The Thought Occurs

Monday, 4 September 2023

Positive Discourse Analysis













It is error only, and not truth, that shrinks from inquiry.
— Thomas Paine

Wednesday, 16 August 2023

Circumstances Inherent In A Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 243):
There are also, in fact, certain circumstances that are construed as inherent in a process. This happens with [transformative] ‘enhancing’ clauses construing movement through space of a participant: here a circumstance of Place represents the destination of that movement and may be inherent in the process. For example:
Did these books and articles put groceries on the table?
They carved its image into stone || and placed it on their temples and palaces.

Friday, 5 May 2023

David Rose Attempting To Deceive The Asflanet And Sysfling Communities

In order to have open public discussions about language and pedagogy could I please ask people to use this official discussion list for ASFLA.


The “sys-func” address is now a privately managed blog site which I keep trying to block (because of how it has been used), but keeps popping up in my feed because all our colleagues and friends are in my contact list.

 

In another thread (unfortunately conducted on the private “sys-func” blog, instead of sysfling or asflanet), William Armour asked the age old question …

 

The jig’s up Chris
Just be kind to people and most people will be kind to you


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Rose has resorted to telling what he knows to be an outright lie in order to knowingly deceive his colleagues on the Asflanet and Sysfling email lists. The Sys-Func email list is demonstrably not a blog, private or otherwise, as shown by the public discussions that have taken place over the last 30 years.

An ethical intelligent reader might ask why Rose would want to betray the trust of his colleagues.

[2] Here Rose repeats and compounds the lie by further claiming that he is not the one who has been caught out, without a defence.

[3] To be clear, here Rose is explaining that the reason he told deliberate lies was in order to be deliberately unkind. That is, it was an act of bullying. See, also David Rose Negatively Judging My 'Behaviour'.

See also Rose's Deceptive Use Of Wikipedia.

Friday, 24 March 2023

Paradigmatic Lexicogrammar vs Syntagmatic Lexical Collocation

Graham Lock wrote to SYSFLING on 23 Mar 2023, at 11:21:
A question for the theorists among us. Like so many I have been trying out ChatGPT and have been astounded at what it can do. For example, I asked it to translate into English passages from an obscure Buddhist text in Classical Chinese that I am 99.9% sure has never been translated before and it produced a reasonably good translation. That is not particularly surprising. What did surprise me is that when challenged on parts of its translation, it was able to engage in a discussion of why it had translated in a certain way, including unpacking some metaphors (I can upload some screen shots if anyone is interested). It was also able to consider and evaluate alternative translations. How does it do this without some semantic “understanding”? I know nothing about AI, but from everything I have read and heard its language processing is entirely connectionist. It trawls through huge amounts of text identifying and matching patters, and making predictions. It can do some basic parsing of syntax but, I am assured, cannot do any kind of semantic analysis, including semantically oriented functional analyses.. Any semantic “understanding” it comes to must be gleaned through identifying and comparing intra text relations, i.e. collocations. So here’s my question. Was John Sinclair right when he said that SFL greatly exaggerated the role of (paradigmatic) lexicogrammar and greatly underestimated the role of (syntagmatic) lexical collocation in generating coherent text?


Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the claim attributed to John Sinclair misunderstands SFL Theory. The syntagmatic juxtaposition of words is the realisation of choices in paradigmatic lexicogrammatical systems in logogenesis. So it is not a matter of "underestimating the role" of one and "exaggerating the role" of the other. One is the (less abstract) realisation of the other.


Postscript:

There have been more than 50 replies to this post on Sysfling, not one of them answering Graham Lock's theoretical question.

Tuesday, 21 March 2023

A Close Examination Of Fontaine's 2023 ISFC Plenary Abstract

Grammatical Energy: the Powerhouse of Language

“Meaning is brought about by language; and the energy by which this is achieved, the source of its semogenic power, is grammar.”
(Halliday, 2005, p. 63)

Within the framework of systemic functional linguistics (SFL), language is modelled as a semiotic system.  At the heart of this language system is the lexicogrammar, which, for Halliday (2005 p 74), is the powerhouse of language. Despite its central role, however, there is generally a feeling that this core area is relatively understudied, at least for English, which has historically provided the foundation of the theory. While the expansive development and use of SFL for transdisciplinary purposes (Wegener et al, in preparation) is very welcome and indeed promising, the source of grammatical energy, the powerhouse itself, should also be the focus of our attention — not instead of, but in addition to, the wealth of work being done on the understanding of its effects on people and society at large. Accepting that language is a semiotic system implies that we should also accept that while it is "made of meaning", it has "to materialise — to become matter" (Halliday 2005 p 68). It follows that if the semiotic system is entirely semantic, the materialised form (matter) of language must be related to, but outside of (or at some boundary of) the semiotic system. We might agree that the materialised form is embedded in context, but the language system as a whole, i.e. its theoretical (abstract) representation, cannot be. For this reason, the distinction between instantiation and actualisation becomes significant, where "actualisation is defined as the relation between the actual and either the potential or the typical" (Wegener 2011 p 98). 

In this talk, I use the semantic profile of watch, as an atypical verb of visual perception, to demonstrate ways in which, at the lexical level, we can explore the relationship between instantiation and actualisationI will also consider its semantic features in relation to several related verbs (see, stare, look and listen). The unique profile of watch makes it a challenging case study because it appears to defy categorisation and as such, provides a useful example to demonstrate the significance of the SFL concept of 'meaning potential' in a meaning driven account of lexical semantics (cf. Allwood 2003, Fontaine 2017). By shift [sic] our focus to the lexical side of the lexicogrammar stratum, we may shed more light on the theoretical powerhouse, ideally resulting in a better understanding of its grammatical energy.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this unsourced 'feeling' is self-contradictory. Since the lexicogrammar 'has historically provided the foundation of the theory' — Halliday's term for the theory is Systemic Functional Grammar — this 'core area' is demonstrably not 'relatively understudied', especially with regard to English, since the theory of grammar is elaborated in most detail in the description of English (Introduction to Functional Grammar 1985, 1994, 2004, 2014).

[2] To be clear, the work that Fontaine positively appraises as 'very welcome and indeed promising' is her own collaboration:
Wegener, R., McCabe, A., Sellami Baklouti, A. & Fontaine, L. (In preparation) The Routledge Handbook of Transdisciplinary Systemic Functional Linguistics. London: Routledge.
[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the grammar is the CPU ('powerhouse') of language, and the CPU of the grammar is the clause. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 22, 10):
Grammar is the central processing unit of language, the powerhouse where meanings are created … The clause is the central processing unit in the lexicogrammar — in the specific sense that it is in the clause that meanings of different kinds are mapped into an integrated grammatical structure.
It will be seen that, despite the title of her paper, Fontaine is concerned here not with this 'powerhouse', but with lexis.

[4] To be clear, no semiotic system is entirely semantic, since every semiotic system also necessarily includes an expression plane, and in the case of language, the content plane includes a stratum of lexicogrammar as well as a stratum of semantics. ('Semiotic' does not mean 'semantic'.)

[5] To be clear, the 'materialised form' of language is the audible sound or visible marks made by bodily action. These are specified by the systems of the expression plane of language.

[6] To be clear, the materialised forms of language, audible sounds and visible marks, form part of the first-order material experience, whereas context is a plane of second-order semiotic experience. In SFL Theory, 'context' refers to the culture as a semiotic system. Clearly, here Fontaine is misconstruing 'context' as material.

[7] As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 25) explain:
A language is a series of redundancies by which we link our eco-social environment to non-random disturbances in the air (soundwaves).
That is, language links two aspects of its material environment, and in that sense, can be said to be "embedded" in the material order (Fontaine's understanding of 'context'). On the other hand, in SFL terms, language construes and realises context: the culture as a semiotic system.

[8] This confuses a first-order semiotic, language ('the language system as a whole'), with a second-order semiotic, metalanguage ('its theoretical (abstract) representation').

[9] To be clear, the claim here is that because the language system as a whole cannot be embedded in the material environment ("context"), the distinction between instantiation and actualisation (Wegener 2011) becomes significant.

Wegener proposes actualisation as an interstratal relation (p98) between actual and either potential or typical (p95):

However, this distinction is motivated by a misunderstanding of instantiation (p95):
Instantiation as a relation is not contextualised. It is, as Halliday (1992) suggests, entirely intrastratal. Because it is intrastratal it does not reach the actual. The actual is interstratal and thus is contextualised.
To be clear, in SFL Theory, the 'contextualisation' of instantiation is the dimension of stratification. As such, the notion of 'actualisation' is a confusion of the dimensions of instantiation and stratification, proposed as an additional complementary dimension.

[10] To be clear, the verb watch is grammatically anomalous, as noted 29 years ago in Halliday (1994: 139):
The verb watch is anomalous: in I’m watching you, the tense suggests a behavioural process but the you appears as a participant like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause.

[11] To be clear, the concern 'at the lexical level' is with the meaning of lexical items in open sets, not with meanings of grammatical systems, such as the clause. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604n):

We can talk of "lexical semantics" if we want to foreground the meanings of words (lexical items functioning in open sets), and of "grammatical semantics" if we want to foreground the meanings of closed grammatical systems;
[12] To be clear, in terms of 'grammatical semantics', the verb see typically serves as a mental process, whereas the verbs stare, look and listen typically serve as behavioural processes.

[13] To be clear, the verb watch is not unique in this respect. Other examples include observe, ogle, eye, view, contemplate and ponder. In each case, the tense suggests behavioural process, but each affords a Phenomenon, suggesting a mental process.

[14] Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 549-52) outline five types of ideational indeterminacy: ambiguities, blends, overlaps, neutralisations, and complementarities. Anomalies like clauses featuring the verb watch are cases of overlap: 'two categories overlap so that certain members display some features of each'.

[15] To be clear, the term 'meaning potential' in SFL Theory refers to language as system, as opposed to language as instance (text). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 33):
The meaning potential itself is one pole on the dimension of instantiation: it is instantiated in the unfolding of text, with patterns of typical instantiation (specific domains of meaning) lying somewhere in between the potential and the instance.

See also