teapot — and nothing else’. Contrast this with the duke gave my aunt that teapot, where the meaning is ‘I am going to tell you something about the duke: he gave my aunt that teapot’ (with no implication that he did not give – or do – other things as well).

Hence even when the Theme is not being extended beyond one element, this identifying structure still contributes something to the meaning of the message: it serves to express this feature of exclusiveness. If I say what the duke did was give my aunt that teapot, the nominalisation what the duke did carries the meaning ‘and that’s all he did, in the context of what we are talking about’. 

This is also the explanation of the marked form, which has the nominalisation in the Rheme, as in that’s the one I like. Here the Theme is simply that, exactly the same as in the non-nominalised equivalent that I like; but the thematic equative still adds something to the meaning, by signalling that the relationship is an exclusive one –  I don’t like any of the others. Compare a loaf of bread we need and a loaf of bread is what we need. Both of these have a loaf of bread as Theme; but whereas the former implies ‘among other things’, the latter implies ‘and nothing else’. 

Note that some very common expressions have this marked thematic equative structure, including all those beginning that’s what, that’s why, etc.; e.g. that’s what I meant, that’s why it’s not allowed.

Halliday's Definition Of Mode

Halliday (2002 [1981]: 225):

Halliday has suggested (1975) that the “textual” properties of a text – the cohesive patterns and those of ‘functional sentence perspective’ – tend to be determined by the “mode”, the function ascribed to the text in the given context of situation, the purpose it is intended to achieve.

Today's 'Typology Forum' Paper By David Rose

The textual metafunction: making matter mean

David Rose

University of Sydney

The textual metafunction is sometimes presented as if it were an afterthought, there merely to organise interpersonal and ideational meanings into convenient structures of clause and text. But in the first stages of language, and in much of everyday discourse, it is the primary means of turning the world into meaning, with exophoric reference to the shared sensations of me and you, this and that, here and there. Once the world gets classified, and configured into clauses, and strung out into texts, the same resources used to indicate the world around us are re-deployed to indicate the semiotic world within a text. Where once there were only signs, now meanings come in messages, each of which must be sensible in the unfolding world of the text, and manage listeners’ attention to the information they present. 

Textual typological studies might start from observing these three general functions: introducing and tracking meanings through a text, or phoricity, contextualising messages, or thematicity, and managing information prominence, or newsworthiness. Resources for realising these functions are prototypically distributed between language strata: phoricity in the reference chains of discourse, thematicity in segmental structures of clauses, and newsworthiness in periodic structures of tone groups. But while they are in principle independently variable, both the functions and their realisations interact with each other, and variations in textual functions proliferate as a result. Perhaps also as a consequence of these interactions, their realisations come to vary across languages and registers. 

This paper will make some general observations about interactions between phoricity and thematicity and between thematicity and newsworthiness, and will exemplify variations in these interactions between languages. In the process, it will also illustrate textual variations in register, from dialogue to monologue, and from accompanying to constituting fields.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Rose's negative appraisal — implied by 'afterthought' and 'merely' (counter-expectancy: limiting) — of an unsourced characterisation of the textual metafunction is unjustified. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398):

The textual metafunction is second-order in the sense that it is concerned with semiotic reality: that is, reality in the form of meaning. This dimension of reality is itself constructed by other two metafunctions: the ideational which construes a natural reality, and the interpersonal, which enacts an intersubjective reality. The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them.

[2] Here Rose confuses the ideational and textual metafunctions.  It is the ideational metafunction that construes experience as meaning ("turns the world into meaning").

[3] As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 530) point out, the textual metafunction only operationalises the resources already created by the other metafunctions:

Reference is a way of referring to things that are already semiotically accessible: either actually, in the text, or potentially, in the context of situation.

[4] To be clear, "classifying the world" is construing experience as ideational meaning.

[5] To be clear, it is experiential options that are "configured into clauses", and "configured" takes a structural (syntagmatic) rather than systemic (paradigmatic) perspective on the clause.

[6] To be clear, it is meaning that is "strung out into texts", through the process of instantiation during logogenesis.

[7] To be clear, these resources are ideational potential, construed of experience, and on the SFL model, they do not "indicate" the world, since there are no meanings outside semiotic systems that can be "indicated".

[8] To be clear, in theoretical terms, this "redeployment" is the process of instantiation during logogenesis.

[9] To be clear, in theoretical terms, "indicate" here refers to the logical projection of second-order meaning.

[10] To be clear, in SFL terms, this is the semogenic distinction between protolanguage ("signs") and language ("messages"), though there is no reason to think that this is Rose's meaning.

[11] Here Rose switches to promoting Martin's work on textual systems, as if the preceding paragraph leads naturally to them, and as if they address the (confused) issues he has raised.

[12] This misrepresents the model in Martin (1992).  The meanings that are introduced and tracked are participants, and the system for doing so is termed IDENTIFICATION, not phoricity.  Martin's model is Halliday & Hasan's (1976) model of cohesive reference, misunderstood, rebranded and relocated from lexicogrammar to discourse semantics (evidence here).  Essentially, Martin confuses

• textual reference with reference in the sense of ideational denotation, like his source Du Bois (1980),
• interpersonal deixis of nominal group structure with non-structural textual reference, and, as a result,
• nominal groups realising participants with reference items,

which is why the experiential feature 'participant' is presented (Martin 1992: 325) as the unit and entry condition of this textual discourse semantic system.

[13] These refer to Martin's (1992) reworkings of Halliday's THEME and INFORMATION, which confuse linguistic theory (Theme, New) with writing pedagogy, namely:

• introductory paragraph, rebranded as Macro-Theme, 
• topic sentence, rebranded as Hyper-Theme (misunderstood from Daneš (1974)), 
• paragraph summary, rebranded as Hyper-New, and 
• text summary, rebranded as Macro-New.

Evidence here.

[14] In SFL theory, these are all systems of the lexicogrammatical stratum.

[15] In SFL theory, reference chains represent (non-structural) cohesive relations within the lexicogrammar.

[16] The claim that thematicity is "distributed" in segmental structures is not only inconsistent with SFL theory, but also with Martin (1992), and most notably with Martin & Rose (2007), where such structures are modelled as waves in a chapter titled Periodicity.

[17] This follows Martin (1992: 384) in confusing the content plane (INFORMATION is a lexicogrammatical system) with the expression plane (the tone group is a rank unit of the phonological stratum).

[18] The notion of "interaction" between strata — different levels of symbolic abstraction — repeats Martin's (1992: 488) misunderstanding of the dimensions of the SFL theoretical architecture as modules.  See the explanatory critiques here.

[19] To be clear, in SFL theory, because 'register' refers to a functional variety of language, it is modelled as a point on the cline of instantiation.  Here Rose follows Martin (1992) in misconstruing register as a stratum of context, the culture as semiotic system.  See the critiques here.

[20] To be clear, in SFL theory, the dialogue vs monologue distinction is one of MODE, a system of context (culture), not register (language).

[21] The notion of 'constituting field' derives from Martin (1992: 185, 193) where it applies to activity sequences, which are modelled in that work as context (field), misconstrued as register, but in Martin & Rose (2007: 100-3) as discourse semantic.  To complicate matters further, Rose, like Martin, confuses the ideational semantics (that realises a field) with field (misconstrued as register).

Moreover, in presenting this distinction as a textual distinction at the level of context, it invites confusion with Hasan's (1985/9: 58) feature opposition of ancillary vs constitutive LANGUAGE RÔLE in her model of MODE, the textual system at the level of context (culture), not register (language):

First, there is the question of the LANGUAGE RÔLE — whether it is constitutive or ancillary. These categories should not be seen as sharply distinct but rather as two end-points of a continuum.

What Is The Textual Metafunction?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 30-1):

But the grammar also shows up a third component, another mode of meaning that relates to the construction of text. In a sense this can be regarded as an enabling or facilitating function, since both the others — construing experience and enacting interpersonal relations — depend on being able to build up sequences of discourse, organising the discursive flow, and creating cohesion and continuity as it moves along. This, too, appears as a clearly delineated motif within the grammar. We call it the textual metafunction.

Halliday (2008: 45):

Every clause in every kind of discourse combines an ideational and an interpersonal strand of meaning. But weaving these two together is an extremely complicated task; and in managing all this complexity, language evolved a third metafunctional component, by which it is enabled to organise itself in the form of discourse. Discourse is what linguists perceive as text; so we call this the textual metafunction. This is what enables a language to function meaningfully in all its multifarious contexts.

Halliday (2008: 142):

This blending [of the ideational and the interpersonal into a lexicogrammar] entailed a third component, that we call the textual, whereby the meanings are organised into discourse in such a way that each element in this experiential-interpersonal complex (each clause, since that is the key grammatical unit where most of the blending takes place) makes sense with its surroundings, both its material environment of what is going on around and its semiotic environment of other clauses that have gone before. 

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8):

The textual metafunction is an enabling one; it is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared. But this does not mean processing some pre-existing body of information; rather it is the ongoing creation of a semiotic realm of reality.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 512): 

Textually, the grammar is the creating of information; it engenders discourse, the patterned forms of wording that constitute meaningful semiotic contexts. From one point of view, therefore, this “textual” metafunction has an enabling force, since it is this that allows the other two to operate at all. But at the same time, it brings into being a world of its own, a world that is constituted semiotically. With the textual metafunction language not only construes and enacts our reality but also becomes part of the reality that it is construing and enacting.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 528):

There is a third component in the linguistic construction of meaning; this is what we refer to as the “textual” metafunction. If we were trying to find a term to match the expressions “language as reflection” and “language as action” that we used to gloss the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions, we might come up with “language as information”; but this is itself not very informative. It is a difficult concept because unlike the other two, the textual metafunction has no obviously distinct function at the back of it. All uses of language involve the creation of text. But at the same time this is precisely the context in which the textual metafunction may be understood.

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 528):

… and if we observe children developing their mother tongue we can see how the ideational and interpersonal resources of the system gradually emerge from the earliest semiotic encounters, in a way which may plausibly mimic how the metafunctions originally evolved. The textual metafunction is different because it does not originate in an extrinsic context of this kind. Rather, it is intrinsic to language itself.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 528): 

The “textual” metafunction is the name we give to the systematic resources a language must have for creating discourse: for ensuring that each instance of text makes contact with its environment. The “environment” includes both the context of situation and other instances of text.

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 528):

Relative to the other metafunctions, therefore, the textual metafunction appears in an enabling rôle; without its resources, neither ideational nor interpersonal constructs would make sense.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532):

… in the course of serving this enabling rôle, the textual component opens up a new dimension of meaning potential, in that it construes a further plane of “reality” that is as it were made of language — meaning not as action or reflection but as information.

How To Distinguish Circumstance From Qualifier

Diagnostic: Thematicity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 270-1):

To differentiate them in analysis, we can apply textual probes: in principle, being an element of the clause, a circumstance is subject to all the different textual statuses brought about by theme, theme predication and theme identification. … In contrast, a Qualifier cannot on its own be given textual status in the clause since it is a constituent of a nominal group, not of the clause; so it can only be thematic together with the rest of the nominal group it is part of.

Do Ellipsed Subjects Function As Theme?

No — this would be a contradiction.  Ellipsis marks elements as textually non-prominent, whereas Theme marks elements as textually prominent. Therefore, ellipsed elements do not function as Theme.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 563):

Ellipsis marks the textual status of continuous information within a certain grammatical structure. At the same time, the non-ellipsed elements of that structure are given the status of being contrastive in the environment of continuous information. Ellipsis thus assigns differential prominence to the elements of a structure: if they are non-prominent (continuous), they are ellipsed; if they are prominent (contrastive), they are present. The absence of elements through ellipsis is an iconic realisation of lack of prominence.

Mathematical Equation As Representation, Exchange & Message

1 + 1	=		2
Identified Token	Process: relational		Identifier Value
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement
Mood		Residue
Theme	Rheme

Theme

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 9):

Textually, the clause presents the ideational and interpersonal information as a message — a contribution to the text evolving in its context. It is structured as Theme ^ Rheme; the Theme provides a local environment created for this clause, positioning it in the unfolding text.

How To Use The Other Metafunctions To Identify The Participants In Identifying Processes

Interpersonal: The Token is the Subject if the clause is operative voice.

Textual: The Identifier is the focus of New information (realised by tonic prominence).

Conjunctive Adjuncts

	Type	Meaning	Examples
I elaborating	appositive	‘i.e., e.g.’	that is, in other words, for instance
	corrective	‘rather’	or rather, at least, to be precise
	dismissive	‘in any case’	in any case, anyway, leaving that aside
	summative	‘in short’	briefly, to sum up, in conclusion
	verificative	‘actually’	actually, in fact, as a matter of fact
II extending	additive	‘and’	also, moreover, in addition, besides
	adversative	‘but’	on the other hand, however, conversely
	variative	‘instead’	instead, alternatively
III enhancing	temporal	‘then’	meanwhile, before that, later on, next, soon, finally
	comparative	‘likewise’	likewise, in the same way
	causal	‘so’	therefore, for this reason, as a result, with this in mind
	conditional	‘(if…) then’	in that case, under the circumstances, otherwise
	concessive	‘yet’	nevertheless, despite that
	respective	‘as to that’	in this respect, as far as that’s concerned

(Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 82)

Expansion Type	Sub-Types			Items
elaboration	apposition	expository		in other words, that is (to say), I mean (to say), to put it another way
		exemplifying		for example, for instance, thus, to illustrate
	clarification	corrective		or rather, at least, to be more precise
		distractive		by the way, incidentally
		dismissive		in any case, anyway, leaving that aside
		particularising		in particular, more especially
		resumptive		as I was saying, to resume, to get back to the point
		summative		in short, to sum up, in conclusion, briefly
		verificative		actually, as a matter of fact, in fact
extension	addition	positive		and, also, moreover, in addition
		negative		nor
		adversative		but, yet, on the other hand, however
	variation	replacive		on the contrary, instead
		subtractive		apart from that, except for that
		alternative		alternatively
enhancement	temporal	simple	following	then, next, afterwards [including correlatives first…then]
			simultaneous	just then, at the same time
			preceding	before that, hitherto, previously
			conclusive	in the end, finally
		complex	immediate	at once, thereupon, straightaway
			interrupted	soon, after a while
			repetitive	next time, on another occasion
			specific	next day, an hour later, that morning
			durative	meanwhile, all that time
			terminal	until then, up to that point
			punctiliar	at this moment
		simple internal	following	next, secondly (‘my next point is’) [including correlatives first…next]
			simultaneous	at this point, here, now
			preceding	hitherto, up to now
			conclusive	lastly, last of all, finally
	manner	comparison	positive	likewise, similarly
			negative	in a different way, contrariwise
		means		thus, thereby, by such means
	causal-conditional	general		so, then, therefore, consequently, hence, because of that, for
		specific	result	in consequence, as a result
			reason	on account of this, for that reason
			purpose	for that purpose, with this in view
			conditional: positive	then, in that case, in that event, under the circumstances
			conditional: negative	otherwise, if not
			concessive	yet, still, though, despite this, however, even so, all the same, nevertheless
	matter	positive		here, there, as to that, in that respect
		negative		in other respects, elsewhere

(Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 542-3)