Negotiating social relations: Viewing tenor from multiple perspectives
Whenever we talk or write, we negotiate our social relations. This may involve small seemingly inconsequential chats with friends, families and colleagues that help us stay in contact and possibly get us closer to them; or they may be large, momentous events that bring us together or tear us apart. In all cases, we negotiate these social relations through the discourse we use – through language and a range of related semiotic resources. In SFL, this has typically been explored through tenor, a variable of context (Halliday 1978; or register, Martin 1992, depending on the model being used). Tenor has variously been described in terms of the 'roles played by those taking part’ in a situation, ‘the values that the interactants imbue’ the activity with (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 33) and the relationships between addressees or interactants (Gregory 1967; Hasan 2020). Or, more broadly, the ‘general dimensions of social relations’ (Poynton 1990:70) and their negotiation (Martin 1992: 523). However, to this point, there has been little by way of comprehensive models of tenor that have been able to link the various dimensions underpinning our social relations with the set of language resources that realise them, in particular, resources within the interpersonal metafunction (Hasan 2020 and related work such as Butt et al. 2021 being perhaps the most comprehensive proposal thus far).
As a step toward such a model, this talk will focus on how we can consider tenor in SFL in relation to recent expansions of SFL theory that have distinguished realisation, instantiation and individuation (Halliday 1991, Matthiessen 1993, Martin 2010). It will propose that a fruitful avenue for understanding the link between language and social relations is to view tenor from these multiple perspectives.
From the perspective of realisation, tenor can be viewed as a set of resources for enacting social relations (drawing on a model developed in Doran, Martin and Zappavigna forthcoming).
From the perspective of instantiation, it can be viewed as sets of guiding principles that underly how we co-select and arrange different language features (such as the principles of status and contact, described by, e.g. Poynton 1990, Martin 1992, Hasan 2020 and Butt et al. 2021).
And in terms of individuation, it can be viewed as sets of social roles and relationships – or more broadly, arenas of sociality – that offer possibilities for variation, contestation and collaboration, in terms of the meaning making resources that are taken up or presumed.
In short, given the major role tenor plays in our understanding of how language and broader semiosis enacts social relations, this talk will propose that it is time to give it the theoretical space it needs.
Blogger Comments:
To be clear, the fundamental misunderstanding in this abstract, as in two of Doran's previous seminars on the subject, is the confusion of interpersonal context with interpersonal semantics. This is a consequence of not understanding the meaning of distinct levels of symbolic abstraction. See further below.
[1] To be clear, even in Martin's model, negotiation is a matter of discourse semantics, whereas social relations are a matter of context. Speakers and writers do not negotiate tenor variables. For example, the essay of a primary school student does not negotiate the status roles — equal or unequal power — with the teacher for whom the essay was written. In his work, The Lord Of The Rings, the author Tolkien does not negotiate the contact roles — familiar or unfamiliar — of himself with his readers.
What speakers and writers potentially negotiate are their propositions and proposals — statements, questions, offers and commands — their speech functional moves in exchanges, as realised by the grammar of MOOD. But such negotiation is largely restricted to the semantics that realise dialogic MODE. For example, what propositions or proposals does Lewis Carroll negotiate with his readers in The Hunting Of The Snark?
[2] To be clear, the linking of social relations with the interpersonal language that realise them is not a model of tenor. It is a description of interstratal relations: how tenor variables are realised by semantic options. See [4] below.
[3] This misunderstands realisation. Specifically, it confuses context with the language that realises it. That is, the set of resources for enacting social relations as meaning is interpersonal language, not tenor. Tenor is the interpersonal context that language realises.
[4] This confuses instantiation with interstratal realisation. From the perspective of instantiation, tenor is the interpersonal dimension of the culture > subcultures/situation types > situations. The notion of tenor as "guiding principles" for the selection of language features is modelled in SFL Theory by interstratal preselection. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375):
At the same time, this stratal organisation means that it is crucial to specify the realisational relations between strata — inter-stratal realisation. … More specifically, inter-stratal realisation is specified by means of inter-stratal preselection: contextual features are realised by preselection within the semantic system, semantic features are realised by preselection within the lexicogrammatical system, and lexicogrammatical features are realised by preselection within the phonological/graphological system. This type of preselection may take different forms between different strata! boundaries, but the principle is quite general.
[5] To be clear, individuation is the process of creating different types of individuals. Individuated tenor thus refers to the different types of tenor (from potential to instance) at the level of the individual. Moving up the cline of individuation (of tenor) is moving up to ever more inclusive types of individuations (of tenor). This is distinct from the individuation of language, and the use of language to contest and collaborate.
[6] To be clear, this presents Doran's paper as righting a wrong, which, in terms of logical fallacies, might be interpreted as an appeal to emotion.
