The Thought Occurs

Showing posts with label Analysis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Analysis. Show all posts

Thursday, 29 June 2017

Grammatical Analysis Is A Compromise Of Three Stratal Perspectives

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 504):
A stratified semiotic defines three perspectives, which (following the most familiar metaphor) we refer to as ‘from above’, ‘from roundabout’, and ‘from below’: looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content, looking at it from below means treating it as the content of some expression, while looking at it from roundabout means treating it in the context of (i.e. in relation to other features of) its own stratum.
Halliday (2008: 141):
When we are observing and investigating language, or any other semiotic system, our vision is essentially trinocular. We observe the phenomenon we want to explore — say, the lexicogrammar of language — from three points of vantage. We observe it from above, in terms of its function in various contexts. We observe it from below, in terms of its various modes of expression. And thirdly, we observe it from its own level: from within, or from round about, according to whether we are focussing on the whole or some of its parts.
Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 31):
We cannot expect to understand the grammar just by looking at it from its own level; we also look into it ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, taking a trinocular perspective. But since the view from these different angles is often conflicting, the description will inevitably be a form of compromise.
Halliday (2008: 6):
The boundaries of any grammatical category are likely to be fuzzy […] — such indeterminacy is a general property of the grammar. The grammarian attempts to define each category as accurately as possible, looking at it from three different angles: its systemic environment (contrast with other term or terms in the system, and the relationship of that system to other systems); its meaning (proportionality in semantic terms), and its form. In other words, the grammarian adopts a “trinocular” perspective on the stratal hierarchy so that every category is viewed “from round about”, “from above” and “from below”. And since the views from these different angles often conflict, assigning instances to a particular category involves some degree of compromise, where criteria will depend on the purposes of the description.

Friday, 24 February 2017

Mathematical Equation As Representation, Exchange & Message


1 + 1
=
2
Identified Token
Process: relational
Identifier Value
Subject
Finite
Predicator
Complement
Mood
Residue
Theme
Rheme

Friday, 7 August 2015

Why Relational Constructions With An Indefinite ‘Value’ Cannot Be Viewed As Attributive

Relational constructions with an indefinite ‘Value’: Non-exhaustive instance-type specification

Kristin Davidse (University of Leuven):
The grammar and semantics of relational constructions are a key interest in SFL. Yet, a number of these constructions, particularly ones that contain participants realized by indefinite nominal groups have, in my view, not yet received a wholly satisfactory characterization – not in their own right and not in terms of their agnation relations to other relational constructions. In this talk I’ll address some of these issues, focusing on clausal and ‘cleft’ constructions in English with be and indefinite nominal groups.
A first set of issues is situated at the borderline between identification and attribution. Clauses with an indefinite Value such as (1a)-(1b) are viewed as identifying in Halliday (1967, 1994: 129) because they share reversibility as a crucial recognition criterion with identifying (2a) – (2b). The question I want to raise is whether they can be viewed as attributive. Semantically, they express a categorizing relation: a more specific thing is said to be an instance of a more general type. Unlike with identifying clauses, no exhaustiveness is implied. Moreover, as is typical of attributive (but not identifying) clauses, the conformity of the instance to the type can be graded in certain contexts, as in (3). If they are viewed as attributive, i.e. as ‘categorizing’ rather than ‘equative’, the further question is whether an opposition akin to decoding – encoding for identifying clauses should be posited for attributive clauses.
(1a) … The Gulf War is a good example.
(1b) … Also, a good example is the Gulf War
(2a) … Tom is the loser.
(2b) … The losers are you and me.
(3) … but Pandora's Tower is very much an example of the difficulty I'd like to see in Zelda game.


Blogger Comments:

[1] It is not true that clauses with an indefinite Value such as (1a)-(1b) semantically express a categorising relation.  In these clauses, the Gulf War identifies a good example — so they are identifying.  (Identifying an example isn't assigning it membership to a class.) The identity encodes a good example by reference to The Gulf War.  (See further clarification here.)

encoding: operative
The Gulf War 
is
a good example
Agent
Process:
Medium
Token/Identifier
identifying
Value/Identified

encoding: receptive
a good example
is
the Gulf War 
Medium
Process:
Agent
Value/Identified
identifying
Token/Identifier

Importantly, encoding identifying clauses and attributive clauses differ markedly on the ergative model.  In terms of agency, encoding clauses are effective, whereas attributive clauses are middle.

encoding
the Gulf War 
is
a good example
Agent
Process:
Medium
Token/Identifier
identifying
Value/Identified

attributive
the Gulf War 
was
immoral
Medium
Process:
Range
Carrier
attributive
Attribute


[2] The function of very much in (3) is interpersonal: a mood Adjunct of intensity.

Pandora's Tower 
is
very much
an example [of the difficulty [[I'd like to see in Zelda game]] ]
Agent
Process:

Medium
Token/Identifier
identifying

Value/Identified
Subject
Finite
mood Adjunct: intensity
Complement
Mood
Residue

These occur whether the clause is identifying or attributive, and whether the Value is definite or indefinite:
  • Tom is very much the loser (identifying with definite Value) 
  • Gerri is hardly an actress (attributive).
Therefore, the Adjunct does not grade 'the conformity of the instance to the type' and does not provide an argument for treating such clauses as attributive.


[3] Since such clauses cannot be viewed as attributive, there is no motivation for positing an opposition akin to encoding and decoding for attributive clauses.


Moreover, it is actually the decoding identifying clauses — not the encoding — that are closer to attributives.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 237):
The 'decoding' type of 'identifying' clause is intermediate between the 'attributive' and  the 'encoding' type. … Nominal Attributes are closer to Values than adjectival ones; and these, in turn, are very close to the ‘is an example of’ type of ‘identifying’ clause …

Thursday, 13 November 2014

From Behaviour To Saying Behaviourally

(1) He nodded.

he
nodded
Behaver
Process: behavioural


(2) He nodded agreement.

he
nodded
agreement
Sayer
Process: verbal
Verbiage


(3) He nodded that he agreed with her.

he
nodded

that
he
agreed
with her
a
b
Sayer
Process: verbal


Senser
Process: mental
Accompaniment

Wednesday, 29 October 2014

'Deploying Functional Grammar' On "Behavioural" Processes

In Deploying Functional Grammar (Martin et al. 2010: 124), the following clauses are said to be 'best treated as behavioural':
the tyres went 'screech!'
the little engine went 'wheeee!'
the car went 'bang!'
This is a very strange analysis, not least because behavioural processes are processes of psychological and physiological behaviour.

Looked at from above, in terms of the meaning being realised, these are creative happenings (making noises).

Looked at from their own level, in terms of the wording that realises the meaning, these are verbal clauses quoting locutions (cf and she went "Oh my God!").

They are therefore metaphorical clauses in which a material happening [meaning] is realised as a verbal projection nexus [wording] — one stylistic resource for personifying inanimate objects in children's stories.

The source of this confusion — aside from not taking a trinocular perspective — appears to be the unsupported claim that behavioural processes include 'processes which concern the creation of a symbolic representation' (ibid) — though it is more likely that this was added as an ad hoc afterthought intended to justify the analysis.



Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 252):
… while ‘behavioural’ clauses do not ‘project’ indirect speech or thought, they often appear in fictional narrative introducing direct speech, as a means of attaching a behavioural feature to the verbal process of ‘saying’.
For example: "She's responsible", they gossiped. 

Tuesday, 15 April 2014

One Way To Analyse The Transitivity Of A Difficult Clause

DATA

The guitar lends itself well to playing pentatonic scales.

ANALYSIS


(1) WHAT DOES THE TEXTBOOK SAY? 

Take a trinocular perspective.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 31):
We cannot expect to understand the grammar just by looking at it from its own level; we also look into it ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, taking a trinocular perspective. But since the view from these different angles is often conflicting, the description will inevitably be a form of compromise.
SO

(2) THE VIEW ‘FROM ABOVE’: MEANING


QUESTION: What type of clause is it in terms of the experiential meaning being realised?

ANSWER: In terms of the meaning it is realising, the clause is an ‘attributive relational’.

REASON: An entity (guitar) has some class attributed to it (the class of things good for playing pentatonic scales)

EVIDENCE:
Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 219):
In the ‘attributive’ mode, an entity has some class ascribed or attributed to it.

(3) THE VIEW ‘FROM ROUND ABOUT’: WORDING (clause rank)


QUESTION: What type of clause is it in terms of lexicogrammatical paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations?

ANSWER: In terms of the wording realising the meaning, the clause is ‘material’.

REASON: The clause structure includes a Recipient (‘playing pentatonic scales’) of the lending process, and the Recipient is a participant restricted to ‘material’ clauses.

EVIDENCE:
Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 191):
Recipients occur only in ‘transitive transformative’ clauses of the ‘extending’ type; and within that category, they occur with those clauses that denote a transfer of the possession of goods. …

(4) THE VIEW ‘FROM BELOW’: WORDING (group/phrase rank)


QUESTION: What type of clause is it in terms of how it is realised at the rank below?

ANSWER: ‘Material’ is not excluded by the probe for unmarked present tense of the verbal group.

REASON: The unmarked ‘present in present’ tense is used for specific doings and happenings, whereas the marked ’simple present’ tense is for generalised or habitual doings, such as construed by this clause.

EVIDENCE:
Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 179-80):
The unmarked tense selection is the present–in–present (eg is doing) rather than the simple present (eg does) … The present–in–present serves to narrow down the present from the extended now of habits and ‘general truths’ that is characteristic of the simple present with ‘material’ clauses …

(5) CONCLUSION

The clause is a ‘material’ realisation of an ‘attributive’ relation, and so an instance of grammatical metaphor. The structural analysis is as follows:

The guitar: Actor
lends: Process: material
itself: Goal
well: Manner: quality
to [[playing pentatonic scales]]: Recipient

(6) FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS:


FIRST OBSERVATION: the role of Actor is filled by an inanimate (guitar) rather than animate entity

COMMENT: This is at odds with the notion of Actor as the source of energy for a material process.

EVIDENCE:
Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 179):
… ‘material’ clauses are clauses of doing–&–happening: a ‘material’ clause construes a quantum of change in the flow of events as taking place through some input of energy. … the source of the energy bringing about the change is typically a participant — the Actor … The Actor is the one who does the deed — that is, the one that brings about the change.

SECOND OBSERVATION: the role of Recipient is filled by a ‘macrothing’ (an Act) rather than a ’simple thing’, conscious or non-conscious.

COMMENT: This is at odds with the notion of Recipient as the one to whom goods are given.

EVIDENCE:
Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 191):
The Recipient is the one that goods are given to …