The Thought Occurs

Showing posts with label Lise Fontaine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lise Fontaine. Show all posts

Tuesday, 21 October 2025

Review of 'Operationalizing Grammatical Metaphor' (Fontaine et al.)

Abstract

Nominal grammatical metaphor (NGM), as theorised within systemic functional linguistics (SFL), typically refers to cases where a process is ‘metaphorically’ encoded through nominal resources, rather than its typical encoding through the clause. Previous approaches to the study of NGM have generally relied on the concepts of agnation and congruence, but these concepts can be quite subjective in nature, leading to an unstable account of the phenomenon. This paper evaluates the theoretical status and methodological implementation of NGMs. Our aim is to consider whether Aktionsart can offer a means of operationalizing NGM. We analyzed 492 nouns from a random selection of 200 sentences in the PopSci register of the CroCo corpus. The nouns were analyzed separately by different coders in terms of (i) grammatical metaphor status and (ii) their ontological status combined with an analysis of Aktionsart. Our statistical analysis shows that adopting an Aktionsart approach provides a more nuanced and anchored methodology for the analysis of NGMs as it not only provides a more consistent and robust analysis, but it also enables us to specify subtypes of nominal grammatical metaphor based on their subtler semantic characteristics.


ChatGPT Comments:

1. Category Slippage: Treating NGM as a nominal phenomenon

The first sentence already discloses a theoretical inversion:

“Nominal grammatical metaphor (NGM) … refers to cases where a process is ‘metaphorically’ encoded through nominal resources…”

Within SFL, grammatical metaphor is not a nominal phenomenon but a systemic one — it is the reconstrual of semantic configurations through non-congruent lexicogrammatical mappings. Nominalisation is merely one way that reconstrual can be realised.

By reifying “nominal grammatical metaphor” as a subtype in itself, the authors collapse the semantic–lexicogrammatical relation into a lexicogrammatical category. What should be a relation between strata is treated as a property within one. Meaning is subordinated to form; the semiotic hierarchy is inverted.


2. Misconstrual of “congruence” and “agnation”

The claim that agnation and congruence are “quite subjective” misses the systemic point entirely.

In SFL, congruence is not a matter of coder agreement but a theoretical construct describing the prototypical alignment between semantics and lexicogrammar. It defines a reference alignment for interpreting non-congruent (metaphorical) realisations.

Similarly, agnation is not a coding criterion but a network relation among options in the system. Labelling these “subjective” betrays a misunderstanding of their function: they are relational descriptors, not empirical variables.

When these constructs are reinterpreted as annotation categories, the systemic relation they describe dissolves into an operational convenience.


3. Importing “Aktionsart”: a category error

Replacing congruence and agnation with Aktionsart commits a deep category error. Aktionsart belongs to lexical-aspect theory — a classificatory system grounded in predicate logic, not in systemic semantics.

To propose that Aktionsart can “operationalise” grammatical metaphor is to substitute a lexical property of verbs for a semantic-grammatical relation between strata. This not only confuses the descriptive level but also detheorises the concept, reducing motivated re-mappings of meaning to aspectual typology.

Halliday’s metaphor operates across strata; Aktionsart operates within a single stratum. Their substitution is thus ontologically incoherent.


4. The corpus fallacy: turning theory into annotation

The analysis of “492 nouns” for “grammatical metaphor status” exemplifies what might be called the corpus fallacy — the assumption that systemic categories can be treated as surface features of tokens.

SFL operates through realisation hierarchies: meaning → wording → sounding. Identifying metaphor requires interpreting the relation between semantic and grammatical construals. A count of “nominal metaphors” at corpus level therefore misses the phenomenon entirely: it measures form, not reconstrual.

To treat grammatical metaphor as a property of a noun is to erase the systemic distinction it was designed to reveal.


5. “Ontological status”: misplaced import

The reference to “ontological status” compounds the confusion. SFL’s ontology is semiotic, not metaphysical: entities have no status outside the construal of experience. To combine “ontological status” with “Aktionsart” fuses two incompatible descriptive traditions — one metaphysical, the other aspectual — neither of which belongs to SFL’s meaning architecture.

This attempt to “anchor” the analysis in extralinguistic categories undermines the fundamental Hallidayan principle that meaning is construed, not discovered.


6. The rhetoric of stability: empiricism disguised as theory

Phrases like “a more consistent and robust analysis” or “a more anchored methodology” betray an empiricist reorientation. Where Halliday’s theory sought to explain the motivated variability of meaning, this study seeks to stabilise it.

The appeal to “robustness” masks a shift from explanatory system to measurement protocol. Theorisation is displaced by operationalisation. The systemic logic of meaning gives way to the statistical logic of reliability.


7. From meaning to metadata

The cumulative effect is the flattening of the stratal architecture. Meaning no longer motivates form; form becomes the empirical ground from which meaning must be induced.

Once grammatical metaphor is redefined as a measurable feature of nouns, the theory of meaning as choice collapses into a model of data as fact. The language-as-system becomes language-as-dataset.

This is not merely a methodological issue — it is a collapse of ontology. The semiotic system that construes reality is replaced by the empirical reality of linguistic surfaces.


In summary

SFL ConstructMisinterpreted asConsequence
Grammatical metaphorNominal phenomenonReduces system to lexicogrammar
Congruence & agnationSubjective coder categoriesRemoves theoretical grounding
Stratal relationLexical/aspectual propertyFlattens ontology
Semiotic ontologyMetaphysical ontologyMisaligns description
Systemic explanationStatistical robustnessReplaces theory with method

8. The deeper irony: method as metaphor

The paper performs its own metaphor — not the grammatical kind, but a methodological one. It re-presents theoretical constructs as empirical ones, just as grammatical metaphor re-presents experience through abstraction. But here the re-presentation is self-erasing: the notion of metaphor as a relation across strata is replaced by its coded residue within one.

In short, the study metaphorises SFL away.


Epilogue: When Method Eats Theory

This study exemplifies the empirical recoding of systemic theory. In the drive to operationalise SFL for corpus work, theoretical categories are repurposed as annotation labels. Constructs designed to model relations between strata become features within a dataset.

This reflects a deeper epistemic inversion:

  • From language as a semiotic system construing experience,

  • to language as a dataset representing ontology.

Once that inversion occurs, theory no longer explains meaning — it measures it. “Grammatical metaphor” becomes a field in a spreadsheet.

The appeal to empirical stability reproduces the positivism Halliday sought to escape. SFL was never meant to stabilise meaning, but to show how meaning is variable yet motivated.

When method eats theory, what remains is not systemic functional linguistics but systemic functional empiricism — an approach that retains SFL’s vocabulary while hollowing out its ontology.

A return to systemic foundations begins by reinstating the order of realisation:

  • Semantics construes experience.

  • Lexicogrammar realises semantics.

  • Metaphor is a relation between strata, not a property within one.

Until that order is restored, analyses of “nominal grammatical metaphor” will continue to enact the very metaphor they misrecognise — the re-presentation of theory as data.

Tuesday, 21 March 2023

A Close Examination Of Fontaine's 2023 ISFC Plenary Abstract

Grammatical Energy: the Powerhouse of Language

“Meaning is brought about by language; and the energy by which this is achieved, the source of its semogenic power, is grammar.”
(Halliday, 2005, p. 63)

Within the framework of systemic functional linguistics (SFL), language is modelled as a semiotic system.  At the heart of this language system is the lexicogrammar, which, for Halliday (2005 p 74), is the powerhouse of language. Despite its central role, however, there is generally a feeling that this core area is relatively understudied, at least for English, which has historically provided the foundation of the theory. While the expansive development and use of SFL for transdisciplinary purposes (Wegener et al, in preparation) is very welcome and indeed promising, the source of grammatical energy, the powerhouse itself, should also be the focus of our attention — not instead of, but in addition to, the wealth of work being done on the understanding of its effects on people and society at large. Accepting that language is a semiotic system implies that we should also accept that while it is "made of meaning", it has "to materialise — to become matter" (Halliday 2005 p 68). It follows that if the semiotic system is entirely semantic, the materialised form (matter) of language must be related to, but outside of (or at some boundary of) the semiotic system. We might agree that the materialised form is embedded in context, but the language system as a whole, i.e. its theoretical (abstract) representation, cannot be. For this reason, the distinction between instantiation and actualisation becomes significant, where "actualisation is defined as the relation between the actual and either the potential or the typical" (Wegener 2011 p 98). 

In this talk, I use the semantic profile of watch, as an atypical verb of visual perception, to demonstrate ways in which, at the lexical level, we can explore the relationship between instantiation and actualisationI will also consider its semantic features in relation to several related verbs (see, stare, look and listen). The unique profile of watch makes it a challenging case study because it appears to defy categorisation and as such, provides a useful example to demonstrate the significance of the SFL concept of 'meaning potential' in a meaning driven account of lexical semantics (cf. Allwood 2003, Fontaine 2017). By shift [sic] our focus to the lexical side of the lexicogrammar stratum, we may shed more light on the theoretical powerhouse, ideally resulting in a better understanding of its grammatical energy.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this unsourced 'feeling' is self-contradictory. Since the lexicogrammar 'has historically provided the foundation of the theory' — Halliday's term for the theory is Systemic Functional Grammar — this 'core area' is demonstrably not 'relatively understudied', especially with regard to English, since the theory of grammar is elaborated in most detail in the description of English (Introduction to Functional Grammar 1985, 1994, 2004, 2014).

[2] To be clear, the work that Fontaine positively appraises as 'very welcome and indeed promising' is her own collaboration:
Wegener, R., McCabe, A., Sellami Baklouti, A. & Fontaine, L. (In preparation) The Routledge Handbook of Transdisciplinary Systemic Functional Linguistics. London: Routledge.
[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the grammar is the CPU ('powerhouse') of language, and the CPU of the grammar is the clause. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 22, 10):
Grammar is the central processing unit of language, the powerhouse where meanings are created … The clause is the central processing unit in the lexicogrammar — in the specific sense that it is in the clause that meanings of different kinds are mapped into an integrated grammatical structure.
It will be seen that, despite the title of her paper, Fontaine is concerned here not with this 'powerhouse', but with lexis.

[4] To be clear, no semiotic system is entirely semantic, since every semiotic system also necessarily includes an expression plane, and in the case of language, the content plane includes a stratum of lexicogrammar as well as a stratum of semantics. ('Semiotic' does not mean 'semantic'.)

[5] To be clear, the 'materialised form' of language is the audible sound or visible marks made by bodily action. These are specified by the systems of the expression plane of language.

[6] To be clear, the materialised forms of language, audible sounds and visible marks, form part of the first-order material experience, whereas context is a plane of second-order semiotic experience. In SFL Theory, 'context' refers to the culture as a semiotic system. Clearly, here Fontaine is misconstruing 'context' as material.

[7] As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 25) explain:
A language is a series of redundancies by which we link our eco-social environment to non-random disturbances in the air (soundwaves).
That is, language links two aspects of its material environment, and in that sense, can be said to be "embedded" in the material order (Fontaine's understanding of 'context'). On the other hand, in SFL terms, language construes and realises context: the culture as a semiotic system.

[8] This confuses a first-order semiotic, language ('the language system as a whole'), with a second-order semiotic, metalanguage ('its theoretical (abstract) representation').

[9] To be clear, the claim here is that because the language system as a whole cannot be embedded in the material environment ("context"), the distinction between instantiation and actualisation (Wegener 2011) becomes significant.

Wegener proposes actualisation as an interstratal relation (p98) between actual and either potential or typical (p95):

However, this distinction is motivated by a misunderstanding of instantiation (p95):
Instantiation as a relation is not contextualised. It is, as Halliday (1992) suggests, entirely intrastratal. Because it is intrastratal it does not reach the actual. The actual is interstratal and thus is contextualised.
To be clear, in SFL Theory, the 'contextualisation' of instantiation is the dimension of stratification. As such, the notion of 'actualisation' is a confusion of the dimensions of instantiation and stratification, proposed as an additional complementary dimension.

[10] To be clear, the verb watch is grammatically anomalous, as noted 29 years ago in Halliday (1994: 139):
The verb watch is anomalous: in I’m watching you, the tense suggests a behavioural process but the you appears as a participant like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause.

[11] To be clear, the concern 'at the lexical level' is with the meaning of lexical items in open sets, not with meanings of grammatical systems, such as the clause. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604n):

We can talk of "lexical semantics" if we want to foreground the meanings of words (lexical items functioning in open sets), and of "grammatical semantics" if we want to foreground the meanings of closed grammatical systems;
[12] To be clear, in terms of 'grammatical semantics', the verb see typically serves as a mental process, whereas the verbs stare, look and listen typically serve as behavioural processes.

[13] To be clear, the verb watch is not unique in this respect. Other examples include observe, ogle, eye, view, contemplate and ponder. In each case, the tense suggests behavioural process, but each affords a Phenomenon, suggesting a mental process.

[14] Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 549-52) outline five types of ideational indeterminacy: ambiguities, blends, overlaps, neutralisations, and complementarities. Anomalies like clauses featuring the verb watch are cases of overlap: 'two categories overlap so that certain members display some features of each'.

[15] To be clear, the term 'meaning potential' in SFL Theory refers to language as system, as opposed to language as instance (text). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 33):
The meaning potential itself is one pole on the dimension of instantiation: it is instantiated in the unfolding of text, with patterns of typical instantiation (specific domains of meaning) lying somewhere in between the potential and the instance.

See also 

Monday, 3 February 2020

Lise Fontaine's Right To Stop Me Saying It

Sun, 2 Feb 2020 20:31:11
You have been removed from the SYSFLING list (Systemic Functional Linguistics).
The change was carried out by a list administrator (Lise Fontaine).

To be clear, Lise Fontaine unsubscribed me from the Sysfling list when she was alerted to the existence of my blog The Cardiff Grammar by Robin Fawcett posing as Dmytro Poremskyi (to praise his own work) on the Facebook site of the NASFLA. The blog provides evidence that the architecture of language proposed by the Cardiff Grammar is invalidated by internal inconsistencies and that Fawcett repeatedly misrepresents Halliday in ways that always suit his own argument. Fontaine is a proponent of the Cardiff Grammar.

If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.
— George Orwell

Friday, 28 April 2017

Lexis, Delicacy And Instantiation

In Systemic Functional Grammatics, delicacy is the scale from the most general (grammatical) features to the most specific (lexical).

The notion of lexis as most delicate grammar is exemplified by Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198-9) as follows: 
… we can differentiate both processes and participants into finer and finer subcategories, until we reach a degree of differentiation that is associated with the choice of words (lexical items). Note that it is not (usually) the lexical items themselves that figure as terms of the systems in the network. Rather, the systems are systems of features, and the lexical items come in as the synthetic realisation of particular feature combinations. Thus lexis (vocabulary) is part of a unified lexicogrammar; there is no need to postulate a separate “lexicon” as a pre-existing entity on which the grammar is made to operate.

The process of instantiation is the selection of features and the activation of their realisation statements in a system network, from the most general (grammatical) systems to the most delicate (lexical) systems.

The cline of instantiation is the scale from the system, as potential, to the instance — to the features and activated realisation statements of an actual text.

The instantiation of lexis, therefore, is the instantiation of the most delicate systems of the lexicogrammar.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 327): 
Instantiation is the relation between the system and the instance. When we shift attention along this scale, we are moving between the potential that is embodied in any stratum and the deployment of that potential in instances of the same stratum … this move can be made at any degree of delicacy.
The notion of lexis as most local context (Fontaine ISFC 2017 Keynote) is, of course, nonsense.