How To Identify The Thing (And Head) Of A Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 394):

… while the Thing … is the entity that is functioning as participant in the transitivity structure of the clause … It is the Head that determines the value of the entity in the mood system, and therefore as a potential Subject.

To demonstrate: 

Here it is clearly the word picture that serves as Thing, since it was the picture that was eaten by the llama, not Dorian Grey.

For Matthiessen (1995: 656-7), on the other hand, it is Dorian Grey that serves as Thing in such nominal groups:

How To Test Whether a Clause Is Behavioural

If a (middle) behavioural clause features two participants, then the second participant must construe a behaviour.

So if the second participant does not construe a behaviour, then the clause cannot be a behavioural clause.

For example, the clause he tracked the data cannot be a behavioural clause because the data is not a behaviour.

Criteria For Distinguishing Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 354):

How To Distinguish Circumstance From Qualifier

Diagnostic: Thematicity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 270-1):

To differentiate them in analysis, we can apply textual probes: in principle, being an element of the clause, a circumstance is subject to all the different textual statuses brought about by theme, theme predication and theme identification. … In contrast, a Qualifier cannot on its own be given textual status in the clause since it is a constituent of a nominal group, not of the clause; so it can only be thematic together with the rest of the nominal group it is part of.

How To Tell If Your Metaphor Is Dead

Dead metaphors can no longer be unpacked; they no longer embody semantic junction.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 261):

Contrast this now with failure in a technical expression such as heart failure; in origin this was no doubt a grammatical metaphor for the heart fails, but the metaphorical quality has since been lost, or at least significantly weakened (the metaphor is "dead"), and heart failure is now the only congruent form. Likewise contrast he regretted his failure to act, agnate to that he had failed to act (or that he had not acted), where failure is a grammatical metaphor, with he always felt that he was a failure, where failure is now the congruent form and this is not a metaphorical agnate of he always felt that he had failed.

​Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 283):​

In our interpretation, the text as it stands, with the grammatical metaphor left in, embodies semantic junction: it is not just a variant form, identical in meaning with its congruent agnate — it also incorporates semantic features from the categories that its own form would congruently construe. Thus engine failure is not synonymous with engines fail; it is both a figure consisting of participant ('engine’) and process ('fail') and an element (participant) consisting of thing ('failure') + classifier ('engine'). In other words, we need both analyses in order to represent it adequately.

This will always be true whenever the metaphor can be unpacked to yield a plausible more congruent form. And this is what distinguishes a grammatical metaphor from a technical term. Almost all technical terms start out as grammatical metaphors; but they are grammatical metaphors which can no longer be unpacked. When a wording becomes technicalised, a new meaning has been construed — almost always, in our present-day construction of knowledge, a new thing (participating entity); and the junction with any more congruent agnates is (more or less quickly) dissolved. If for example we said that engine failure had now become a technical term, what would we mean by this? We would mean that the semantic bond with a figure an/the engine fails had been ruptured (it could no longer be 'unpacked'); and that a new meaning, an abstract participating entity or thing 'engine failure' had come into being which had the full semantic freedom — to participate in figures, to admit of classes and properties, and the like.

How To Analyse Relational Clauses

Q1: Can either participant be made Subject?
A1a: No —> The clause is attributive; the Subject is Carrier
A1b: Yes —> The clause is identifying; go to Q2.

Q2: Is the identifying clause operative or receptive?
A2a: Operative —> The Subject is Token.
A2b: Receptive —> The Subject is Value.

Q3: Is tonic prominence on the Token or the Value?
A3a: Token —> The Token is the Identifier
A3b: Value —> The Value is the Identifier.

Q4: Is the Identifier the Token or the Value?
A4a: Token —> The clause is encoding.
A4b: Value —> The clause is decoding.

Q5: Is the clause encoding or decoding?
A5a: encoding —> the clause is effective: Agent/Token; Medium/Value
A5b: decoding —> the clause is middle: Medium/Token; Range/Value

Behavioural Processes: Grammatical Reactances

(Mostly) from Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135-6).

• Like material clauses (but unlike mental clauses) the unmarked present tense in behavioural clauses is present-in-present (he is watching) rather than the simple present (he watches).

• Behavioural clauses include conscious processing construed as active behaviour (watching listening, pondering, meditating) rather than just passive sensing (seeing, hearing, believing).

• Like the Senser in a mental clause, the ‘Behaver’ in a behavioural one is endowed with consciousness; whereas in other respects behavioural clauses are more like material ones.

• Like material clauses (but unlike mental ones), behavioural clauses can be probed with do: What are you doing? — I’m meditating but not I’m believing.

• Behavioural clauses normally do not project, or project only in highly restricted ways (contrast mental: cognitive David believed —> the moon was a balloon with behavioural: David was meditating —> the moon was a balloon;

• Behavioural clauses can not accept a ‘fact’ serving as Phenomenon (mental: David saw that the others had already left but not behavioural: David watched that the others had already left).

Circumstantial Vs Modal And Conjunctive Adjuncts

Diagnostic: Textual Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 279):

Modal and Conjunctive Adjuncts are outside the transitivity system, hence while typically thematic, they are not topical Theme and therefore cannot be given special thematic prominence; nor will they carry the only focus of information in the clause. … But many items can occur both as circumstance and in one of the other functions.

Material Clauses: Transformative Vs Creative

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 186):

Neither happen to nor do to/with can be used [as probes] with creative clauses …

Mental Clauses Vs Material Clauses

1. Diagnostic: Tense

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 206):

In a ‘mental’ clause, the unmarked present tense is the simple present … But in a ‘material’ clause the unmarked present tense is the present in present … 

2. Diagnostic: ‘Do’

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 207):

Mental processes … are not kinds of doing, and cannot be probed or substituted by do.

Relational Clauses Vs Mental Clauses

1. Diagnostic: Consciousness

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 212): 

… while one participant in a ‘mental’ clause, the Senser, is always endowed with consciousness, this is not the case with ‘relational’ clauses. 

2. Diagnostic: Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 213): 

With a ‘mental’ clause, the phenomenon of consciousness can be construed as an idea brought into existence through the process of consciousness and represented grammatically as a separate clause … but this is not possible with ‘relational’ clauses.

Relational And Mental Clauses Vs Material Clauses

Diagnostic: Acts & Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 213): 

In being able to be construed not only with things as participants, but also with acts and facts, ‘relational’ clauses clearly differ from ‘material’ ones; but they resemble ‘mental’ ones in this respect.

Relational Clauses Vs Material And Mental Clauses

1. Diagnostic: Inherent Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 213): 

In ‘relational’ clauses, there are two parts to the ‘being’: something is said to ‘be’ something else … This means that in a ‘relational’ clause in English, there are always two inherent participants … In contrast, the general classes of ‘material’ and ‘mental’ clauses have only one inherent participant (the Actor and the Senser, respectively). 

2. Diagnostic: Salience

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 214): 

Verbs in general in ‘relational’ clauses are typically non-salient, whereas verbs in ‘material’ and ‘mental’ clauses are salient at the accented syllable …

Attributive Vs Identifying Relational Clauses

1. Diagnostic: Reversibility

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 215): 

The ‘identifying’ ones are reversible … The ‘attributive’ ones are not reversible … 

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 220): 

The [‘attributive’] clauses are not reversible: there are no ‘receptive’ forms … 

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 228): 

These [‘identifying’] clauses are reversible. All verbs except the neutral be and the phased become, remain (and those with following prepositions like as in act as) have passive forms … Clauses with be reverse without change in the form of the verb and without marking the non-Subject participant …

2. Diagnostic: Definiteness

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 219): 

The nominal group functioning as Attribute construes a class of thing and is typically indefinite: it has either an adjective or a common noun as Head and, if appropriate, an indefinite article … It cannot be a proper noun or a pronoun since these do not construe classes. 

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 228): 

The nominal group realising the function of Identifier is typically definite: it has a common noun as Head, with the or other specific determiner as Deictic, or else a proper noun or pronoun. The only form with adjective as head is the superlative ….

Intensive Vs Circumstantial Attributive Clauses

Diagnostic: Constituent Structure

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 240n): 

Ascriptive verbs of marked phase such as turn and look, were treated as ‘intensive’ even when they had a preposition after them: for example, caterpillars turn into butterflies, Penelope looked like an angel. This reflects their constituent structure; cf what they turn into are butterflies (not what they turn is into butterflies), Penelope looked angelic. But there is an overlap at this point, and these could also be interpreted as circumstantial.

Circumstantial Attributive Vs Material Clauses

1. Diagnostic: Unmarked Present Tense

2. Diagnostic: Inherent Participant Mobility

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 242): 

Verbs serving in clauses with a circumstantial process are often derived from a basic use in ‘material’ clauses of motion …

The unmarked present tense is the simple present … rather than the present in present of ‘material’ clauses …

The Carrier is typically some immobile physical feature, whereas the Actor of a ‘material’ clause of motion is typically an animate being or a mobile entity.

Because of the overlap of a large set of verbs, there will of course be cases that are indeterminate …

Circumstantial Attributive Vs Existential Clauses

Diagnostic: Mood Tag

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 241):

However, note that clauses such as on the north wall … hangs a Union Jack … are not ‘attributive’ but ‘existential’. The thematically unmarked form of these clauses is that beginning with existential there: there is (hangs) a Union Jack on the north wall. The prepositional phrase then appears initially as a marked Theme; in that case the existential feature may be left implicit, although the there may still be present and will appear in any case in the mood tag: on the north wall (there) is a Union Jack, isn’t there?. In contrast, in a ‘circumstantial attributive’ clause, the Subject/Carrier is picked up in the mood tag: the sounds and smells of the ocean hang in the air — don’t they? …

Intransitive Creative Material Clauses Vs Existential Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 185):

‘Intransitive’ ‘creative’ clauses have the sense of ‘come into existence’ and shade into clauses of the ‘existential’ process type. One difference is the unmarked present tense: it is present–in–present for material clauses … but the simple present in existential ones. Another difference is the potential for a construction with there as Subject in existential clauses, but not in creative material ones.

'Fact' Clauses Vs 'Idea' Clauses

Diagnostic: Clause Constituency

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 206):

Thus while ‘fact’ clauses serve as the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause and can therefore be made Subject and be theme–predicated, ‘idea’ clauses are not part of the ‘mental’ clause but are rather combined with the ‘mental’ clause in a clause nexus of projection.

'Fact' clauses realise the Range of sensing, whereas

'idea' clauses realise the projection of sensing.

Classifier Vs Epithet: Reflections In The Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 320):

Classifiers do not accept degrees of comparison or intensity … and they tend to be organised in mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets …

For example, in the nominal group a stone wall, the noun stone can only function as Classifier, and not as Epithet, since if it functioned as Epithet, it would make sense to say: a very stone wall and a more stone wall than the previous one.