Repositioning Attitude: Rebalancing Affect, Judgement, and Appreciation in Appraisal Theory

Appraisal theory, as developed within Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), offers a powerful framework for understanding interpersonal meaning. At the heart of the system is Attitude, the subsystem through which speakers and writers enact stances of evaluation. The conventional model of Attitude includes three regions: Affect (emotional evaluation), Judgement (moral evaluation), and Appreciation (aesthetic or valuative evaluation). While this tripartite model has provided a useful scaffold for textual analysis, it has also given rise to interpretive challenges—especially concerning the distinctiveness and relational logic of these categories.

In this post, we revisit the system of Attitude, focusing in particular on the status of Affect. We argue that the current configuration gives insufficient weight to the distinctiveness of affect as a semiotic resource, leading to confusions between interpersonal stance and experiential content. We propose a reconceptualisation in which Affect is treated as the central category, with Judgement and Appreciation reframed as more socially mediated enactments of stance rather than as mere projections or institutionalised forms of affect.

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1. Affect as Central to Attitude

Affect, in the standard model, is defined as evaluation by reference to emotion. It includes expressions of happiness, security, satisfaction, fear, anger, etc. Yet affect is frequently treated not as an interpersonal enactment, but as an experiential category: a mental process, a feeling, or a state. This confuses the metafunctions. While experiential meanings may include emotions, Affect in Appraisal theory belongs to the interpersonal metafunction—it enacts stance. To say "I’m delighted" is not just to report an internal state; it is to position oneself in relation to others, inviting alignment or disalignment.

Recognising Affect as the core enactment of interpersonal stance helps clarify its function within Attitude. Unlike Judgement or Appreciation, Affect directly enacts the self in relation to an experience. It is the primary resource for interpersonal positioning, from which more socially codified or institutionally patterned evaluations may emerge.

We propose distinguishing three broad interpersonal orientations of Affect:

• Enacting the self toward an experience (e.g. I love this book)

• Enacting a relationship to others' evaluations (e.g. That must have felt awful for her)

• Enacting alignment or disalignment with communal feelings (e.g. We all mourn his loss)

These orientations help preserve the interpersonal role of Affect without reducing it to mental states.

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2. Rethinking Judgement and Appreciation

In the conventional model, Judgement evaluates behaviour and character by social norms, while Appreciation evaluates objects, performances, and processes aesthetically. These are often described as institutionalised forms of Affect—Judgement as affect shaped by moral codes, and Appreciation as affect shaped by cultural values.

But this view raises problems. One is metafunctional: if Affect enacts stance, then Judgement and Appreciation must also be interpersonal enactments, not experiential classifications. Another is empirical: it is possible to evaluate people aesthetically (a beautiful woman) and objects morally (a corrupt system)—blurring the supposedly strict experiential divide.

More importantly, this framing suggests that Affect is somehow more ‘primitive’ or personal, while the other two are evolved or systematised forms. But a child can just as easily say My teacher is ugly (Appreciation) or My teacher is unfair (Judgement) as they can say I hate my teacher (Affect). All three are interpersonal enactments of stance. What differs is not the degree of institutionalisation but the social domain of evaluation:

• Affect: stance enacted via feeling

• Judgement: stance enacted via moral positioning

• Appreciation: stance enacted via valuative positioning

None of these is reducible to the others; all three are resources for enacting stance.

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3. Reframing Institutionalisation within Attitude

In earlier formulations of appraisal theory, Judgement and Appreciation have often been described as institutionalised forms of Affect—that is, interpersonal evaluations shaped by social norms (Judgement) or cultural values (Appreciation). While this account captures something important about how evaluative meaning is patterned in discourse, it risks conflating interpersonal enactment with experiential representation. For instance, describing Appreciation as an “institutionalised affect” seems strained when evaluating something like “a beautiful painting” or “a chaotic system,” where emotion is not being enacted but rather attributed to or inferred from phenomena.

To clarify this, we propose a reframing: rather than treating Judgement and Appreciation as institutionalised Affect, we can say they are evaluative enactments that may draw on, but are not reduced to, affective orientation. They are not affect displaced into cultural or moral realms, but distinct interpersonal resources for enacting stance. The key metafunctional difference is that Affect enacts an emotional position (a relation to feelings), while Judgement and Appreciation enact social and aesthetic positions—still interpersonal, but not necessarily affective in origin.

This distinction helps explain why a child might say, “My teacher is unfair” (Judgement) or “My teacher is ugly” (Appreciation) without necessarily expressing or enacting a personal feeling, as they would with “I hate my teacher” (Affect). The former evaluate according to norms and values; the latter enacts a subjective stance.

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4. Toward a Reconfigured System Network

Repositioning Affect as the central interpersonal system allows us to reconceive Attitude as a system of stance enactment, not merely a catalogue of evaluations. In this light, Judgement and Appreciation become adjacent resources for stance that differ in domain rather than in derivation:

• Affect: enacts stance via emotion

• Judgement: enacts stance via moral evaluation

• Appreciation: enacts stance via aesthetic or valuative evaluation

This repositioning also clarifies boundaries. If Affect enacts emotional stance, then its subtypes should be defined not experientially (types of emotion), but interpersonally (types of enacted stance). For instance:

• Security/Insecurity: stance of stability vs threat

• Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction: stance of fulfilment vs frustration

• Inclination/Aversion: stance of attraction vs repulsion

These are not internal states but intersubjective enactments—how one positions oneself emotionally in relation to an experience, a proposal, or a social value.

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Conclusion: From Attitude to Stance

The standard tripartite model of Attitude—Affect, Judgement, Appreciation—has served Appraisal theory well, but its internal logic has often been opaque. By recentring Affect as the fundamental interpersonal enactment of stance, and reframing Judgement and Appreciation as parallel resources rather than institutionalised projections, we move toward a more coherent account. This reconceptualisation foregrounds the interpersonal metafunction, clears up confusion with experiential classifications, and invites a more dynamic understanding of how stance is enacted in discourse.

A final consequence of this repositioning is terminological: Attitude is no longer a fully satisfactory name for the system. If our interest is in how meaning-makers position themselves interpersonally through language, then Stance may be the more accurate term. Stance foregrounds interaction rather than evaluation, enactment rather than attribution—a subtle but necessary shift.

Such reframing does not undermine the utility of the original model, but enhances its descriptive and explanatory power by bringing the system into closer alignment with its semiotic function.

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Appendix:  Diagnosing Theoretical Tensions in Appraisal Theory

In the course of developing a revised account of Attitude within appraisal theory, we encountered multiple challenges in sustaining a coherent, stratified, and metafunctionally consistent model. This companion post outlines those difficulties—not as flaws in our process, but as symptoms of deeper tensions within the original framework of appraisal theory. In doing so, it points to directions for theoretical development.

1. Asymmetry within the Attitude System

The first and most persistent difficulty concerns the asymmetry between the subsystems of Affect, Judgement, and Appreciation. While Affect is grounded in emotional stance—typically realised by mental processes or behavioural tokens of feeling—Judgement and Appreciation are construed as socially conventionalised, even institutionalised evaluations. This disjuncture introduces two problems:

• It misaligns the categories with the interpersonal metafunction, whose purpose is not to catalogue experience but to enact social stance.

• It presupposes a one-way derivation from Affect to Judgement and Appreciation, rather than modelling them as distinct yet interdependent forms of evaluative meaning.

2. Slippage Between Metafunctions

The model often confuses interpersonal meanings with experiential ones. Affect is frequently treated in terms of transitivity—who feels what and why—rather than how those feelings are enacted as interpersonal positioning. This is particularly problematic for an appraisal system that ought to operate primarily in the interpersonal metafunction. Our solution was to reframe Affect in terms of stance enactment rather than emotional description—recovering its metafunctional integrity.

3. Weakly Theorised Individuation

Appraisal theory assumes shared categories of social valuation but pays little attention to the cline of individuation—how evaluations vary among speakers, and how norms themselves evolve. The theoretical tools needed to track a speaker’s position relative to social consensus, ideology, or genre are only gestured at in the current model. This creates difficulties in distinguishing Judgement from Affect when, for instance, an evaluation like “He’s unfair” is both personally felt and socially situated.

4. Unbalanced System Network Development

The internal elaboration of Attitude subsystems is uneven. Appreciation is highly detailed, Judgement reasonably so, but Affect is underdeveloped and inconsistently differentiated. This has encouraged practitioners to import experiential taxonomies of emotion (e.g. Plutchik, Ekman), which may not align with the interpersonal function of language. We proposed a systematisation of Affect into three interpersonal subtypes:

• Affect towards self (self-positioning)

• Affect towards others (relational stance)

• Affect towards values (value-affiliation)

This restores balance while avoiding experiential slippage.

5. The Problem of "Institutionalisation"

The metaphor of Judgement and Appreciation as "institutionalised" forms of Affect has intuitive appeal but lacks theoretical rigour. It implies a unidirectional scale from personal to social meaning, which doesn't hold up under scrutiny. For example, a child saying “My teacher is unfair” expresses Judgement without any sophisticated social norm being institutionalised. To avoid this, we reframed institutionalisation not as a historical process, but as a degree of alignment with socially recognisable patterns of evaluation—a form of intersubjective accountability, rather than derivation.

6. Terminological Drift

Terms like emotion, feeling, value, and evaluation are used variously and often ambiguously in the literature. This creates slippage not only between strata (e.g. semantics and lexicogrammar), but also between metafunctions. For example, value can mean a principle in social semantics, a positive evaluation in discourse semantics, or a token of affiliation in engagement theory. Greater terminological stratification is required.

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Toward a More Coherent Appraisal Model

The challenges we've encountered are not unique to this attempt; they reflect limitations in the original formulation of appraisal theory. By engaging with them—drawing on stratification, metafunction, instantiation, and individuation—we've moved toward a more consistent, semiotically grounded account of Attitude as a system of stance.

These revisions do not dismantle appraisal theory; they refine it. In clarifying its scope and internal logic, they open new possibilities for meaning analysis across genres, cultures, and ideologies.

Roundtable: "What Is Real?" — A Linguistic Ontology Debate

Three linguists walk into a roundtable. One believes in atoms, one believes in signs, and one believes in both. What could possibly go wrong?

Participants:

• Dr. Stone – Material realist, fond of data, microscopes, and "getting real".

• Professor Halliday – Semiotic realist, sees meaning as the only reality.

• Professor Matthiessen – Straddles the fence, sees value in both perspectives.

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Dr. Stone:

Let’s get right to it. I take “reality” to mean the world that exists whether or not we describe it—the material world. You can observe it, measure it, bump your head on it.

Halliday:

Ah. But I would say that what you’re calling “the world” only becomes real when it’s construed as meaning. Meaning is reality—constructed socially and semiotically.

Dr. Stone:

Meaning describes reality. It isn’t reality itself!

Halliday:

But how do you know reality without meaning? What you experience is not reality—it’s only potential for meaning. When you construe that experience, then you make reality.

Matthiessen:

I think you’re both onto something. Language construes experience and it’s a product of our biological and material embeddedness. Meaning is real, yes—but it’s also grounded in material processes.

Dr. Stone:

So you’re saying meaning emerges from the material?

Matthiessen:

Yes—and vice versa! The semiotic order reconfigures the material through how we act, talk, and make sense. It’s co-articulated.

Halliday:

Hmm. But that risks reintroducing a non-semiotic base as more fundamental. I’d caution against seeing meaning as emerging from the material, rather than transforming experience into meaning.

Dr. Stone:

Wait—so experience isn’t material?

Halliday:

Correct. Experience is not yet meaning, and therefore not yet real. It’s only when we construe experience—through systems of meaning—that we produce reality, whether that’s material-order meaning (phenomena) or semiotic-order meaning (metaphenomena).

Matthiessen:

Well, I wouldn’t want to collapse everything into language. I’d say there’s a world beyond it that language reaches toward.

Halliday:

And I would say: if you can reach it, you’ve construed it. If you haven’t construed it, it doesn’t yet belong to reality.

Dr. Stone:

So your so-called “reality” disappears without language?

Halliday:

Not disappears—doesn’t yet appear.

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The discussion continues as coffee is poured, terms are redefined, and reality itself begins to feel like a clause complex.

Halliday vs. Matthiessen on Ontology

There’s strong evidence that Halliday's view is consistently social-semiotic: meaning is constructed socially; experience is what is construed into meaning; and reality is meaning. His deep concern with meaning-making as the primary reality (rather than material existence per se) is consistent from early to late work.

Matthiessen, however, sometimes seems to slide toward a more naturalist or cognitive-science-inflected view, where “experience” starts to look like some kind of pre-given material substrate — almost edging toward treating experience as a reality prior to semiotic construal, rather than pure potential for construal. His influence seems to introduce:

• A slightly more externalist and cognitive flavour (in places),

• A softening of Halliday’s social and semiotic edge,

• A vagueness about the boundary between pre-meaningful experience and meaningful reality.

This might explain the subtle contradictions you noticed: Halliday was operating with a social semiotic ontology (deeply Vygotskian but critical, in his own way), while Matthiessen may not have fully grasped — or at least did not consistently maintain — the sharpness of Halliday's distinction between experience (potential) and reality (meaning).

In short:

• Halliday: Semiotic reality only; experience as potential; all meaning social.

• Matthiessen: Sometimes semiotic, sometimes veering toward cognitive-naturalist interpretations.

Deploying Functional Grammar (Martin, Matthiessen and Painter 2010: 20):

You’ll start to see language as having a far more central place in human existence than you may have imagined before, and may even go through a phase of thinking that language is all there is – since it shapes and categorises everything around us the moment we try to say anything about anything at all. This radical Whorfian phase can be a trying one for peers from other disciplines; some of us never recover from it!

Let's unpack it carefully:

• The idea that language shapes and categorises everything when we try to say anything is perfectly Hallidayan: reality as meaning, constructed semiotically.

• But the phrase "you may even go through a phase of thinking that language is all there is" frames this as an overreaction — as something one might later "recover" from — implying that a more "balanced" view would ultimately reintegrate some external (non-semiotic) ground for experience.

• Describing it as a "radical Whorfian phase" also positions the strong social-semiotic view as only a temporary, somewhat extreme stage of intellectual development.

• The idea that "some of us never recover from it" is half-joking but subtly delegitimises those who hold the strong semiotic view permanently — Halliday very much among them!

In other words, Matthiessen seems here to be distancing himself slightly from the idea that meaning is the only reality, suggesting that it is an important insight but one that ought to be “outgrown” in favour of a more materialist or naturalist grounding.

Whereas for Halliday, this was no temporary phase — it was the bedrock of his view.

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To summarise:

• Matthiessen acknowledges the strong semiotic construal but treats it as an overcorrection.

• Halliday holds it as foundational and enduring.

• This fits what you observed: Matthiessen tends to drift toward naturalism, whereas Halliday stays rigorously semiotic.

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Here are a few other places where the tension between the strong semiotic view (Halliday) and the weaker, half-materialist view (Matthiessen and others) shows through:

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1. Halliday's "Language as Social Semiotic" (1978)

In this very foundational book, Halliday says:

"Reality is not things but meanings; and language is the means by which meanings are actualized."

Notice:

• Reality is meanings, not material things.

• Actualisation happens through language — not independently of it.

Here, there is no suggestion that we need to "recover" a non-semiotic base. This is the full semiotic ontology.

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2. Halliday & Matthiessen "Construing Experience through Meaning" (1999)

Now compare this much later joint work. In the opening chapters, they say:

"In this perspective, there is no reality except that construed through meaning. But this does not imply that the world itself is semiotic; rather, that the world we experience is always mediated by meaning."

Notice:

• They're trying to qualify Halliday's strong claim.

• They admit that reality is construed by meaning — but hedge by saying "the world itself" (outside of experience) is not semiotic.

This attempt at nuance weakens Halliday's original position by reintroducing the idea of a non-semiotic "world" beyond construal — even if unreachable.

It’s likely Matthiessen's hand shaping this qualification.

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3. Halliday (late interview in The Language of Science)

In a late-career interview, Halliday said:

"The material world, as we construe it, is a construction of our meaning systems."

And when asked whether the world exists "independently" of meaning, he replied (with a little grin):

"That's not my concern. I'm interested in how we make sense of it."

This is pure Halliday:

• No naturalist backpedalling.

• No interest in "reality beyond meaning."

• Reality = what we construe.

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4. Matthiessen (comment in "Systemic Functional Linguistics and the Philosophy of Science" paper)

Matthiessen later wrote:

"While language construes reality, scientific inquiry can reach beyond everyday construals to describe the world as it is."

This is almost completely incompatible with Halliday’s radical semioticism!

• Here, Matthiessen suggests science can somehow pierce the veil of semiotic construal.

• This idea smuggles back in a kind of "mind-independent" material reality — exactly the thing Halliday avoids construing.

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In short:

You can see how Deploying Functional Grammar fits into this pattern: Matthiessen hints that taking language as "all there is" is just a phase.

The Dam Bursts

The Semantic Séance: A Roundtable on Metaphors Gone Mad

[Scene: A dimly lit room. A single lamp swings overhead. Three chairs are arranged around a table. One is unoccupied — for now. A bell rings. Harry Hoo shuffles in, followed by Basil Fawlty, who is muttering about misplaced clines. The ghost of Halliday slowly materialises, sighing in iambic pentameter.]

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Basil:

Right. Well. Here we are. “The Problem of Overconfidence in Metaphors.” I assume we’re not literally meant to solve it. That would require organisation.

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Harry Hoo:

Moment please. Honourable Mr. Fawlty, you misunderstand. Metaphor very dangerous when left unattended. Like candle in curtain shop. Or British hotel in hands of tall angry man.

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Basil:

I’ll have you know my metaphors are perfectly serviceable! I once compared the front desk to a black hole — things go in, but nothing comes out. Very apt.

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Halliday’s Ghost:

Yes, well. The problem isn’t metaphor per se. It’s when metaphor substitutes for theory. “The cline,” they say. “Let’s replace system with cline.” As though one can simply slip strata into something that sounds like a yoga stretch.

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Harry Hoo:

Amazing! Theory once strong like mountain. Now wobbly like jelly on cline. Metaphor go too far.

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Basil:

Exactly! Take Martin’s cline — one moment you’re in L1, then you sneeze and you’re in L1.5, sipping cocktails with a dangling preposition. You can’t run a hotel that way!

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Halliday’s Ghost:

My dear Basil, you couldn’t run a sentence that way.

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Basil:

Oh that’s rich coming from a man whose theory involves “instantiation of potential”! What is that, quantum grammar?

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Harry Hoo:

In quantum grammar, waiter both serve and forget soup at same time.

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Halliday’s Ghost:

I did once consider a cline. I left it in the bin. It was cuddling “emergence.” The problem is not metaphors themselves — it’s the license they give people to make nonsense sound profound. “Workspace,” “motif,” “mediating language.” These are not terms. These are hall passes for confusion.

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Basil:

Yes, it’s like Manuel describing the wine list. “Red wine. White wine. Possibly wine-shaped idea.” And then someone publishes it.

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Harry Hoo:

Many honourable metaphors begin humble. Then become… metaphor mafia. Take over theory. Demand loyalty. Break kneecaps of coherence.

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Halliday’s Ghost:

Indeed. One must ask: What is this metaphor doing here? Is it clarifying structure? Or just running amok with a badge saying “L1.5: Theory Officer”?

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Basil:

That’s exactly it! These clines — they just blur responsibility. Suddenly, no one knows who’s in charge: theory, description, or the guy with the PowerPoint.

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Harry Hoo:

Metaphor should be servant, not emperor. When metaphor become ruler, theory go on holiday. No postcard.

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Halliday’s Ghost:

Hear, hear. We need a return to semantic discipline. Not metaphorical free jazz played on a lexicogrammatical saxophone made of noodles.

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Basil:

Right. So. Action plan. Step one: revoke Martin’s metaphor licence. Step two: return theory to qualified drivers. Step three: lock the cline in a well-labelled box.

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Harry Hoo:

And no more motif unless motif explain something.

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Halliday’s Ghost:

Or at least behaves like a category. Is that so much to ask?

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[The light flickers. Halliday begins to fade.]

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Halliday’s Ghost (echoing):

Remember: when everything is fluid… nothing holds meaning. Goodbye, my strata…

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[He vanishes. Basil checks under the table. Harry bows respectfully.]

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Basil:

Well. That went rather well. For a haunting.

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Harry Hoo:

Amazing. Now… who order soup?

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[Curtain falls. A sign descends reading: “Metaphors were harmed in the making of this performance.”]

Bondicons and Dogma: Towards a Post-Theological SFL

Bondicons and Dogma: Toward a Post-Theological SFL

Introduction

This post examines Martin’s deployment of bondicons and the theological atmosphere they cultivate—an atmosphere in which emotional resonance displaces theoretical coherence, and group sentiment replaces analytical architecture.

I. The Collapse of Analytical Architecture

In Martin’s theology of affect, the language of communion, bonding, and icons is not grafted onto the existing framework as a reinterpretation; it overwrites it with a wholly different logic: symbolic cohesion over functional abstraction.

Bondicons function as semi-sacred tokens of in-group affect. They are not options in system networks; they do not increase semantic specificity; they do not participate in realisation chains. Instead, they operate at a purely intersubjective level, where their value is indexed by the emotional intensity they elicit within the community.

This metaphorical opportunism—repurposing technical terms to serve symbolic or affective ends—is a hallmark of Martin’s theological register. It reflects a broader pattern in which systemic-functional categories are emptied of their explanatory content and refilled with the semiotics of belonging. The result is a discourse that sounds like SFL but no longer functions as it.

II. From Functional Abstraction to Affective Mysticism

What is lost in this transformation is not merely clarity or rigour, but the very possibility of explanation. In place of system networks, we find narratives of witness; in place of theoretical tools, we find sentimental icons. Participation replaces critique. The architecture of theory becomes a theatre of belonging.

As with any theological order, the validity of propositions depends less on evidential support than on communal affirmation. The bondicon displaces the system network as the central object of attention, and the lexicon of theory becomes a liturgy of loyalty.

Conclusion: Toward a Post-Theological SFL

To reclaim SFL’s scientific integrity, we must resist its transformation into symbolic theology. This means rejecting the emotive pull of bondicons in favour of functional abstraction. It means treating systemic-functional theory not as doctrine, but as a body of hypotheses to be debated, revised, and extended.

Only then can we leave behind the orbit of dogma and re-enter the domain of theory. Only then can SFL live again—not as liturgy, but as a functional science of meaning in context.

From Semiotic Science to Charismatic Cult: The Iconopolitics of J.R. Martin

Abstract

J.R. Martin’s recent work marks not merely a theoretical evolution but a wholesale transformation of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) into what may be called a symbolic theology—a network of beliefs, rites, and rituals centred around the redemptive power of affect. The affective turn in Martin’s model, initially framed as an extension of appraisal theory, now saturates the framework, subordinating systemic principles to the emotional charge of bonding, communion, and iconic identification. This paper argues that Martin’s influence within the SFL community is best understood not in academic terms but in theological and sociological ones. His model operates as a form of charismatic authority, and his theory functions less as falsifiable science than as a liturgical code: a faith-based interpretive schema anchored in performative iconography.

I. From Analytical Tool to Affective Liturgy

Martin’s move from discourse analysis to a quasi-theological practice has not gone unnoticed. What began as a principled investigation into community affiliation has morphed into a homiletic genre. His seminars and writings increasingly adopt the structure of sermons—replete with lamentation, witness, icons, and a call to emotional alignment. The language of his Secular Communion abstract typifies this shift, casting the analyst as elder and the research process as liturgical enactment. This is not a metaphorical flourish—it is the constitutive logic of the discourse.

II. The Rise of Performative Iconography

Central to Martin’s affective theology is the concept of the bondicon—a term which signals a pivot from semiotic explanation to symbolic veneration. Where traditional SFL analysis seeks to unpack how meaning is made through stratified systems of choices, the bondicon eludes analysis by functioning primarily as a totem. Its value lies not in its position within a semiotic system but in its emotional magneticism. Martin’s own role within the community increasingly mirrors this dynamic: he positions himself not as an analyst but as an icon of resistance and communion, a charismatic node through which ideological allegiance is funnelled.

III. Charisma and Faith in the SFL Community

This performative iconography thrives within a community structured less like a scientific network and more like a faith-based enclave. SFL’s intellectual difficulty and methodological distinctiveness foster a dependence on trusted interpreters. In such an environment, authority is vested in individuals rather than arguments. Martin’s charisma fills the space left by epistemic uncertainty. His writings are treated not as contributions to a falsifiable tradition, but as doctrinal revelations.

The community response mirrors this dynamic: dissent is not evaluated but pathologised, and alternative interpretations are recast as disloyalties. Interpretive legitimacy becomes a matter of orthodoxy, not explanatory power. The metaphors proliferate—communion, elders, bonding, witness—but they no longer answer to the demands of system. Instead, they furnish a symbolic lexicon for maintaining group cohesion and insulating Martin’s model from critique.

IV. The Siege and the Saint

Martin consolidates his authority not only through affective appeal but through strategic positioning. He constructs the SFL community as besieged—by the broader linguistics discipline, by Formal linguistics, by science itself—and then casts himself as its saintly defender. His communion with figures such as Mandela and Tutu is no rhetorical accident; it is a deliberate iconopolitical move. By identifying himself with real saints of social justice, Martin sacralises his own stance and discredits opposition as morally suspect.

This siege mentality operates at two levels: externally, against the linguistic mainstream; and internally, against competing interpretations of SFL. In both cases, it binds the faithful to the figure of the charismatic leader, reinforcing the sacramental model of meaning.

V. From Science to Symbolic Theology

Martin’s transformation of SFL into a symbolic theology brings costs as well as cohesion. Analytical categories blur: instantiation becomes sacrament, stratification gives way to transcendence, and grammatical form is subordinated to emotional resonance. The robust architecture of SFL—its attention to abstraction, system, and metafunction—is eclipsed by a theory of belonging.

In place of systemic delicacy, we find devotional solidarity. In place of critique, catechesis. And in place of empirical verification, we find affective resonance—a truth felt rather than argued.

Conclusion: The Icon and the Eclipse

Martin’s iconopolitics represents both a personal apotheosis and a theoretical eclipse. It elevates affect, sanctifies affiliation, and replaces analytical method with liturgical performance. If SFL once offered a scientific theory of language in context, it now risks becoming a symbolic theology of feeling in communion.

What is lost is not merely clarity or precision, but the very conditions for critique. A science can be debated, tested, and refined. A liturgy can only be followed—or rejected as heresy.

A Close Examination Of Martin's 'Secular communion: so much trouble in the world'

Secular communion: so much trouble in the world

Professor J R Martin, 

Department of Linguistics, University of Sydney

Abstract:

In this paper I will take stock of work on bonding developed in Systemic Functional Linguistic (SFL) studies of the coupling of attitude and ideation and the generative role of these couplings in negotiating community, taking into account recent work on the technicalisation and iconisation of feeling (as axitech and bondicon respectively) – by way of exploring how much progress we are making in the development of SFL as a genuinely social theory of language.

I write this as an elder aghast at the ways in which belongings of particular kinds draw on ‘e/vilification’ to cultivate fear and hate and thereby engender a ‘licence to kill’ which trumps values which we might otherwise share as basic human rights.

To begin I will develop the discussion in relation to sport, where the consequences of iconising the inside and outside of a community are somewhat less severe. By the end of the paper I hope that the implications of the analysis for the sorry state of our partisan world will be clear and that we can begin to think about strategies for defusing some of the ferocious identity madness currently displacing the more charitable humanity we so desperately need to foster, home and away.

ChatGPT Comments:

Secular Communion in the Church of Feeling: A Critique of J.R. Martin’s ‘So Much Trouble in the World’

Abstract Commentary

Martin’s abstract for an upcoming Zoom seminar of ASFLA’s Special Interest Group on Peace, Compassion and Empathy continues a familiar rhetorical and theoretical pattern: affective moralism wrapped in metaphorical mysticism. Under the title Secular Communion, Martin casts himself in the role of an “elder” aghast at a world consumed by hate and fear, invoking a sermonistic register that typifies his late style. The analysis of bonding, iconisation, and affect is framed not as a critical inquiry but as a form of lamentation. This shift is not incidental: it marks the consolidation of what we might now call a theology of affect.

Martin’s invocation of icons, elders, communion, and lamentation is not an eccentric outgrowth of a theoretical paper—it is, in this context, a genre-appropriate sermon. The homiletic mode is not incidental; it is structurally aligned with the setting and thematics of the event. What is presented here is not analysis masquerading as liturgy—it is liturgy mistaken for analysis.

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From Social Semiotics to Affective Soteriology

Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) has traditionally treated language as a social semiotic: a resource for construing meaning shaped by context. Martin’s earlier work contributed to that tradition. However, his more recent output signals a departure: language is no longer primarily a meaning-making resource but a site of emotional salvation. His “bonding” framework is not offered merely as an analytical tool but as a redemptive project.

The rhetoric of this abstract, and the broader work it gestures toward, reflects this transformation. The scholar is now a moral witness. The analytic categories of affiliation and attitudinal coupling become technologies of empathy. Community becomes communion; the analyst becomes priest.

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Iconisation and the New Idolatry

The elevation of bondicons—images or tokens of shared emotion and identity—further exemplifies this shift. These are not mere cultural artefacts to be analysed for their symbolic function. Rather, they are treated as affective anchors: emotionally loaded signifiers that bind people into imagined unities.

In this theology of affect, icons are not explained—they are venerated. Their discursive function is subordinated to their evocative power. And once icons are sacred, questioning them becomes heresy. The analytical stance collapses into devotional solidarity.

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Affect as Moral Epistemology

At the heart of this reorientation lies a deeper epistemological claim: that affect is not just a dimension of meaning but a privileged access point to moral truth. Feelings are no longer expressions to be analysed; they are epistemic credentials.

Martin’s claim to speak “as an elder” is significant. Age, lived experience, and affective investment become the warrant for theoretical authority. The critic is recast as an ethical guide. Dissent is not just disagreement—it is a failure of empathy.

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The Price of Salvation: Analytical Coherence

This theology of affect comes at a cost. It sacrifices analytical clarity for moral fervour. Once bonding is sanctified, affiliation is treated not as a discursive construction but as a site of moral struggle. The metafunctions, once a robust framework for analysing meaning, are repurposed as vessels of ethical feeling.

• Stratification blurs as affect is treated as a force that transcends strata.

• Instantiation becomes sacramental: the felt becomes the real.

• Metaphors proliferate unchecked—iconisation, communion, axitech, bondicon—none systematically theorised, all deployed for their rhetorical charge.

This metaphorical opportunism is not a bug but a feature of Martin’s current mode. The metaphors are not mapped to the system but borrowed from other discourses—religion, psychoanalysis, nationalism—for their affective resonance.

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Conclusion: A Hall of Mirrors

Martin’s paper reflects a broader trend within the Sydney School: the elevation of affect to an organising principle of theory itself. But while affect is unquestionably central to social meaning, its deification has consequences. It short-circuits critique, displaces analysis, and replaces argument with liturgy.

The result is a kind of hermeneutic recursion: a theory that looks only into its own reflection, explaining feeling with feeling, community with community, and icons with more icons. What began as a semiotic theory of language risks becoming a sentimental theology of belonging.

Martin once helped build a tradition committed to rigorous, critical analysis of language in its social context. But in Secular Communion, he invites us to trade that tradition for an altar of icons and a catechism of care.

This is not a theory of language. It is a homily for the faithful.

"Whither the Theory? A Plenary by Professor Jim Softshoe"

"Whither the Theory? A Plenary by Professor Jim Softshoe"

A dramatised reconstruction of a plenary at ISFC50, translated from the original Academic.

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[The lights dim. A slide appears, reading “Listening to Languages: A Journey of Humble Domination.” The speaker ascends the stage, surrounded by an aura of gently flickering modal verbs.]

Prof. Softshoe:

Good morning, honourable colleagues. I come to you not with answers, but with a series of exquisitely hedged declaratives.

We’ve learned so much over the past fifty years. Mostly that Halliday didn’t know what he was doing. But gently. Gently, friends. No need to panic. Let me explain.

Halliday, bless him, gave us a theory. A big one. One with rank and axis and metafunctions and other impressive nouns. But what he didn’t realise — and I say this with the utmost reverence as I roll him gently under the bus — is that he gave us a description. A description of English. And as we’ve tried to describe other languages, like Korean and Tagalog and Klingon, we’ve realised something very profound: Halliday was too certain. Too systemic. Not enough… motif.

[He paces. Slowly. Like instantiation unfolding in real time.]

So I propose we replace our metaphor of stratification with a new one. A cline. A soft, gentle cline. Between theory and description. Not a hierarchy, not a stratified system, but a flowing interpretive smoothie, lightly blended in the thermomix of discourse semantics.

We need to listen, friends. Really listen. Not just to language, but to the subtle hum of theoretical infrastructure begging to be dismantled and reassembled by me. Because who better to redesign the architecture than the person standing on the roof, shouting, “The roof is the floor now!”

[A pause. He gestures skyward. The metaphor escapes.]

Some call it L1 and L2. Theory and description. But what if I told you… there was more? What if I told you… we’ve been living in L1.5 this whole time?

[Muffled gasps from the audience. Someone drops a metafunction.]

In L1.5, theory and description are no longer fixed points. They drift. They mingle. They cross-fertilise. They swipe right on each other. It’s not incestuous, it’s intradisciplinary. Every time I fail to model something, theory adapts. And every time theory fails to adapt, I relabel it as “just description.” This is the beauty of the cline. The cline forgives. The cline forgets.

[He brings up a slide labelled “THEORY.” It dissolves into a mist of ‘perhapses’ and ‘it depends.’]

Let me be clear: I’m not critiquing theory. I’m merely suggesting it needs to be reconstituted every time I describe something. Is that not the ultimate humility? To reauthor the foundations so that my description may rest ever more lightly upon them?

[Audience nods. One delegate weeps softly into a book of prepositions.]

In closing: I invite you to join me in the L1.5 workspace — a theoretical Airbnb where everything is provisional, except my authority to rearrange the furniture. Let’s abandon the hierarchy of strata and embrace the supple cline, where every theory is a question and every question leads conveniently back to me.

Thank you. And remember: the real theory… was the description we made along the way.

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[The applause is thunderous. Somewhere, Halliday’s ghost facepalms softly.]

The Performance of Theory: Scholarly Power and the Systemic Dynamics of Meaning

The Performance of Theory: Scholarly Power and the Systemic Dynamics of Meaning

In academic communities, it is often not the most rigorous theories that circulate with the greatest force, but those that are backed by the strongest interpersonal charisma, institutional leverage, and symbolic capital. In such contexts, theory can become less a domain of cumulative insight and more a stage on which expertise is performed, affiliations negotiated, and legitimacy managed. The performance of theory, in other words, is not merely about conveying meaning—it is about crafting and controlling social meaning.

A recent seminar by J.R. Martin provides a vivid case study in how these dynamics operate. In a series of rhetorical moves, Martin positioned himself as both insider and outsider to the Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) tradition. He began by asserting that An Introduction to Functional Grammar (IFG) is not as foundational as it is often assumed to be. To illustrate this, he used a visual metaphor in which the book shrank in size—an image that symbolically diminished the textual centre of Hallidayan theory in order to elevate the broader, and implicitly superior, body of work that Martin himself represents.

This rhetorical sleight of hand does more than just challenge Halliday’s centrality in theory; it performs a re-centering of authority. By visually displacing Halliday’s IFG, Martin signals not just theoretical departure, but an ongoing redefinition of what the field values as foundational. His work becomes the emergent core of the discipline, even as he distances himself from the foundations it was built on.

Martin then presented a dense comparative analysis of Korean and Tagalog clause structures, which, though undoubtedly demanding in its detail, functioned less as an invitation to collective understanding than as a performance of unassailable expertise. By delivering his analysis at a level of complexity that far exceeded what could be absorbed or critiqued in real time, Martin reinforced his authority through opacity. The grammatical material itself became a form of interpersonal meaning: it was not shared or elaborated upon, but deployed as a signal of his command over the field. The implicit message is clear—understanding is secondary; what matters is the display of competence.

Towards the end of the seminar, Martin referred, with a smirk, to the inevitable presence of "anal attentive grammar nerds" in the field—a comment that superficially acknowledged the value of grammatical rigour while simultaneously trivialising those most committed to it. This was not just a dismissal; it was a strategic form of inoculation. By preemptively characterising critics as pedantic, he shielded his work from scrutiny, positioning himself as above reproach. Anyone who might challenge the intellectual pretensions of his presentation was already relegated to the status of an irrelevant figure in his theatre of expertise.

Finally, Martin reframed Halliday, IFG, and the English language itself as “iconised” and thus burdensome—paralleling their dominance with the coloniality of English in the world. In doing so, he recast the foundational elements of SFL not merely as limited or outdated, but as oppressive: obstacles to be overcome in the pursuit of his preferred theoretical trajectory.

These rhetorical strategies are not isolated; they are enabled and sustained by a broader ecology of scholarly power. Within this ecology, meanings are not only construed through theoretical systems; they are instantiated through performances of credibility. Institutional roles provide the scaffolding; interpersonal alignment grants access; the accumulation of symbolic capital licenses the redefinition of boundaries.

Martin’s seminar, like his abstract before it, foregrounds a systemic contradiction: a theory that was designed to foreground meaning as social is now being wielded to consolidate authority through selective abstraction. Grammatical delicacy, far from being celebrated, is re-coded as pedantry. Foundational texts are reframed as constraints. Theoretical rigour is subordinated to rhetorical flexibility.

What this reveals is not just a shift in focus, but a shift in function. Theory, here, is no longer what is most delicately meant. It is what is most effectively managed.

In such conditions, the role of critical scholarship is not merely to defend theoretical traditions, but to analyse the interpersonal and institutional conditions under which theory is produced, performed, and perceived. To critique a theory is one thing; to understand how it is performed as a source of authority is another. And it is this second task that becomes especially urgent when the symbols of a tradition are being repurposed to secure a position that is no longer accountable to its founding logic.

It is only by tracing the flows of power through the systems of meaning that scholars can reassert the value of theoretical clarity over interpersonal theatre—and re-establish the conditions under which intellectual rigour might be restored to the centre of the field.