How To Identify The Thing (And Head) Of A Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 394):

… while the Thing … is the entity that is functioning as participant in the transitivity structure of the clause … It is the Head that determines the value of the entity in the mood system, and therefore as a potential Subject.

To demonstrate: 

Here it is clearly the word picture that serves as Thing, since it was the picture that was eaten by the llama, not Dorian Grey.

For Matthiessen (1995: 656-7), on the other hand, it is Dorian Grey that serves as Thing in such nominal groups:

How To Test Whether a Clause Is Behavioural

If a (middle) behavioural clause features two participants, then the second participant must construe a behaviour.

So if the second participant does not construe a behaviour, then the clause cannot be a behavioural clause.

For example, the clause he tracked the data cannot be a behavioural clause because the data is not a behaviour.

Theoretical Problems With Doran's 'Factoring Out Structure: Nuclearity, Linearity And Iteration'

Factoring out structure: Nuclearity, linearity and iteration

Yaegan Doran:

Like much of its framework, SFL offers a very elaborate model of structure. Its metafunctional distribution of periodic, prosodic and particulate structures is well known, with numerous distinctions within each type (Halliday 1979). Focusing on particulate structures, Halliday distinguishes between multivariate and univariate structures, and within univariate structures, between hypotactic and paratactic structures (Halliday 1965, Halliday and Matthiessen 2014), while Martin (1996) conceptualises particulate structures as involving orbital and serial relations (Martin 1996). Similarly, relations in discourse are alternatively conceptualised from the perspective of grammar as non-structural (Halliday and Hasan 1976) or from discourse semantics as involving co-variate structures (Martin 1992, adapted from Lemke 1985).  

Many of these types of structure are sharply distinct, while others have significant overlap. Together, they account for a wide range of linguistic phenomena and do a good job at describing the patternings that occur across regions of language. However as SFL has expanded its descriptive framework into a wider range of languages, it has been clear that there are grammatical constructions that are not quite accounted for. Building upon this work, this talk offers a generalised model of particulate structure, developed with Jim Martin, that aims to cover a wider range of grammatical patterns. 

This model does not start with types of structure, but rather with three sets of factors that can be combined relatively freely: whether the structures involves a nucleus and subordinate satellites (nuclearity), whether there is linear interdependency between the elements in the structure (linearity), and whether the relations can occur more than once (iteration). These factors generate a wider set of structures than so far acknowledged explicitly in SFL. Together, they offer a means of seeing both the differences between types of structure already acknowledged, as well as variation within them. They also generate structures that account for phenomena not yet considered structurally in SFL to date. 

The goal of this talk is build more explicitness in SFL’s model of structure as it continues its descriptive expansion and in doing so, help clarify issues that have often been left aside in SFL grammatical description. Where possible, the model will be exemplified through English but I will bring in other languages as need be.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday soon after revised his model of grammatical structure types in favour of the current typology. Halliday (1994: 36) :

[2] To be clear, as demonstrated here and here, Martin's orbital vs serial distinction purports to model the structural distinction for the experiential vs logical metafunctions, but actually models the distinction between hypotaxis (nucleus vs satellite status) and parataxis (nuclei of the same status).

[3] To be clear, these are cohesive relations at the level of lexicogrammar, and Halliday & Matthiessen (2014) provides an updated interpretation.

[4] To be clear, by 1992, Lemke had already recanted his view that 'covariate' was a type of structure. Lemke (1988: 159):

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

[5] To be clear, this remains a bare assertion until it is supported by evidence. The previous attempt to provide such evidence, Martin's seminar of 13/8/21, was demonstrated to be based on theoretical misunderstandings (see here).

[6] To be clear, Doran's work builds on Martin's misunderstanding of structure; see [2].

[7] To be clear, here Doran is modelling metalanguage (SFL Theory), not language, by essentially devising a metalinguistic system of features ("factors") that generates types of structure, as if metalanguage were language.

[8] To be clear, each of these factors is theoretically problematic.

Firstly, nuclearity corresponds to Martin's orbital structure, which purports to be a model of experiential structure, but is actually a model of logical hypotaxis (independent nucleus vs dependent satellites). That is, nuclearity misconstrues a multivariate structure as a univariate structure.

Secondly, linear interdependency is just interdependency. The word 'linear' is redundant, since all structures are linear. (For Halliday (1965), univariate structures are lineally recursive.) Linear interdependency corresponds to Martin's serial structure, which purports to be a model of the univariate structure of the logical metafunction, but is actually just a model of one of its dimensions: parataxis (multiple nuclei of the same status).

Thirdly, in SFL Theory, iteration describes the type of structure favoured by the logical metafunction (Halliday (1994: 36). The purpose of introducing Halliday's term here is to provide the possibility of 'iterative nuclearity' and 'non-iterative linear interdependency'; see [9].

To summarise, Doran's three factors actually concern:

• hypotactic interdependency
• paratactic interdependency
• interdependency in general.

[9] To be clear, this "wider set of structures" includes iterative multivariate structures and non-iterative univariate structures (subjacency duplexes), neither of which withstands close scrutiny, as demonstrated here.

[10] To be clear, these phenomena include structure markers misconstrued as units in unit complexes, as in Martin's notion of a subjacency duplex.

Postscript:

The theoretical misunderstandings in this seminar turned out to be so complicated, that the paper is now being examined, slide by slide, here.

Criteria For Distinguishing Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 354):

The Spectrum Of Circumstances According To The Different Types Of Expansion And Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 174):

Doing & Being As Complementary Perspectives On Change

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 161):

Expansion Relations Between Ergative Functions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 158):

The Orientations Of The Different Types Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144):

The Overall Semantic Space Of Figures With Principal Areas Of Indeterminacy And Complementarity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137):

Process Types In Clause Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 136):

Types Of Figure As Domains Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

The Possibilities Of Projecting Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 116):

Consciousness In Projection And The Two Levels Of Metaphenomena

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 108):

Ideational Semantic System

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 67):

Today's 'Typology Forum' Paper By David Rose

The textual metafunction: making matter mean

David Rose

University of Sydney

The textual metafunction is sometimes presented as if it were an afterthought, there merely to organise interpersonal and ideational meanings into convenient structures of clause and text. But in the first stages of language, and in much of everyday discourse, it is the primary means of turning the world into meaning, with exophoric reference to the shared sensations of me and you, this and that, here and there. Once the world gets classified, and configured into clauses, and strung out into texts, the same resources used to indicate the world around us are re-deployed to indicate the semiotic world within a text. Where once there were only signs, now meanings come in messages, each of which must be sensible in the unfolding world of the text, and manage listeners’ attention to the information they present. 

Textual typological studies might start from observing these three general functions: introducing and tracking meanings through a text, or phoricity, contextualising messages, or thematicity, and managing information prominence, or newsworthiness. Resources for realising these functions are prototypically distributed between language strata: phoricity in the reference chains of discourse, thematicity in segmental structures of clauses, and newsworthiness in periodic structures of tone groups. But while they are in principle independently variable, both the functions and their realisations interact with each other, and variations in textual functions proliferate as a result. Perhaps also as a consequence of these interactions, their realisations come to vary across languages and registers. 

This paper will make some general observations about interactions between phoricity and thematicity and between thematicity and newsworthiness, and will exemplify variations in these interactions between languages. In the process, it will also illustrate textual variations in register, from dialogue to monologue, and from accompanying to constituting fields.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Rose's negative appraisal — implied by 'afterthought' and 'merely' (counter-expectancy: limiting) — of an unsourced characterisation of the textual metafunction is unjustified. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398):

The textual metafunction is second-order in the sense that it is concerned with semiotic reality: that is, reality in the form of meaning. This dimension of reality is itself constructed by other two metafunctions: the ideational which construes a natural reality, and the interpersonal, which enacts an intersubjective reality. The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them.

[2] Here Rose confuses the ideational and textual metafunctions.  It is the ideational metafunction that construes experience as meaning ("turns the world into meaning").

[3] As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 530) point out, the textual metafunction only operationalises the resources already created by the other metafunctions:

Reference is a way of referring to things that are already semiotically accessible: either actually, in the text, or potentially, in the context of situation.

[4] To be clear, "classifying the world" is construing experience as ideational meaning.

[5] To be clear, it is experiential options that are "configured into clauses", and "configured" takes a structural (syntagmatic) rather than systemic (paradigmatic) perspective on the clause.

[6] To be clear, it is meaning that is "strung out into texts", through the process of instantiation during logogenesis.

[7] To be clear, these resources are ideational potential, construed of experience, and on the SFL model, they do not "indicate" the world, since there are no meanings outside semiotic systems that can be "indicated".

[8] To be clear, in theoretical terms, this "redeployment" is the process of instantiation during logogenesis.

[9] To be clear, in theoretical terms, "indicate" here refers to the logical projection of second-order meaning.

[10] To be clear, in SFL terms, this is the semogenic distinction between protolanguage ("signs") and language ("messages"), though there is no reason to think that this is Rose's meaning.

[11] Here Rose switches to promoting Martin's work on textual systems, as if the preceding paragraph leads naturally to them, and as if they address the (confused) issues he has raised.

[12] This misrepresents the model in Martin (1992).  The meanings that are introduced and tracked are participants, and the system for doing so is termed IDENTIFICATION, not phoricity.  Martin's model is Halliday & Hasan's (1976) model of cohesive reference, misunderstood, rebranded and relocated from lexicogrammar to discourse semantics (evidence here).  Essentially, Martin confuses

• textual reference with reference in the sense of ideational denotation, like his source Du Bois (1980),
• interpersonal deixis of nominal group structure with non-structural textual reference, and, as a result,
• nominal groups realising participants with reference items,

which is why the experiential feature 'participant' is presented (Martin 1992: 325) as the unit and entry condition of this textual discourse semantic system.

[13] These refer to Martin's (1992) reworkings of Halliday's THEME and INFORMATION, which confuse linguistic theory (Theme, New) with writing pedagogy, namely:

• introductory paragraph, rebranded as Macro-Theme, 
• topic sentence, rebranded as Hyper-Theme (misunderstood from Daneš (1974)), 
• paragraph summary, rebranded as Hyper-New, and 
• text summary, rebranded as Macro-New.

Evidence here.

[14] In SFL theory, these are all systems of the lexicogrammatical stratum.

[15] In SFL theory, reference chains represent (non-structural) cohesive relations within the lexicogrammar.

[16] The claim that thematicity is "distributed" in segmental structures is not only inconsistent with SFL theory, but also with Martin (1992), and most notably with Martin & Rose (2007), where such structures are modelled as waves in a chapter titled Periodicity.

[17] This follows Martin (1992: 384) in confusing the content plane (INFORMATION is a lexicogrammatical system) with the expression plane (the tone group is a rank unit of the phonological stratum).

[18] The notion of "interaction" between strata — different levels of symbolic abstraction — repeats Martin's (1992: 488) misunderstanding of the dimensions of the SFL theoretical architecture as modules.  See the explanatory critiques here.

[19] To be clear, in SFL theory, because 'register' refers to a functional variety of language, it is modelled as a point on the cline of instantiation.  Here Rose follows Martin (1992) in misconstruing register as a stratum of context, the culture as semiotic system.  See the critiques here.

[20] To be clear, in SFL theory, the dialogue vs monologue distinction is one of MODE, a system of context (culture), not register (language).

[21] The notion of 'constituting field' derives from Martin (1992: 185, 193) where it applies to activity sequences, which are modelled in that work as context (field), misconstrued as register, but in Martin & Rose (2007: 100-3) as discourse semantic.  To complicate matters further, Rose, like Martin, confuses the ideational semantics (that realises a field) with field (misconstrued as register).

Moreover, in presenting this distinction as a textual distinction at the level of context, it invites confusion with Hasan's (1985/9: 58) feature opposition of ancillary vs constitutive LANGUAGE RÔLE in her model of MODE, the textual system at the level of context (culture), not register (language):

First, there is the question of the LANGUAGE RÔLE — whether it is constitutive or ancillary. These categories should not be seen as sharply distinct but rather as two end-points of a continuum.

Projecting Verbal Group Complex Or Projecting Clause Complex?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 586):

Fig. 8-14 Projecting verbal group/clause nexuses: 

(a) Mary wanted to go (i) as verbal group complex [preferred], (ii) as clause complex; 

(b) Mary wanted John to go (i) as verbal group complex, (ii) [preferred] as clause nexus

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 588):

A verbal group nexus is intermediate between a clause nexus and a verbal group: a verbal group construes a single event, and a clause nexus construes two distinct processes; but a verbal group nexus construes a single process consisting of two events. These different options are available to speakers and writers when they construe their experience of the flow of events. They choose whether they construe a given experience as a process consisting of a single event, as a process consisting of a chain of two (or more) events, or as a chain of two (or more) processes.

Experiential Semantics: Types Of Participant, Types Of Thing

(Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 182, 190)

Knowledge

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 3):

We contend that the conception of ‘knowledge’ as something that exists independently of language, and may then be coded or made manifest in language, is illusory. All knowledge is constituted in semiotic systems, with language as the most central; and all such representations of knowledge are constructed from language in the first place.

The Transitivity Of Bamboozlement

John Bateman wrote to sysfling on 2 November 2017 at 19:10:

One of the main points of these papers (derived from our 12 year collaborative research center on space ...) is to open up the 'space' (ha ha) between a grammatically-induced semantics and any contextualised use of involved grammatical constructions so that the enormous flexibility of ranges of interpretation is both made visible and constrained sufficiently so that it can be worked with productively.

This is a hypotactically elaborating clause complex, with the dependent clause enclosed within the main clause:

One of the main points of these papers	<< derived from our 12 year collaborative research center on space >>	is to open up the 'space' between a grammatically-induced semantics and any contextualised use of involved grammatical constructions so that the enormous flexibility of ranges of interpretation is both made visible and constrained sufficiently so that it can be worked with productively
	= β
α

Ranking α Clause

The ranking α clause has a lexical density of about 23, depending how it it measured.  It metaphorically construes an identity of purpose, wherein the Value (one of the main points of these papers) is encoded by reference to the Token (to open up the 'space' between a grammatically-induced semantics and any contextualised use of involved grammatical constructions so that the enormous flexibility of ranges of interpretation is both made visible and constrained sufficiently so that it can be worked with productively):

One of the main points of these papers	is	to open up the 'space' between a grammatically-induced semantics and any contextualised use of involved grammatical constructions so that the enormous flexibility of ranges of interpretation is both made visible and constrained sufficiently so that it can be worked with productively
Identified Value	Process	Identifier Token

The clause is marked for both voice (receptive) and direction of coding (encoding).

Identifier Token

The Identifier Token in this relation is realised as an embedded clause complex in which the main clause is hypotactically enhanced, first in terms of result — and this includes a nested paratactic extending nexus — and then in terms of purpose:

to open up the 'space' between a grammatically-induced semantics and any contextualised use of involved grammatical constructions	so that the enormous flexibility of ranges of interpretation is both made visible	and constrained sufficiently	so that it can be worked with productively
α	x β cause: result		x γ cause: purpose
	1	+ 2

Embedded α Clause

The α clause in the embedded complex serving as Identifier Token is a non-finite abstract material clause:

to open up	the 'space' between a grammatically-induced semantics and any contextualised use of involved grammatical constructions
Process	Goal

The Goal of this clause is realised by a nominal group in which the Thing is both metaphorical (circumstantial) and abstract:

the	'space'	between a grammatically-induced semantics and any contextualised use of involved grammatical constructions
Deictic	Thing	Qualifier

The Qualifier of this nominal group is realised by a prepositional phrase whose Range is realised by a paratactically extending nominal group complex:

between	a grammatically-induced semantics	and any contextualised use of involved grammatical constructions
Process	Range
	1	+ 2

The first nominal group construes a semantic theory as Thing and sub-classifies it as grammatically-induced:

a	grammatically-induced	semantics
Deictic	Classifier	Thing

The second nominal group metaphorically construes a process ('use') as Thing, which it sub-classifies as contextualised, and metaphorically construes the congruent medium of the process involved grammatical constructions as Qualifier:

any	contextualised	use	of involved grammatical constructions
Deictic	Classifier	Thing	Qualifier

The Qualifier of this nominal group is realised by a prepositional phrase:

of	involved grammatical constructions
Process	Range

The Range of this prepositional phrase is realised by a nominal group that sub-classifies constructions as grammatical, and identifies them as involved:

involved	grammatical	constructions
post-Deictic	Classifier	Thing

Embedded β1 Clause

The β1 clause in the embedded complex serving as Identifier Token is an attributive clause that assigns the enormous flexibility of ranges of interpretation to the set visible:

so that	the enormous flexibility of ranges of interpretation	is	both	made	visible
	Carrier	Process			Attribute

The Carrier is realised by a nominal group that metaphorically construes a quality as Thing:

the	enormous	flexibility	of ranges of interpretation
Deictic	Epithet	Thing	Qualifier

The Qualifier is realised by a prepositional phrase:

of	ranges of interpretation
Process	Range

The Range of this prepositional phrase is realised by a nominal group:

ranges	of interpretation
Thing	Qualifier

Embedded β2 Clause

The β2 clause in the embedded complex serving as Identifier Token has an ellipsed Mood element:

the enormous flexibility of ranges of interpretation	is constrained		sufficiently
Carrier	Process	Attribute	Manner: degree

Embedded γ Clause

The γ clause in the embedded complex serving as Identifier Token is a receptive material clause:

so that	it	can be worked with	productively
	Goal	Process	Manner: quality

Ranking β Clause

The ranking elaborating clause can be analysed as 

derived from	our 12 year collaborative research center on space
Process: circumstantial	Attribute

The Attribute is realised by the nominal group:

our	12 year	collaborative	research center	on space
Deictic	post-Deictic	Classifier	Thing	Qualifier

The Thing of the nominal group is realised by a word complex:

research	center
β	α

Conclusion

This is the wording of someone who expects not to be understood, the social function of which has been described by Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 272):

So the more the extent of grammatical metaphor in a text, the more that text is loaded against the learner, and against anyone who is an outsider to the register in question. It becomes elitist discourse, in which the function of constructing knowledge goes together with the function of restricting access to that knowledge, making it impenetrable to all except those who have the means of admission to the inside, or the select group of those who are already there. 

It is this other potential that grammatical metaphor has, for making meaning that is obscure, arcane and exclusive, that makes it ideal as a mode of discourse for establishing and maintaining status, prestige and hierarchy, and to establish the paternalistic authority of a technocratic elite whose message is 'this is all too hard for you to understand; so leave the decision-making to us.

See also John Bateman Positively Judging Himself and John Bateman On "The 'Space' Between A Grammatically-Induced Semantics And Any Contextualised Use Of Involved Grammatical Constructions".

We don't understand.

He must be clever.

He must be right.

— Peter Hammill 'The Jargon King'