The Language "Instinct"

The very essence of instinct is that it's followed independently of reason.

 — Charles Darwin

Occam's Razor

Occam's razor (also written as Ockham's razor from William of Ockham, and in Latin lex parsimoniae) is a principle of parsimony, economy, or succinctness used in logic and problem-solving. It states that among competing hypotheses, the hypothesis with the fewest assumptions should be selected.

In science, Occam's razor is used as a heuristic (general guiding rule or an observation) to guide scientists in the development of theoretical models rather than as an arbiter between published models.

Reductio Ad Absurdum

Reductio ad absurdum is the technique of reducing an argument or hypothesis to absurdity, by pushing the argument's premises or conclusions to their logical limits and showing how ridiculous the consequences would be, thus disproving or discrediting the argument.

This has roots in the Socratic method, and has been employed throughout the history of logic, mathematics, philosophy and the philosophy of science.

Reductio ad absurdum is only valid when it builds on assertions which are actually present in the argument it is deconstructing, and not when it misrepresents them as a straw man.

Straw Man Fallacy

A straw man argument is one that misrepresents a position in order to make it appear weaker than it actually is, refutes this misrepresentation of the position, and then concludes that the real position has been refuted. This, of course, is a fallacy, because the position that has been claimed to be refuted is different to that which has actually been refuted; the real target of the argument is untouched by it.

Example

(1) Trinitarianism holds that three equals one.

(2) Three does not equal one.

Therefore:

(3) Trinitarianism is false.

This is an example of a straw man argument because its first premise misrepresents trinitarianism, its second premise attacks this misrepresentation of trinitarianism, and its conclusion states that trinitarianism is false. Trinitarianism, of course, does not hold that three equals one, and so this argument demonstrates nothing concerning its truth.

Source: http://www.logicalfallacies.info/

The Argument From Adverse Consequences

The argument from adverse consequences rejects an argument because its consequences are undesirable, or because accepting it could mean accepting something we would prefer not to acknowledge; in most cases, this is regarded as a logical fallacy.

Bandwagon Fallacy

The bandwagon fallacy is committed by arguments that appeal to the growing popularity of an idea as a reason for accepting it as true. They take the mere fact that an idea suddenly attracting adherents as a reason for us to join in with the trend and become adherents of the idea ourselves.

This is a fallacy because there are many other features of ideas than truth that can lead to a rapid increase in popularity. Peer pressure, tangible benefits, or even mass stupidity could lead to a false idea being adopted by lots of people. A rise in the popularity of an idea, then, is no guarantee of its truth.

The bandwagon fallacy is closely related to the appeal to popularity; the difference between the two is that the bandwagon fallacy places an emphasis on current fads and trends, on the growing support for an idea, whereas the appeal to popularity does not.

Example

(1) Increasingly, people are coming to believe that Eastern religions help us to get in touch with our true inner being.

Therefore:

(2) Eastern religions help us to get in touch with our true inner being.

This argument commits the bandwagon fallacy because it appeals to the mere fact that an idea is fashionable as evidence that the idea is true. Mere trends in thought are not reliable guides to truth, though; the fact that Eastern religions are becoming more fashionable does not imply that they are true.

Source: http://www.logicalfallacies.info/

Genetic Fallacy

The genetic fallacy is committed when an idea is either accepted or rejected because of its source, rather than its merit. 

Even from bad things, good may come; we therefore ought not to reject an idea just because of where it comes from, as ad hominem arguments do. 

Equally, even good sources may sometimes produce bad results; accepting an idea because of the goodness of its source, as in appeals to authority, is therefore no better than rejecting an idea because of the badness of its source. Both types of argument are fallacious. 

Examples 

(1) My mommy told me that the tooth fairy is real.
Therefore:
(2) The tooth fairy is real.  

(1) Eugenics was pioneered in Germany during the war.
Therefore:
(2) Eugenics is a bad thing. 

Each of these arguments commits the genetic fallacy, because each judges an idea by the goodness or badness of its source, rather than on its own merits.

Source: http://www.logicalfallacies.info/

Robin Fawcett Being Rude To Computer Software

At 09:09 on 27/1/14, Robin Fawcett replied to a message that is automatically generated when posts are sent from an email address that is not subscribed to the sys-func list as follows:

Dear Whoeveryouare, 

I have sent the message below to Chris Gledhill, the organizer of the next ESFLA conference, and sysfling, but sysfunc has rejected it. It may be of interest to any sysfunc user who is not also on sysfling and who may be contemplating a vidit to Europe in July. 

Robin 

Robin P. Fawcett

Emeritus Professor of Linguistics

Cardiff University

fawcett@cardiff.ac.uk

Academic Freedom

There must be no barriers for freedom of inquiry. There is no place for dogma in science. The scientist is free, and must be free to ask any question, to doubt any assertion, to seek for any evidence, to correct any errors. 

— J Robert Oppenheimer 

If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.

— George Orwell

An intelligent person is never afraid or ashamed to find errors in his understanding of things.

— Bryant H. McGill

The suppression of uncomfortable ideas may be common in religion or politics, but it is not the path to knowledge.

 — Carl Sagan

The Agreement Fallacy

The fact that an opinion has been widely held is no evidence whatever that it is not utterly absurd.

 — Bertrand Russell

The Square Of Opposition (Aristotelian Logic)

Nietzsche On Institutions

The aim of institutions — whether scientific, artistic, political, or religious — never is to produce and foster exceptional examples; institutions are concerned, rather, for the usual, the normal, the mediocre.

— Friedrich Nietzsche Also Sprach Zarathustra

The Origins Of Positivism: The Sociologists Comte And Durkheim

"Positivism is a philosophy of science based on the view that information derived from logical and mathematical treatments and reports of sensory experience is the exclusive source of all authoritative knowledge, that there is valid knowledge (truth) only in scientific knowledge. Verified data received from the senses is known as empirical evidence. This view, when applied to the social as to the natural sciences, holds that society operates according to general laws like the physical world. Introspective and intuitive knowledge is rejected. 

Though the positivist approach has been a recurrent theme in the history of Western thought, modern sense of the approach was developed by the philosopher and founding sociologist Auguste Comte in the early 19th century. Comte argued that, much as the physical world operates according to gravity and other absolute laws, so also does society. 

Positivism states that the only authentic knowledge is that which allows positive verification and assumes that there is valid knowledge only in scientific knowledge. Enlightenment thinkers such as Henri de Saint-Simon, Pierre-Simon Laplace and Auguste Comte believed the scientific method, the circular dependence of theory and observation, must replace metaphysics in the history of thought. Sociological positivism was reformulated by Émile Durkheim as a foundation to social research. 

In the early 20th century, logical positivism — a descendant of Comte's basic thesis but an independent movement — sprang up in Vienna and grew to become one of the dominant schools in Anglo-American philosophy and the analytic tradition. Logical positivists (or 'neopositivists') reject metaphysical speculation and attempted to reduce statements and propositions to pure logic. Critiques of this approach by philosophers such as Karl Popper, Willard Van Orman Quine and Thomas Kuhn have been highly influential, and led to the development of postpositivism."

Source here.

The Difference Between A Symbolising Process, A Symbolic Process And Symbolic Processing

(1) A symbolising process is a type of relational process.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 599-600):

The ideational resources of language are primarily a theory of experience, so they are reflected fairly directly in consciously designed theories such as those of cognitive science. If we stay within the ideational metafunction, where mental processes are construed, we also find other processes that are complementary to these: those of saying (verbal processes) and symbolising (a type of relational process).

(2) A symbolic process is an alternative name for a verbal process (Halliday & Matthiessen: 2004: 254).

(3) Symbolic processing refers to a projecting figure — interior sensing or exterior saying — that brings another figure into symbolic existence (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 129). It involves the symbolic process and the participant engaged in symbolic processing, the Symboliser. 

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 129):

“Symbolic processing” is a generalisation across sensing and saying that foregrounds the fact that they can both project.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 130):

The interior Symboliser of sensing is construed as a participant engaged in conscious processing.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 153):

The general motif of figures of sensing is ‘conscious processing’; that of figures of saying is ‘symbolic processing’.

SFL's Architecture Of Language Classified By SFL Relations

A. system networks

i. delicacy: elaboration

ii. disjunction: extension: alternative

iii. conjunction: extension: addition

iv. entry condition: enhancement: condition

B. rank scale: extension: composition (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 146)

C. realisation: elaboration + identifying (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 145)

1. higher stratum realised by lower stratum [stratification]

2. system realised by structure [axis]

3. function realised by form; eg clause rank function structure realised by group rank syntagm

D. instantiation cline: elaboration + attributive (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 145)


P.S. The pedagogical advantage of understanding SFL's architecture of language in these very precise ways is that it enables the learner to immediately identify the bluffers in the SFL community who don't understand the theory — but whose confident bullying might suggest otherwise — so that the learner doesn't waste time trying to accommodate their misunderstandings.

The Metafunctions: Grammatical Or Semantic?

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 511):

We have stressed all along that a language is a system for creating meaning; and that its meaning potential has evolved around three motifs — what we refer to as the “metafunctions” of ideational, interpersonal and textual, with the ideational in turn comprising an experiential component and a logical component. These are the multiple aspects of the content plane — the grammar (in its usual sense of lexicogrammar) and the semantics. Since the powerhouse of language lies in the grammar, we shall refer to them here as aspects of the grammar; but it is important to insist that they could not be “in” the one without also being “in” the other. It makes no sense to ask whether the metafunctions are grammatical or semantic; the only possible answer would be “yes”.

Why ‘Realisation’ Applies To Both Strata And Rank And Where The Difference Lies

The overall architecture of SFL theory can be understood in terms of theoretical constructs within the model, namely: relational processes (identifying and attributive) and logical semantic relations (expansion and projection).

‘Realise’ functions as an intensive identifying process, which means that it combines ‘identifying’ with ‘elaboration’.

The term ‘realisation’ is used wherever there is an intensive identifying (token-value) relation in the theory. eg between system and structure on a given stratum, between strata, between function and form in the rank scale.

Stratal Hierarchy:

In the case of strata, a lower stratum realises a higher stratum, and the relation between them is thus identifying + elaboration.


Rank Scale:

The rank scale, on the other hand, is organised in terms of composition, which is a subtype of extension.

‘Realise’ is used on the rank scale to relate the function of a higher rank to the form of a lower rank (eg Process is realised by verbal group). This relation between function and form is thus also identifying + elaboration.


Similarity:

The similarity thus lies in elaboration + identifying being an organising principle for both stratification and the rank scale.


Difference:

The difference lies in the fact that, whereas stratification involves only elaboration + identifying, the rank scale combines extension (relation between forms) with elaboration + identifying (relation between function and form).

Inherent Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 213):

In ‘relational’ clauses, there are two parts to the ‘being’: something is said to ‘be’ something else … This means that in a ‘relational’ clause in English, there are always two inherent participants … In contrast, the general classes of ‘material’ and ‘mental’ clauses have only one inherent participant (the Actor and the Senser, respectively).

Google Books Ngram Viewer: Functional Vs Formal Grammar

Projection Vs Realisation

Projection is a logical relation between the material order of experience and the semiotic order of experience — between a macrophenomenon (a senser sensing or a sayer saying) and a metaphenomenon (an idea or locution).

Realisation is both a logical relation and an experiential relation.  

As a logical relation, it is elaboration, a type of expansion.  

As an experiential relation, it is one of symbolic identity, a type of identifying relation.  

Realisation is an ideational relation between different levels of symbolic abstraction.

"Reading Images"

		Token	Process	Value
consciousness (Symboliser symbolic processing)	projects	meaning x construed by language (Value)	means	y
		pictorial re-presentation of visual experience (Token)

Why Stratify The Content Plane?

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237):

Of course, what we are recognising here as two distinct constructions, the semantic and the grammatical, never had or could have had any existence the one prior to the other; they are our analytic representation of the overall semioticising of experience — how experience is construed into meaning. If the congruent form had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

Cognitively Projected Propositions: Reported Interrogatives

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 450-1):

In the environment of ‘mental’ projection, the contrast between statement and question is not concerned with the speech functional orientation of giving vs demanding information but rather with the status of the validity of the information.  In a statement, it is fixed with respect to the polarity and the elements of transitivity (realised by an indirect declarative clause optionally introduced by that), but in a question, it is open with respect [to] the polarity (realised by an indirect yes/no interrogative clause introduced by whether or if) or one (or more) of the elements of transitivity (realised by an indirect wh- interrogative clause introduced by who, which, when, where, etc).  Consequently, mental clauses representing an ‘undecided’ state of mind are used to project indirect questions.  These include clauses of wondering and doubting, finding out and checking, and contemplating, which tend to be characterised by special lexical verbs such as wonder, ascertain …

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 463):

If the reported clause is interrogative it typically shifts into the declarative; the declarative is the unmarked mood, and is used in all clauses that do not select for mood independently, including all dependent clauses. A yes/no interrogative becomes declarative, introduced by if or whether; a WH- interrogative becomes declarative with the WH- element remaining at the front.

How To Improve A Theory

Step 1: First make sure you understand the theory in its own terms.

Martin’s Cline Of Instantiation Applied To Martin’s Stratification

Martin's strata: genre, register, discourse semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology

Martin's cline of instantiation: system, genre/register, text type, text, reading.

On this model,

(1) register is simultaneously more abstract than discourse semantics (in terms of stratification) and a sub-system of discourse semantics (in terms of the latter stratum's instantiation);

(2) genre is simultaneously more abstract than register (in terms of stratification), and a sub-system of register (in terms of the latter stratum's instantiation);

(3) register is simultaneously a stratal system and a sub-system of itself (in terms of that stratum's instantiation);

(4) genre is simultaneously a stratal system and a sub-system of itself (in terms of that stratum's instantiation);

etc …

cf Halliday's original (logically coherent) model:

Instantiation / Stratification Matrix

Locating Genre in The SFL Model

Because Martin's model of genre as a level of context isn't theorised according to SFL principles — see for example arguments here here and/or here — components of the model are scattered across the architecture of SFL theory. For example:

1. to the extent that genre refers to text type, it is a point of variation on the cline of instantiation: specifically, it is register viewed from the instance pole;
2. to the extent that genre refers to the rôle of language in context, it is defined by features of the system of MODE, and so by the textual metafunction at the level of context;
3. to the extent that genre refers to the sequence in which ideational and interpersonal meanings are organised, it is within the textual metafunction at the level of semantics.

The Difference Between Material Setting, Context And Cotext

When we construe a person speaking, we construe a material order and a semiotic order of experience.

• The material order includes the person speaking and their physical circumstances; while
• the semiotic order includes the projected content of what is said: the wording that realises meaning. 

So

1. the term material setting refers to the material order of a person speaking;
2. the term context refers to the (instance of) culture being realised in the content of what is being said — i.e. the context is of the semiotic order: it is the culture construed as a semiotic system (field, tenor and mode) that is realised in language;
3. the term cotext refers to the rest of the language that accompanies an identified portion of what is being said.

It is important to understand that the term context does not refer to either the material setting or the (semiotic) cotext.

The misunderstanding that context refers to the cotext and the material setting can be found in Martin (1992: 33), as recorded here.

Semiotic Context And Material Setting

Context is of the semiotic order of experience and realised by the content that is projected from the material order through a 'sayer saying' or a 'senser sensing'. The material order realisation of context is the expression plane of language.

The material setting is of the same order of experience as the 'sayer saying' and the expression plane. It does not materially realise the semiotic context — the expression plane does.

Embedded (Defining) Vs Enclosed (Non-Defining) Relative Clauses Exemplified

(1) Defining, so embedded as Qualifier

Ivy’s uncle [[who is a doctor]] lives nearby (whereas her other uncle lives miles away).

(2) Non-Defining, so ranking and hypotactically elaborating:

Ivy’s uncle <<who is a doctor >> lives nearby (so let’s phone him).

Defining Vs Non-Defining Relative Clauses

Consider the following sentence:

The house that Jack built, which is a British nursery rhyme, is a 'cumulative' tale.

There are two relative clauses:

1. that Jack built
2. which is a British nursery rhyme

The first of these is a defining relative clause, while the second is a non-defining relative clause.

On the SFL model, the defining relative clause is embedded as Qualifier in a nominal group, while a non-defining relative clause is a ranking clause within a clause complex.  In the example above, the non-defining relative interrupts the clause on which it is dependent, and is termed 'enclosed'.

The distinction between the clauses is indicated by the following notation:

The house [[that Jack built]] <<which is a British nursery rhyme>> is a 'cumulative' tale.

Let's take a trinocular perspective on these types of relative clauses.

The view from above (the meaning being realised by the wording):

In terms of the logical semantic relations between the relative clause and the item it modifies, both types involve hypotactic elaboration.

The relation is hypotactic because each relative clause is dependent on the item that it modifies:

• [[that Jack built]] is dependent on the house
• <<which is a British nursery rhyme>> is dependent on the house [[that Jack built]]

The relation is elaborating because each relative clause expands the item it modifies by further specifying or describing it:

• [[that Jack built]] further specifies/describes the house
• <<which is a British nursery rhyme>> further specifies/describes the house [[that Jack built]]

Hypotactic elaboration is what the two types of relative clause have in common.  But they also significantly differ in meaning.  A defining relative clause specifies a particular subset of a general class, whereas a non-defining relative clause 'adds a further characterisation of something that is taken to be already fully specific' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 400).

The view from below (how the wording is realised):

In terms of intonational realisation, the two types of relative clause differ markedly.

In the unmarked case — unless there are textual pressures for doing otherwise — the defining relative clause is realised within the same tone group realising the nominal group in which it functions as embedded Qualifier.  That is, both are packaged as a single unit of information.  So, in the above example:

• the house and [[that Jack built]] are realised within the same tone group.

On the other hand, in the unmarked case, non-defining relative clauses are realised by their own separate tone group.  That is, the relative clause and the item that it modifies are each packaged as  distinct units of information.  So, in the above example:

• the house [[that Jack built]] and <<which is a British nursery rhyme>> are each realised as distinct tone groups, thereby construing them as distinct units of information.

The view from roundabout (systemic relations at the level of wording):

In terms of systemic possibilities, the two type of relational clause differ markedly. This is a consequence of defining relative clauses being embedded as Qualifiers in nominal groups, and non-defining being ranking clauses in their own right.

Dependent elaborating clauses, of which non-defining relative clauses are a type, can be given thematic prominence in a clause nexus.  A non-finite agnate (see Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 404) of the example above is the following:

• A British nursery rhyme, the house that Jack built is a 'cumulative' tale.
  

(If you don't understand how this clause is agnate with the original, see http://thoughts-that-cross-my-mind.blogspot.com.au/2013/09/michl-odonnell-on-non-defining-relative.html)

However, as embedded clauses, defining relative clauses are not given thematic prominence in a clause.  For example, we do not say:

• Jack built, the house, which is a British nursery rhyme, is a 'cumulative' tale.

Moreover, the lexicogrammatical domain which is elaborated by a non-defining relative clause may be a whole clause or any of its constituents, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 400) point out, whereas the domain elaborated by a defining relative clause is restricted to a nominal group.

In summary, taking a trinocular vision demonstrates that defining and non-defining relative clauses share common logical semantic features, but differ markedly in every other respect.

As Halliday (2008: 6) has pointed out:

The boundaries of any grammatical category are likely to be fuzzy […] — such indeterminacy is a general property of the grammar.  The grammarian attempts to define each category as accurately as possible, looking at it from three different angles: its systemic environment (contrast with other term or terms in the system, and the relationship of that system to other systems); its meaning (proportionality in semantic terms), and it form.  In other words, the grammarian adopts a “trinocular” perspective on the stratal hierarchy so that every category is viewed “from round about”, “from above” and “from below”.  And since the views from these different angles often conflict, assigning instances to a particular category involves some degree of compromise, where criteria will depend on the purposes of the description.