Behavioural Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 136):

These can be interpreted as a subtype of material processes or as a borderline category between material and mental.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 514):

Here [in English] the grammar postulates a third type of process intermediate between these two [material and mental]: “behavioural” processes, in which inner events are externalised as bodily behaviour, like staring, thinking (in the sense of pondering) or crying.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 171):

On the borderline between ‘material’ and ‘mental’ are the behavioural processes: those that represent the outer manifestations of inner workings, the acting out of processes of consciousness and physiological states. 

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 248-50):

These are processes of (typically human) physiological and psychological behaviour, like breathing, coughing, smiling, dreaming and staring. They are the least distinct of all the six process types because they have no clearly defined characteristics of their own; rather they are partly like the material and partly like the mental.

 Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 250):

The usual unmarked present tense for behavioural processes is present in present, like the material … however, we also find the simple present in its unmarked sense (ie not meaning habitual) … which suggests an affiliation with a mental.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 250):

The participant who is ‘behaving’, labelled Behaver, is typically a conscious being, like the Senser; the Process is grammatically more like one of ‘doing’.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 255):

… ‘behavioural’ process clauses are not so much a distinct type of process, but rather a cluster of small subtypes blending the material and the mental into a continuum …

'Deploying Functional Grammar' On "Behavioural" Processes

In Deploying Functional Grammar (Martin et al. 2010: 124), the following clauses are said to be 'best treated as behavioural':

the tyres went 'screech!'

the little engine went 'wheeee!'

the car went 'bang!'

This is a very strange analysis, not least because behavioural processes are processes of psychological and physiological behaviour.

Looked at from above, in terms of the meaning being realised, these are creative happenings (making noises).

Looked at from their own level, in terms of the wording that realises the meaning, these are verbal clauses quoting locutions (cf and she went "Oh my God!").

They are therefore metaphorical clauses in which a material happening [meaning] is realised as a verbal projection nexus [wording] — one stylistic resource for personifying inanimate objects in children's stories.

The source of this confusion — aside from not taking a trinocular perspective — appears to be the unsupported claim that behavioural processes include 'processes which concern the creation of a symbolic representation' (ibid) — though it is more likely that this was added as an ad hoc afterthought intended to justify the analysis.

∞

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 252):

… while ‘behavioural’ clauses do not ‘project’ indirect speech or thought, they often appear in fictional narrative introducing direct speech, as a means of attaching a behavioural feature to the verbal process of ‘saying’.

For example: "She's responsible", they gossiped. 

Van Leeuwen's Verticality As "Ideal – Real"

ideal:	upper class	powerful	Netherlands	tall	shallow
|	|	|	|	|	|
real:	lower class	powerless	Australia	short	deep

Kristen Davidse: Revisiting the subclassification of English copular clauses

Seminar presentation (slides and audio) at Macquarie university, April 29, 2014.  Click here.

Reconstruing Email Discussions As Protolanguage

After more than a decade of observing the socio-semiotic dynamics of another social species, rainbow lorikeets, as they continually "renegotiate" their position in the pecking order, it strikes me that the socio-semiotic dynamics of humans on academic discussion lists, such as sys-func and sysfling, can also be construed in terms of the microfunctions of protolanguage.

		exterior phenomenon
		intersubjective “proto-interpersonal”	objective “proto-ideational”
interior sensing	desideration “proto-interpersonal”	regulatory I want you-&-me	instrumental I want it
	cognition “proto-ideational”	interactional I think you-&-me	personal I think it

regulatory: demands for compliance (i.e. bullying)

interactional: collegiality and grooming (e.g. flattery*)
instrumental: requests for goods-&-services (e.g. for articles and analyses)
personal: opinions (e.g. on analyses and theory)


* Some instances:

David Rose to Margaret Berry (Sys-Func and Sysfling 27/9/13):

I can't tell you what a pleasure it is having someone with your experience and stature and personal generosity fomenting discussion on sysfling… its such a great potential resource for the community…

David Rose to Gordon Tucker (Sys-Func and Sysfling 5/12/13):

And I am glad that you are adding your academic weight to correct the epidemic error that process types are classifications of verbs.

David Rose to Margaret Berry (Sys-Func 13/2/14):

 Thank heavens you're still with us Margaret

David Rose to Margaret Berry (Sys-Func 15/2/14):

Thanks Margaret, its such a pleasure to read your posts

∞

I might point out that David Rose has openly boasted, with glee — at least three times in my presence — that if he tells a colleague he likes their work they "roll over and become like kittens".

∞

Flattery corrupts both the receiver and the giver.

— Edmund Burke

Sign Of The Times

Words We Get From Irish: 'Tory'

Tory (n.) 1566, "an outlaw," specifically "one of a class of Irish robbers noted for outrages and savage cruelty," from Irish toruighe "plunderer," originally "pursuer, searcher," from Old Irish toirighim "I pursue," from toir "pursuit," from Celtic *to-wo-ret- "a running up to," from PIE root *ret- "to run, roll" (see rotary). 

About 1646, it emerged as a derogatory term for Irish Catholics dispossessed of their land (some of whom subsequently turned to outlawry); c.1680 applied by Exclusioners to supporters of the Catholic Duke of York (later James II) in his succession to the throne of England. After 1689, Tory was the name of a British political party at first composed of Yorkist Tories of 1680. Superseded c.1830 by Conservative, though it continues to be used colloquially. In American history, Tory was the name given after 1769 to colonists who remained loyal to George III of England; it represents their relative position in the pre-revolutionary English political order in the colonies. As an adjective from 1680s.

Pedagogues 'R' Us

Let's not burn the universities yet. 

After all, the damage they do might be worse.
 — H. L. Mencken

Realisation: Encoding & Decoding

In an identifying relation, the identity either encodes the Value (the higher level of abstraction) by reference to the Token (the lower level of abstraction), or it decodes the Token by reference to the Value (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 230).

So, in the identifying relation: expression realises content, 

the identity either encodes content by reference to expression,

or it decodes expression by reference to content.

And, in the identifying relation: form realises function, 

the identity either encodes function by reference to form,

or it decodes form by reference to function.

And, in the identifying relation: structure realises system, 

the identity either encodes system by reference to structure,

or it decodes structure by reference to system.

Linguistic "Borrowing"

Construing Experience

'A quantum of experience is not defined before it is construed' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 118)

I'd Rather Be A Hammer Then A Nail

Circumstance Vs Expanding Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 369):

In the creation of text, we choose between augmenting a clause ‘internally’ by means of a circumstantial element and augmenting it ‘externally’ by means of another clause in a complex. The decision depends on many factors; but the basic consideration has to do with how much textual, interpersonal and experiential semiotic ‘weight’ is to be assigned to the unit.

Semantic Weight

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111):

… whenever two figures are related in a sequence, they may be either equal or unequal in semantic weight. … The projecting and projected figures may have equal status in the sequence: this relation is that of quoting … . Or they may have unequal status: this relation is that of reporting ….

Projections Of Meaning & Wording: Ideas & Locutions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 108):

We have suggested that the relation of projection sets up one figure on a different plane of reality — we refer to this as the second-order or semiotic level. This second-order level of reality is the content plane of a semiotic system. That is to say, the projected figure is projected in the form of ‘content’. We have seen that the content plane is stratified into two levels — semantics (the level of meanings) and lexicogrammar (the level of wordings). Consequently, we would expect projections to be located at either or both of these levels, and this is indeed what happens: a projected figure is either a meaning or a wording. […] We will refer to these [i.e. meaning and wording] in the context of projection as ideas and locutions.

Comment Adjuncts

Type					Examples Of Adverbs
propositional	on whole	asseverative	natural		naturally, inevitably, of course
			obvious		obviously, clearly, plainly, of course
			sure		doubtless, indubitably, no doubt
		qualificative	prediction	predictable	unsurprisingly, predictably, to no-one’s surprise
				surprising	surprisingly, unexpectedly
			presumption	hearsay	evidently, allegedly, supposedly
				argument	arguably
				guess	presumably
			desirability	desirable: luck	luckily, fortunately
				desirable: hope	hopefully
				undesirable	sadly, unfortunately
	on Subject	wisdom	positive		wisely, cleverly
			negative		foolishly, stupidly
		morality	positive		rightly, correctly, justifiably
			negative		wrongly, unjustifiably
speech-functional	unqualified	persuasive	assurance		truly, honestly, seriously (+ tone 1)
			concession		admittedly, certainly, to be sure (+ tone 4)
		factual			actually, really, in fact, as a matter of fact
	qualified	validity			generally, broadly, roughly, ordinarily, by and large, on the whole
		personal engagement	honesty		frankly, candidly, honestly, to be honest
			secrecy		confidentially, between you and me
			individuality		personally, for my part
			accuracy		truly, strictly
			hesitancy		tentatively

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 130)

Modal Adjuncts

	Type	Meaning	Examples
I	probability	how likely?	probably, possibly, certainly, perhaps, maybe
	usuality	how often?	usually, sometimes, always, (n)ever, often, seldom
	typicality	how typical?	occasionally, generally, regularly, for the most part
	obviousness	how obvious?	of course, surely, obviously, clearly
II	opinion	I think	in my opinion, personally, to my mind
	admission	I admit	frankly, to be honest, to tell you the truth
	persuasion	I assure you	honestly, really, believe me, seriously
	entreaty	I request you	please, kindly
	presumption	I presume	evidently, apparently, no doubt, presumably
	desirability	how desirable?	(un)fortunately, to my delight/distress, regrettably, hopefully
	reservation	how reliable?	at first, tentatively, provisionally, looking back on it
	validation	how valid?	broadly speaking, in general, on the whole, strictly speaking, in principle
	evaluation	how sensible?	(un)wisely, understandably, mistakenly, foolishly
	prediction	how expected?	to my surprise, surprisingly, as expected, by chance

(Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 82)