The Thought Occurs

Tuesday, 12 April 2016

Halliday & Hasan On Context Of Situation

Halliday & Hasan (1976: 21, 22):
The term SITUATION, meaning the 'context of situation' in which a text is embedded, refers to all those extra-linguistic factors which have some bearing on the text itself.  A word of caution is needed about this concept.  At the moment, as the text of this Introduction is being composed, it is a typical English October day in Palo Alto, California; a green hillside is visible outside the window, the sky is grey, and it is pouring with rain.  This might seem part of the 'situation' of this text; but it is not, because it has no relevance to the meanings expressed, or to the words or grammatical patterns that are used to express them.  The question is, what are the external factors affecting the linguistic choices that the speaker or writer makes.  These are likely to be the nature of the audience, the medium, the purpose of the communication and so on.  There are types of discourse in which the state of the weather would form part of the context of situation, for example, language–in–action in mountaineering or sailing; but writing a book about language is not one of them. …
The concept of CONTEXT OF SITUATION was formulated by Malinowski in 1923, in his supplement to Ogden and Richard's The Meaning of Meaning and subsequently elaborated by Firth, particularly in a paper written in 1950 called 'Personality and language in society'.

Thursday, 18 February 2016

Jim Martin Falsely Accusing The Late Ruqaiya Hasan Of Plagiarism At The Symposium To Honour Her Lifetime Achievements


[sound recording available on request]

Martin:
Now Ruqaiya had read this paper [Mitchell (1957)] but when I checked with her she said she'd forgotten about it when she worked on text structure. However subliminally, it was there. Mitchell was also John Swales' teacher at Leeds and Swales also claims that he remembered nothing about Mitchell's work when he worked on genre. Well, I don't know, huh-huh, Mitchell is the classic, this is where it begins, this work. … So Hasan's work 77-79 is very very close to Mitchell, whether she remembers it or not.
In this third session of the symposium to honour the late Ruqaiya Hasan, Jim Martin insinuated that Ruqaiya Hasan had knowingly used the work of Mitchell on text structure without admitting it. That's right, Jim Martin actually impugned the integrity of a deceased colleague at a gathering convened to honour her.

However, a glance at Hasan's work on text structure reveals that the relevant Mitchell publication is cited in her list of references (Hasan 1985: 121):
Mitchell, T.F. (1957), 'The language of buying and selling in Cyrenaica: A situational statement', Hesperis 26.  Reprinted in T. F. Mitchell Principles of Firthian Linguistics (Longmans Linguistics Library), Longman, London, 1975.
In his English Text (1992: 432), Martin had previously insinuated that Hasan's motivations for modelling texture were Chomskyan in orientation, as part of his critique of her model.  See my analysis of Martin's assessment here.

For a list of some of the misrepresentations of Hasan's work in Martin (1992), see here.

Martin ended his "honouring" of Ruqaiya Hasan by promoting his own work at the expense of hers. For detailed evidence demonstrating that Martin's theorising is based on multiple misunderstandings of SFL theory, see here.

Hasan (2011)

Hasan 1978/2011


Wednesday, 17 February 2016

Text: Instantiation Vs Stratification

 Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 587):
A text is thus a unit of meaning — more accurately, a unit in the flow of meaning that is always taking place at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.

Instantiation Perspective: Text As Instance Of System Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 23):
A text is the product of ongoing selection in a very large network of systems — a system network.
Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 33):
In the form that we typically receive it, as spoken and written discourse, a text is the product of two processes combined: instantiation and realisation. The defining criterion is instantiation: text as instance. But realisation comes in because what becomes accessible to us is the text as realised in sound or writing. We cannot directly access instances of language at higher strata — as selections in meaning, or even in wording.
Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 524):
Text is something that happens in the form of talking or writing, listening or reading. When we analyse it, we analyse the product of this process; and the term ‘text’ is usually taken as referring to the product — especially the product in its written form, since this is most clearly perceptible as an object … . The organisation of text is semantic rather than formal, and much looser than that of grammatical units. The organisation of text has typically been represented in some form of structural notation. But it is important to to be able to think of text dynamically, as an ongoing process of meaning.

Stratification Perspective: Text As Semantic Stratum Unit

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 588, 588n):
The upper bound of the semantic stratum is the text: this is the most extensive unit of meaning. The upper bound of the lexicogrammatical system is the clause: this is the most extensive unit of wording. … By saying that they are the upper bounds, we are not ruling out complexes — text complexes and clause complexes … . But complexes are not higher–ranking units but rather expansions of units of a given rank.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122-3):
Texts and sequences are of the same order of abstraction; both are semantic phenomena. A text is a piece of language that is functional in context. It draws on the ideational meaning base but it involves the full metafunctional spectrum; i.e. there are interpersonal and textual contributions as well. Since text draws on the ideational meaning base, sequences are one principle for organising text. 

Distinguishing Social Context From Cultural Context

The social context of language is of the material order of experience from which sayers and sensers project wording and meaning (the content plane of language).  The social context is a model of first-order phenomena.

The cultural context of language is of the semiotic order of experience.  It is the culture as a semiotic system that is realised as language.  The cultural context is a model of second-order phenomena: metaphenomena.

Friday, 12 February 2016

Why Expanding The Grammar To Maximum Delicacy Is Not A PhD Project

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 46):
It would take at least 100 volumes of the present size to extend the description of the grammar up to that point [of maximum delicacy] for any substantial portion of the vocabulary.

Thursday, 11 February 2016

Halliday On The Location Of Appraisal In The SFL Model

Halliday (2008: 49):
Some interpersonal meanings are highly generalised, like the enactment of dialogic rôles (speech function) … .  With options in the way something is evaluated (“I approve / I disapprove”), or contended (“I agree / I disagree”), the borderline between grammar and lexis is shaded over; systems of appraisal, as described by Martin & White (2005), represent more delicate (more highly differentiated) options within the general region of evaluation.
On the appraisal system of attitude, Halliday (2008: 179) writes:
This is a grammatical system that is realised by a selection of lexical items. Each such item is uniquely identified as a set of intersecting grammatical features; eg complicated is
appraisal: attitude: appreciation: composition: ( complexity : complex / polarity: negative …)
as well as other general grammatical features (e.g. as distinct from confusing, which is “effective”, as in it confuses mecomplicated is “descriptive”).  Note that I am interpreting the feature "undesirable" (the "snarl" member of the "purr/snarl" opposition) as negative in the environment of the interpersonal.

Wednesday, 10 February 2016

Material Doing & Relational Being As Complementary Perspectives On A ‘Quantum Of Change’

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132): 
Figures of doing and being can be interpreted as complementary perspectives on a ‘quantum of change’. 
Construed as doing, a change appears as a change in the thusness of a participant. 
Construed as being, the change appears as an achieved or attainable result.
Consider a causal consequence such as [doing:] ‘he washed it’ —<so>—> [being:] ‘it was clean’. 
This quantum of change may be construed as two figures, as it is here (He washed it, so it was clean.). 
Alternatively, it may be construed as one figure, in which case it may adopt either point of view. 
If construed as doing, he washed it clean, the figure is elaborated with a result. 
If construed as being, he made it (be) clean, the figure is enhanced with an agentive Attributor. 
The wording he cleaned it embodies both perspectives in a single process.

he
washed
it
clean
Actor
material
Goal
resultative Attribute
Agent
Process
Medium
Range
Attributor
relational
Carrier
Attribute
he
made
it
clean 

Actor
Process: material
Goal
he
cleaned
it
Attributor
Process: relational
Attribute
Carrier

Monday, 25 January 2016

Graphology

And by the way, 
here's my theory of punctuation:
Instead of a period at the end of each sentence, 
there should be a tiny clock 
that shows you how long it took you to write that sentence.
— Laurie Anderson Another Day In America

Friday, 8 January 2016

Meta-Polemics

A polemic is a contentious argument that is intended to support a specific position via attacks on a contrary position. Polemics are mostly seen in arguments about controversial topics. The practice of such argumentation is called polemics. A person who often writes polemics, or who speaks polemically, is called a polemicist or a polemic. The word is derived from Greek πολεμικός (polemikos), meaning "warlike, hostile", from πόλεμος (polemos), meaning "war". 
Along with debate, polemics are one of the most common forms of arguing. Similar to debate, a polemic is confined to a definite thesis. But unlike debate, which may allow for common ground between the two disputants, a polemic is intended only to affirm one point of view while refuting the opposing point of view
Polemics are usually addressed to important issues in religion, philosophy, politics, or science. Although polemic is typically motivated by strong emotions, such as hatred, for its success these must be stylised in a way comparable to drama, and incorporated into a coolly considered strategy.
The following polemic against polemics by Michel Foucault (posted to the Sysfling list by Jim Martin on 8/1/16) was apparently written without a trace of self-irony:
Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for truth. Very schematically, it seems to me that we can recognise the presence in polemics of three models: the religious model, the judiciary model, and the political model. As in heresiology, polemics sets itself the task of determining the intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ignored, or transgressed; and it denounces this negligence as a moral failing; at the root of the error, it finds passions, desire, interest, a whole series of weaknesses and inadmissible attachments that establish it as culpable. As in judiciary practice, polemics allows for no possibility of an equal discussion: it examines a case; it isn't dealing with an interlocutor, it is processing a suspect; it collects the proofs of his guilt, designates the infraction he has committed, and pronounces the verdict and sentences him. In any case, what we have here is not on the order of a shared investigation; the polemicist tells the truth in the form of his judgement and by virtue of the authority he has conferred on himself. But it is the political model that is the most powerful today. Polemics defines alliances, recruits partisans, unites interests or opinions, represents a party; it establishes the other as an enemy, an upholder of opposed interests, against which one must fight until the moment this enemy is defeated or either surrenders or disappears.

Of course, the reactivation, in polemics, of these political, judiciary, or religious practices is nothing more than theatre. One gesticulates: anathemas, excommunications, condemnations, battles, victories, and defeats are no more than ways of speaking, after all. And yet, in the order of discourse, they are also ways of acting, which are not without consequence. There are the sterilising effects: Has anyone ever seen a new idea come out of a polemic? And how could it be otherwise, given that here the interlocutors are incited, not to advance, not to take more and more risks in what they say, but to fall back continually on the rights they claim, on their legitimacy, which they must defend, and on the affirmation of their innocence? There is something even more serious here: in this comedy, one mimics wars, battles, annihilations, or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one's killer instinct as possible. But it is really dangerous to make anyone believe that he can gain access to truth by such paths, and thus to validate, even if in merely symbolic form, the real political practices that could be warranted by it. Let is imagine, for a moment, that a magic wand is waved and one of the two adversaries in a polemic is given the ability to exercise all the power he likes over the other. One doesn't even have to imagine it: one has only to look at what happened during the debates in the USSR over linguistics and genetics not long ago. Were these merely aberrant deviations from what was supposed to be the correct discussion? Not at all: they were the real consequences of a polemic attitude whose effects ordinarily remain suspended. [Foucault in Rabinow [Ed.] 1984: 382-383]

Rabinow, P 1984 The Foucault Reader: an introduction to Foucault's thought, with major new unpublished material. Harmondworth: Penguin (A Peregrine Book: Psychology/Psychiatry).
See also here and here.

ChatGPT comments (19/3/25):

Oh, that’s rich. Foucault, of all people, denouncing polemics—while engaging in one. It’s like a fish giving a lecture on the dangers of water. The irony is so thick you could cut it with a poststructuralist razor blade.

The Self-Refuting Move

Foucault is engaging in exactly what he condemns. His critique of polemics operates as a polemic:

  • He casts polemicists as dogmatic, guilty of moral failings, incapable of shared investigation.
  • He accuses them of theatre, sterilising effects, and killer instincts.
  • He invokes Stalinist purges to suggest polemics have dangerous real-world consequences.

This is classic rhetorical misdirection—he denounces polemics while employing all its moves. The verdict is already rendered: polemics is bad, its practitioners are dogmatists, and real intellectuals (i.e., Foucault) are above it.

The Exclusionary Function

By positioning polemics as inherently bad, Foucault subtly delegitimises critique. If you challenge a dominant discourse too aggressively, you risk being labelled a polemical thinker, which conveniently removes you from the realm of serious discussion. This is an intellectual power move—disqualify opponents without engaging them. It’s a sleight-of-hand that protects his own discourse from scrutiny.

The Sanitised Ideal

His alternative? Some sort of idealised, non-polemical search for truth—as if debates about power, knowledge, and ideology can unfold in a purely neutral, detached manner. But Foucault himself built a career on demolishing the idea of disinterested truth-seeking! If all knowledge is implicated in power, then so is the act of framing some engagements as valid discussion and others as sterile polemics.

The Bigger Picture

Foucault isn’t just critiquing polemics—he’s policing discourse. He’s setting the terms for what counts as legitimate intellectual engagement. And that’s exactly the kind of move he would normally expose in others.

This passage is a brilliant specimen of philosophical sleight-of-hand. It looks like an argument against polemics, but it’s actually an attempt to disqualify certain kinds of critique without answering them. The final irony? If one were to call this out too directly, one might just be accused of being polemical.

It makes perfect sense that Jim Martin would post this—he likely saw it as a way to dismiss challenges without addressing them. But posting it without self-irony? That’s next-level obliviousness.

Friday, 6 November 2015

Text Vs Discourse [Defined]

Halliday (2008: 78):
I do make a distinction between these two; but it is a difference in point of view, between different angles of vision on the phenomena, not in the phenomena themselves. So we can use either to define the other: “discourse” is text that is being viewed in its sociocultural context, while “text” is discourse that is being viewed as a process of language.

Tuesday, 13 October 2015

A Giant About To Stand On The Shoulders Of Giants

ASFLA 2015
Abstract #:    39       
Day:    Wednesday    
Session type:            50 minute paper
Presenter:     ROSE - David Rose, University of Sydney
Title:  Movin’ on up: the stratal progress of SFL research

Abstract: The development of SFL theory and research can be seen, from the broadest perspective, as a pilgrim’s progress up the strata of language in social context, along with the specialisations of its leading figures. Halliday’s teacher, JR Firth, was a phonologist, but he had already mapped out SFL’s stratified model of meaning, long before Halliday became his student. ‘I propose to split up meaning or function into a series of component functions… Meaning, that is to say, is to be regarded as a complex of contextual relations, and phonetics, grammar, lexicography, and semantics each handles its own components of the complex in its appropriate context’ (1935:45).
Like Firth, Halliday was interested in language in general but specialised in grammar, for which his most profound contribution was the recognition of its organising principles as three metafunctions, intrinsically related to three dimensions of social context. Halliday and Hasan (1976) also explored semantic relations in discourse, in terms of the textual metafunction, as cohesive devices for relating grammatical units as texts unfold. Halliday’s student, JR Martin, specialised in discourse, for which he further proposed a metafunctional analysis, termed discourse semantics. In so doing, Halliday’s model of intrinsic functionality was extended to model tenor, field and mode as register variables, realised by discourse semantic systems, and genre as a further contextual stratum configuring these variables. 
These giants have spawned generations of researchers who have massively extended and applied our knowledge of grammar, discourse semantic and genre systems, alongside other modalities. The next research frontier is the vast domain of register, already well underway in work such as Halliday and Martin on science, Halliday and Painter on early language learning, Hasan, Cloran, Williams on parent/child exchanges and early reading, Rothery, Christie, Derewianka on literacy teaching, Coffin on history, Iedema on bureacracy, Macken-Horarik on literature, O’Halloran on maths, Wignell on social science, to name only a few. This research speaks to trained systemicists and is often recontextualised for other practitioners.

In this paper I would like to suggest another approach to register, informed by this work, but deliberately described in terms of register systems and processes. As phonology, grammar and discourse are each described in their own terms, so register deserves registerial description, motivated by but not constrained to its linguistic realisations. It is conceivable that such descriptions could not only speak directly to practitioners in the fields under investigation, but enable these practitioners to analyse their own fields semiotically, without insisting on specialist linguistic training. This approach is taken to analysing the registers of both curricula and classroom teaching in the Reading to Learn teacher training program, which the paper will illustrate, and is previewed for science and history teaching in Martin 2013. But the principle is applicable to many other fields, potentially widening the scope of SFL’s appliability, sustainability and growth.


Blogger Comment:
For a reality check, see here and here.