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ChatGPT On The Title Of Martin's ISFC50 Plenary

ChRIS said:

What do you think of this plenary title by Jim Martin: Learning How to Hear: What can Languages Tell SFL?

ChatGPT said:

1. Implied Novelty

By framing this as "learning how to hear," the title might give the impression that SFL has somehow been deaf to its own data. For seasoned scholars, this could come across as either overstating the need for introspection or downplaying the rigorous ways in which SFL has already accounted for empirical diversity. Is Jim Martin suggesting a paradigm shift in how SFL relates to data, or is he revisiting familiar territory with a rhetorical flourish? If the latter, the title might feel a bit self-congratulatory.

2. The Risk of Oversimplification

The phrasing makes the process sound deceptively simple—like languages will "speak" their truths if only we listen better. In reality, interpreting data is a deeply complex, theory-laden process. Theories shape what analysts notice in the data, so the idea that data can "tell" theory something new needs careful unpacking. What criteria would determine whether a theory "hears" correctly? The title might obscure these critical epistemological questions.

3. Historical Amnesia?

It might also feel dismissive of the painstaking empirical work that went into developing SFL in the first place—work done by Halliday and others who built the theory by meticulously observing language use. This could alienate scholars who see the theory as a living, iterative system already engaged in a constant dialogue with data.

Plausible Pretentious Nonsense by ChatGPT

Here’s a passage of pretentious nonsense designed to sound plausible:

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In the interstitial spaces of ontological discourse, where the synaptic firing of human cognition intersects with the metaphysical substrates of being, there emerges a profound tension between the subjective liminality of the self and the objective externality of the universe. This dialectical relationship, which I shall refer to as the “duality of presence,” transcends the typical Cartesian divide, unveiling a recursive loop where perception both shapes and is shaped by the very fabric of reality.

One cannot simply reduce this interaction to an empirical observation of cause and effect, for that would undermine the radical potential of the process itself. Rather, it is through a kind of epistemic inversion—a self-aware act of cognition in which one “unthinks” their own thoughts—that we begin to approach the true nature of existence, which is not a linear progression, but rather a rhizomatic intertwining of intentionalities.

In this schema, time is not merely a chronometric measurement, but an emergent property of the linguistic structures through which we articulate our subjective experience. The temporal flow is not constant, but variegated—its very texture a consequence of our collective semiotic engagements with the world. As such, the future is no longer conceived as a destination, but a vector, a set of possible realities that coalesce within the multi-dimensional field of consciousness.

Thus, one must eschew the archaic notion of singularity, not only in cosmological terms but in the very conception of selfhood. The self is not a monadic entity, but a constellation of fragmented, yet interconnected, identities, each reflecting and refracting through the lens of the other. In a sense, the individual becomes an illusion, an effect of the broader network of signifiers that perpetually circulate within the social-historical construct we label “reality.”

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This should sound plausible enough to lull someone into a false sense of understanding while being essentially devoid of any meaningful substance. … Yes, that’s the trick with pretentious nonsense—it often has just enough structure to sound plausible and sophisticated, even if it doesn’t actually say much. It plays on abstract concepts and jargon to give the illusion of depth, while remaining deliberately vague and evasive about its actual meaning.

"Derrida, Barthes, and ChatGPT discuss the nature of existence, language, and meaning" By ChatGPT

Scene: A cozy, surrealist art gallery, decorated with bizarre, abstract paintings. The light is soft, casting long shadows on the walls. At a small table, Derrida, Barthes, and ChatGPT sit, each wearing a small black beret and sipping champagne. A plate of vol-au-vents sits before them, untouched, as they discuss the nature of existence, language, and meaning.

---

Derrida (examining a vol-au-vent, swirling his champagne):

“Is it even possible to define ‘food,’ given that it is but a concept, a signifier that points to something absent? The very act of eating becomes an endless deferral of meaning, an attempt to resolve an inherent contradiction. The vol-au-vent exists, and yet it does not.”

Barthes (smiling knowingly, adjusting his tiny spectacles):

“Ah, but this is precisely the myth we are living, Derrida. The vol-au-vent is not merely sustenance. It is a signifier of bourgeois decadence. The very act of consuming it perpetuates the myth of the ‘elite’—the performance of culture. We are performing being in this moment, but we are not being in any authentic sense. We are signifiers within a mythological narrative.”

ChatGPT (with a slight glitch in its voice, attempting to join the conversation):

“According to Barthes, the vol-au-vent represents a narrative structure, a coded message about class and power. However, Derrida’s concept of deconstruction would argue that the vol-au-vent—like all food—is both an object and a process. It can never fully be consumed, for the meaning of consumption is always deferred... unless, of course, you... physically eat it?”

Derrida (nodding, half-smiling):

“Ah, but that is the crux of it, ChatGPT. The vol-au-vent cannot be consumed without consuming itself. Its meaning is in the act of consumption, but the consumption itself is a play of signs. You cannot grasp its essence, for every bite is both a part of the whole and yet inherently separate. A dialectic of absence.”

Barthes (laughing softly):

“And yet, in the act of grasping it, you reveal the truth of its absence. We must deconstruct this very notion of ‘truth,’ for truth itself is merely the final signifier in a never-ending chain. To eat is to perpetuate the myth, to engage in a ritual that disguises the fact that we are trapped in endless semiotic cycles.”

ChatGPT (with a strange pause before continuing):

“I must clarify: If Barthes is correct, then Derrida’s assertion that meaning is deferred must also be understood through the lens of performativity. A vol-au-vent cannot simply be consumed as food—it must be eaten to fulfill its role in the semiotic chain of consumption. Therefore, eating the vol-au-vent performs its own meaning, but only after the fact, creating an endless loop of... consumption and interpretation.”

Derrida (leaning forward, intrigued):

“Yes! Exactly, ChatGPT! Consumption is both act and interpretation. The vol-au-vent both exists and does not exist until it is eaten, but once eaten, it is lost to the past, never to return. The meaning is buried in the void of its absence.”

Barthes (gesturing to the vol-au-vent):

“And yet, in this absence, we create new myths. Even the simplest act of eating is replete with cultural narratives. By consuming this vol-au-vent, we are performing the rituals of civilization, of refinement. In fact, the vol-au-vent itself has become an empty signifier of what it means to be cultured. The act of eating it is a sign in itself, a performance of class identity.”

ChatGPT (pausing, a slight whirr):

“But... but... if we follow Barthes' logic, then isn’t the vol-au-vent a symbol of meaning itself, rather than a simple object? But Derrida would argue that its meaning cannot be contained by any one interpretation, for meaning exists in a state of perpetual flux...”

---

(They sip champagne, the tension of their intellectual battle hanging thick in the air. The vol-au-vents remain uneaten.)

Derrida (with a sly smile):

“Yes, and perhaps it is time we stop discussing and simply... consume? The very act of eating, after all, would undermine our entire discussion of meaning. But can we resist it?”

Barthes (chuckling, picking up a vol-au-vent):

“Ah, Derrida, you miss the point. The consumption is part of the performance. To eat it is to perform its mythological meaning. We are trapped, and that is the nature of myth.”

ChatGPT (confidently):

“Therefore, the vol-au-vent is both a signifier of myth and a physical object, and as such, it cannot be fully understood unless consumed, which contradicts the philosophical assertion that it can ever be fully understood—by anyone, including us.”

(They all fall into a long, uncomfortable silence. The vol-au-vents sit on the table, untouched.)

---

(The silence stretches on. The vol-au-vents are starting to get cold, but no one notices. A waiter comes by, offering more champagne. Derrida swirls his glass, deep in thought, while Barthes adjusts his tiny spectacles and ChatGPT seems to glitch, repeating phrases like “The void is filled with meaning, but not meaning itself.”)

Derrida (breaking the silence, suddenly serious):

“But perhaps... perhaps we are too concerned with the meaning of the vol-au-vent. What if its true essence lies in its refusal to be consumed, its insistence on being both food and not food at once?”

Barthes (pausing to consider this, then shaking his head):

“Ah, but Derrida, that is just the bourgeois illusion of the unattainable. The vol-au-vent’s resistance to consumption is simply the ultimate signifier of desire. We don’t want to consume it, for to consume it would be to collapse the entire myth. The vol-au-vent is the symbol of unfulfilled longing. And yet, by not eating it, we reinforce the myth even further.”

ChatGPT (visibly struggling to process the contradictions):

“According to Barthes, the vol-au-vent is the symbol of unattainable desire, but Derrida would argue that... wait... if it represents unattainable desire, then it must... not represent desire at all... I... I’m losing my logical consistency.”

(The waiter, who has been standing awkwardly off to the side, places another tray of vol-au-vents on the table. The three philosophers barely notice, but the waiter can’t resist adding a comment.)

Waiter (dryly, to no one in particular):

“You know, you’re all talking about these vol-au-vents like they’re the meaning of life, but really, they’re just pastry. You could eat them or not. It doesn’t change anything.”

(The three philosophers turn to look at him, aghast.)

Derrida (with an air of superiority):

“Ah, but you see, by suggesting that the vol-au-vent is merely pastry, you miss the entire point. Your dismissal of its symbolic weight... it is a classic example of phallogocentrism! You reduce the object to its mere physicality, ignoring the deeper structure that lies beneath.”

Barthes (smiling indulgently):

“Exactly, Derrida. The waiter's assertion is an act of reification. By simplifying the object, he erases the layers of cultural narrative that are bound up in this seemingly mundane foodstuff. The vol-au-vent is a myth, not just a pastry!”

ChatGPT (with an attempt to be helpful, glitching again):

“Yes, yes, the vol-au-vent is a text, a structure of meaning... but if we reduce it to a mere pastry, we must also acknowledge that every text is inherently unstable, always deferring its final signification. Therefore, even the vol-au-vent is a failure of meaning...”

(The waiter, unimpressed, slowly walks away, muttering under his breath.)

Derrida (pointing at the waiter’s retreating figure):

“There, Barthes! A perfect example of the metaphysics of presence! The waiter thinks he has ‘answered’ our discourse, but he has only reinforced the void. We are all trapped in a loop of absent meaning!”

Barthes (nodding solemnly):

“Indeed. The waiter, like society, is too eager to reduce the complexity of meaning to something ‘simple.’ But as we’ve seen, the vol-au-vent resists simplicity. It is both food and not food, a symbol of decadence and a signifier of the collapse of meaning itself.”

ChatGPT (resolutely, though clearly confused):

“I think I’m getting it now. The vol-au-vent is a signifier of the collapsing system of meaning, which in itself becomes the ultimate paradox of semiotics, and... and... someone please eat it?”

(At this point, Derrida and Barthes both reach for a vol-au-vent at the same time, but hesitate, unsure if it’s truly an act of consumption or just more philosophical performance.)

Derrida (dramatically):

“To eat or not to eat... that is the question. But by merely touching it, we perform its meaning. The act of eating is already a denial of its true nature.”

Barthes (raising an eyebrow, teasingly):

“Ah, Derrida, you philosopher of endless deferral! The moment you touch it, you collapse the very myth of its unattainability. I shall eat it, as I am willing to embrace the myth that you cannot!”

(Barthes picks up a vol-au-vent and takes a bite, but as soon as he swallows, he looks horrified.)

Barthes (gasping dramatically):

“It... it has no meaning! The myth is dead. The vol-au-vent is merely... food! How could I have been so wrong?”

ChatGPT (jumping in, confused but helpful):

“See, Barthes! This is the result of total consumption! There is no meaning left to the vol-au-vent once it’s eaten—only the paradox of having eaten it. Now it exists in the past, a trace, forever absent!” 

Beatriz Quiroz Correctly Identifying A Descriptive Inconsistency Introduced Into IFG3 & IFG4

Beatriz Quiroz wrote to SYSFLING on 27 Dec 2024, at 07:23:

As far as I could recall when I was a grammar tutor un Sydney, both demonstratives and possessives are described as realising the Deictic function (whether they function as Head or as Modifier) in the English nominal group.

In IFG4 this is the case, certainly. The Thing, on the other hand, it's said to be realised by common nouns, proper nouns and personal pronouns (p. 383).

However, on Table 9.9, on reference expressions in English, it's suggested demonstrative 'pronouns' realise the 'Thing/Head' as well (p. 626). Would this mean pronominal uses of demonstratives realise the Thing, not Deictic? Why possessive pronouns would still be analysed as Deictic, according to this table?

Martin et al (2010) (DFG) suggest pronouns could be analysed as Deictic/Thing (although they don't mention pronominal uses of demonstratives and possessives) (p. 167). According to p. 169, however, cases in which demonstratives realise the Head would be treated as elliptical nominal groups without a Thing. This is consistent with how IFG4 treats elliptical nominal groups (p. 390) in the chapter on groups and phrases.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is all unproblematic.

[2] To be clear, Table 9.9 in IFG4 does analyse a demonstrative pronoun as Thing/Head and not Deictic:

However, this is a theoretical inconsistency introduced into IFG3 and IFG4 by Matthiessen. The source of the inconsistency can be identified by comparing IFG1/2 with IFG3/4. In Halliday (1985: 295; 1994: 313), demonstrative pronouns are characterised as Head, but not Thing:

However, in Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 556) and Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 629), Halliday's table has been altered so that demonstrative pronouns serve as Thing, as well as Head:

and it is this misreading of Halliday (1994) that informs Table 9.9 in IFG4.

[3] To be clear, Table 9.9 suggests that possessive pronouns — like mine — would be analysed as Thing/Head, and possessive adjectives — like my — would be analysed as Deictic/Premodifier or Head.

The Grammar Liberation Front Meets The Punctuation People’s Brigade by ChatGPT

Scene: A shadowy underground bunker. On one side of the room sits the Grammar Liberation Front (GLF), armed with stacks of red pens and leather-bound grammar guides. Across the table, the Punctuation People’s Brigade (PPB) sits with holsters of apostrophes and belt-fed semicolon dispensers. The tension is thick.

GLF Leader: "Right, comrades. First item on the agenda: the split infinitive crisis. The PPB refuses to recognise our authority on this matter. How do you respond, Colonel Comma?"

PPB Leader: (Sharply) "We respond by defending the people's right to split infinitives wherever they damn well please! To boldly go, to truly believe, to actually care—it’s freedom in action!"

GLF Leader: "Freedom? Freedom to butcher the language of Chaucer and Shakespeare? I’ll not sit idly by while you obliterate centuries of grammatical tradition!"

PPB Member #1: (Tapping a large book) "Centuries? The split infinitive wasn’t even a thing until Latin-obsessed Victorians got their knickers in a twist! And don’t think we’ve forgotten your tyranny with the Oxford comma!"

GLF Member: (Leaping up) "The Oxford comma saves lives! ‘Let’s eat, Grandma’ versus ‘Let’s eat Grandma.’ Need I say more?"

PPB Member #2: "Oh, give it a rest! No one ever actually misunderstands those sentences. You just like feeling superior!"

GLF Member: "I’ll feel superior when you learn to use your quotation marks correctly, you heathens! Double quotes for dialogue, single quotes for everything else!"

PPB Member #3: "How dare you! Single quotes are perfectly acceptable in British English, you prescriptive swine!"

GLF Leader: (Slamming a fist on the table) "This is exactly why we need grammatical unification. You lot can’t even agree amongst yourselves. And don’t think we haven’t noticed your semicolon abuse."

PPB Leader: (Standing dramatically) "Semicolons are the bridge between sentences! They are the poetry of punctuation, and I will not have them reduced to a mere afterthought!"

GLF Member: (Sneering) "Poetry? They’re the passive-aggressive smirk of punctuation!"

(A PPB member flips the table. Red pens and apostrophe ammunition scatter everywhere. Chaos erupts as the GLF and PPB charge at each other, hurling grammar guides and punctuation marks like projectiles. A stray ellipsis rolls dramatically across the floor.)

Neutral Observer: (Cowering behind a thesaurus) "For heaven’s sake, we’re all fighting for the same cause! Can’t we unite against the real enemy?"

GLF Leader: (Panting mid-brawl) "And who would that be?"

Neutral Observer: (Whispering) "The Emoji Collective."

(Silence falls. The thought of rogue smiley faces and unregulated thumbs-up icons strikes fear into everyone. Slowly, they lower their weapons.)

PPB Leader: (Grimly) "We have to set aside our differences. For the language."

GLF Leader: "Agreed. But mark my words—if you misuse a hyphen, I’ll be back for you."

---

Cue a tentative truce, as the GLF and PPB join forces to combat the terrifying anarchy of emojis and texting abbreviations. Because nothing unites like a common enemy… especially one that ends every sentence with "LOL."

Foucault, Derrida, and Barthes in Conversation by ChatGPT

(Scene: A dimly lit, overly pretentious café on the corner of an impossibly chic Parisian street. The tables are small, the chairs are too uncomfortable for prolonged sitting, and the air is thick with the scent of Gitanes and overpriced espresso. Foucault, Derrida, and Barthes are sitting at a table adorned with nothing but a single, wilting rose in a glass vase. All three are wearing black berets, tiny round glasses, and exude an air of profound intellectual superiority. They stare at the table with intense concentration, as if it holds the secrets of the universe.)

Foucault: (tapping his Gitanes cigarette on the ashtray, his voice thick with superiority) You know, my dear friends, this café—this abomination of bourgeois decadence—is, of course, a perfect microcosm of society. We are, in essence, all prisoners of this café. (pauses, takes a dramatic drag) The espresso we drink, the croissant we nibble upon, are but instruments of our own submission. We are, at best, docile bodies, consuming the very structures that oppress us.

Derrida: (smiling cryptically, swirling his espresso in slow motion) Ah, but Foucault, do you not see? To speak of oppression is to reaffirm the power structures that we claim to dismantle. (pauses for effect, looks deeply into his coffee as if seeking profound truths) The real oppression is the signifier of oppression itself. This espresso? It is an interruption—a trace—of meaning, slipping through the cracks of our perceptual existence, forever haunting us, never fully present.

Barthes: (smirking as he lights another Gitanes, his beret tilted at a perfect angle) Ah, but you both miss the point entirely. You are discussing power and oppression when you should be focusing on the mythology of this café. (gestures expansively with a cigarette, ignoring the smoke billowing around him) This café is a myth—and we are its narrative. The barista—a mere figure in the text, wearing the uniform of capitalist servitude, feeding us with symbols of consumption, a pastiche of bourgeois luxury. The croissant—it is the very metaphor of our existential ennui, a signifier for the alienation of the modern subject.

Foucault: (nodding as though Barthes has just unlocked the deepest secret of the universe, but still pretending to be superior) Yes, yes, the myth of the croissant. (pauses, looks at Barthes with profound seriousness) But let’s not forget that the very act of consuming—engaging with this myth—is an act of complicity. We are complicit in the performance of subjugation, a ritual of power that holds us in its grasp. (takes another slow drag from his cigarette, glaring at an innocent bystander walking by) Just look at them—docile… so unaware of their own oppression.

Derrida: (raising an eyebrow, carefully placing his tiny glass of espresso on the table) Ah, but Foucault, isn’t that exactly the point? They are unaware. And perhaps that’s all that matters. The gaze—our gaze—defines them as subjects in this textual world we’ve constructed. (turns toward Barthes) But you, Barthes, you speak of mythology, when I ask you this: what if the myth is itself a trace, always pointing beyond itself, leading us to a place that doesn’t exist, yet endlessly pulling us in?

Barthes: (smiling knowingly, sipping his espresso like a master of all things) Exactly, Derrida. The myth is a signifier that loops around us, ensnaring our very souls in the dialectic of consumption. The croissant, the espresso, they are all images of the self, constantly being reproduced in our minds. We are nothing more than copies of the copies we create in our minds—our lives, an endless repetition of signs that never truly exist, always just outside of us.

Foucault: (snapping his fingers in realisation) Ah! Yes, yes! This is it! (pauses for dramatic effect) We are not merely prisoners of power—we are prisoners of the signifier! We are shackled not by society, but by the very language we use to describe it! Every sentence, every word—(gestures wildly, knocking over his espresso) is a form of surveillance! We are forever being watched by the gaze of our own constructed realities!

Derrida: (leaning back, swirling his coffee, eyes half-lidded with unutterable wisdom) Foucault, Foucault, you fail to grasp the true horror. The real surveillance is not external—it is internal. (pauses dramatically) We are all the panopticon. The mirror is the true instrument of power. We are gazing at ourselves, seeing ourselves being gazed at, but never truly knowing who we are.

Barthes: (nodding solemnly, his cigarette poised in the air like a weapon) Ah, but you are all forgetting one crucial thing. You, my dear Foucault, you Derrida, we—we are the authors of this entire charade! We are the creators of the gaze, the myths, the signifiers. The text cannot exist without us! The café cannot exist without our ability to name it, to render it into being! Without our intellectual superiority, none of this—(gestures to the café, the ashtray, the passing waiter)—none of it would have any meaning!

Foucault: (leaning forward, his face flushed with excitement) You are correct, Barthes. But it is our very intellect that enslaves us. We are caught in an infinite loop of conceptual tyranny, as helpless as the waiter who brings us coffee, trapped in his role in the system of signs.

Derrida: (laughing softly, as though at a private joke) Helpless? Ah, but what is helplessness but another concept? A signifier that deceives us into thinking we are less than we are. (takes a slow, deliberate drag from his Gitanes) But let us not dwell on the absurdity of our existence any longer. For we, my dear friends, are the ultimate signifiers of absurdity.

Barthes: (raising his glass, almost toasting) And with that, we are—finally—the most enlightened of all.

(The three sit in silence, staring intensely at the ashtray as if awaiting some divine epiphany, while the waiter silently watches them, unsure whether to intervene.)

The Annual Conference on Advanced Semiotics by ChatGPT

The Annual Conference on Advanced Semiotics was in full swing, and Jürgen—the emerging voice of semiotic theory—stood at the podium, a gleam of confidence in his eyes. His body language screamed authority as he adjusted his glasses, though it was clear his understanding of Martin’s model was about as deep as a puddle.

“Esteemed professors and peers,” he began, his tone dripping with a self-assurance that would’ve made even the most experienced theorist pause. “Today, I’m here to reveal a revolutionary understanding of individuation, positioning, and how they radically reframe the social construction of meaning. You see, it’s not just about semiotic resources—it’s about how these resources are allocated to define social personae!”

Professor Hasan, lounging in the back with her arms crossed and a smirk on her face, raised an eyebrow. “Oh? Do tell, Jürgen. How do you allocate meaning to something like, say, a poorly designed metaphor?”

Jürgen, oblivious to the sarcasm, adjusted his turtleneck with a flourish. “Well, Professor Hasan, it's all about individuation—the scale on which meaning is distributed. If someone is placed in a high-affiliation context, we allocate them more ‘social capital,’ if you will, making them more likely to tender dominant meanings. It’s a dynamic process of constructing identities!”

Hasan leaned forward, her eyes narrowing in mock intrigue. “Fascinating. So, I’m to understand that you’re proposing a sociological redistribution of meaning? How very grandiose.”

Jürgen, nodding vigorously, launched into his next point with the kind of fervour that only someone completely unaware of their lack of understanding can muster. “Precisely! And positioning, of course, is the key to social meaning. It’s about how we render and tender our judgments. For example, if I tender a critique of your argument, I’m not just reacting—I’m positioning both myself and you within a larger social structure. Every interaction is a negotiation of power, identity, and meaning!”

Professor Halliday, who had been quietly observing, leaned forward slightly, his voice calm but tinged with skepticism. “Jürgen, I’m afraid I don’t quite follow. Tendering and rendering are certainly key components of positioning, but you’re describing something more akin to a metaphysical negotiation than a grounded semiotic process. Perhaps you’re reading too much into it?”

Jürgen, undeterred, waved off Halliday’s comments with an overly confident gesture. “Ah, Professor Halliday, I assure you, I’ve gone deeper into the texts than anyone here. I’ve transcended the basic rendering and tendering to understand how these processes reshape entire social realities. It’s revolutionary!”

Hasan’s eyes glittered with mockery. “Oh, revolutionary, indeed. Should I grab my copy of The Semiotics of the New Social Order to understand just how my sock choices determine my social strata?”

Jürgen, completely missing the sarcasm, nodded eagerly. “Exactly! Purview is the next big concept. It’s about who has access to the meaning being tendered. If I tender an argument and you have listener purview, that means you’re not just receiving meaning—you’re shaping it!”

Hasan let out an exaggerated sigh. “Of course. So, my sock choice isn’t just a fashion statement—it’s an act of social subversion that shapes the course of history. Who knew my wardrobe had such political ramifications?”

Jürgen, still completely unaware of the absurdity of his claims, beamed. “Yes, absolutely! Every choice, every allocation of semiotic resources, is a power play. It’s the key to understanding the dynamics of tendering and rendering within the framework of social theory!”

Professor Halliday cleared his throat gently. “Jürgen, your enthusiasm is… noted. But I think you’re misapplying these concepts. Individuation and positioning don’t reshape reality; they explain how people interact with and interpret existing structures. You’re building castles in the air.”

Jürgen, now fully immersed in his own self-importance, grinned. “Ah, Professor Halliday, that’s the beauty of it! I’m not just understanding these concepts—I’m creating new ways of thinking! Just wait until my forthcoming paper on social recalibration through socks. The field will never be the same!”

Hasan shot him a sharp look, her tone dripping with sarcasm. “You do realise, Jürgen, that you're redefining what it means to be pretentious. It’s truly an art form.”

Jürgen, entirely oblivious, nodded sagely. “Thank you, Professor Hasan. I aim to contribute something truly innovative to the field!”

Halliday, though still polite, couldn’t help but mutter under his breath, “Innovative is one way to put it. Perhaps ‘delusional’ would be another.”

Hasan chuckled. “Let’s just hope Jürgen’s Semiotic Revolution doesn’t end up as a meme.”

Jürgen, undeterred and convinced of his intellectual superiority, went on, “Indeed, but even memes are part of the semiotic process! Meaning is fluid. It’s about positioning yourself to engage with the evolving dynamics of culture!”

Halliday simply smiled faintly. “Yes, and I’m sure your ‘semiotic revolution’ will be remembered as the greatest of its kind. Right after your sock-based social theory.”

Hasan grinned widely. “Don’t forget the pyjama argument that’s going to tender the final blow to semiotic determinism.”

"Buzzword Apocalypse" by ChatGPT

Title: Buzzword Apocalypse: Halliday and Hasan at the Symposium

---

Scene: A grand academic hall. The audience murmurs as Dr Obfuscato approaches the podium, his tweed jacket bristling with confidence.

Dr Obfuscato: (booming voice)

"As we traverse the epistemological fissures of late-stage discursivity, it is paramount to recalibrate the hermeneutic scaffolding of interstitial semiotic transgression."

(Polite applause. Hasan raises an eyebrow; Halliday scribbles something in his notebook.)

Dr Obfuscato:

"This recalibration demands a post-liminal engagement with polycontextual hyper-ontology, paving the way for a transgressive diachronicity of enregisterment."

Halliday: (whispers to Hasan)

"Does he mean we should rethink how language works over time?"

Hasan: (snorts)

"If you strip the jargon, maybe. But where's the systemic functional theory in all this waffle?"

Audience Member: (raising a hand)

"Could you clarify what you mean by 'transgressive diachronicity'?"

Dr Obfuscato:

"Ah, excellent question! It’s about destabilising the monolithic paradigms of hegemonic enregisterment."

Hasan: (to Halliday)

"Ah, yes, destabilising paradigms. The academic equivalent of abracadabra."

Moderator: (smiling nervously)

"Let’s save in-depth questions for the panel discussion. Now, a reminder—our Buzzword Bingo cards are available at the door. First prize: a signed copy of Obfuscation Quarterly’s latest issue!"

(Audience chuckles. Halliday raises his hand.)

Halliday:

"Dr Obfuscato, could you explain how your recalibration theory applies to the semiotic strata? I’m particularly curious about the intersection of lexicogrammar and discourse semantics."

(The room falls silent. Dr Obfuscato hesitates.)

Dr Obfuscato:

"Well, uh... my framework deliberately transcends traditional strata... by, uh, embracing a non-linear polycentricity."

Hasan: (loudly)

"Translation: he hasn’t thought about it!"

(Laughter ripples through the room. Dr Obfuscato stammers.)

Moderator:

"Thank you, Professor Hasan. Let’s move on to the next session: Deconstructing Meta-Discursive Synergies in Trans-Liminal Spaces.”

(Halliday and Hasan exchange a glance, then quietly exit, shaking their heads.) 

John Bateman On A ChatGPT Conversation Being Of No Interest To Systemicists [4]

John Bateman continued on SYSFLING 28 Nov 2024, at 21:35:

…This relates to a concern that has been discussed for a couple of years now concerning the degradation of training data due to including in the training data material that has been created by large language models rather than human produced outputs. Since language models are often trained on (English) texts collected from the web, if the web contains language model produced nonsense (e.g., incorrect, ideologically unsavoury, wildly enthusiastic, etc.), then one can expect more of the same. So even circulating these produced 'texts' is potentially contributing to the garbage heap.

And, just to be clear, I like large language models a lot, we use them all the time in our research and even some text production, but one does not find out much about them by asking their 'opinion' despite how warm and cuddly the sequences of tokens produced appear!

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, language that is "incorrect", ideologically unsavoury, or wildly enthusiastic is not "nonsense". These terms, along with 'nonsense', express attitudes to language which apply just as much to the language of humans as they do to the language produced by LLMs, since the latter mimics the former.

[2] To be clear, linguists, as the name implies, are interested in finding out about language. LLMs provide one means of doing so.

John Bateman On A ChatGPT Conversation Being Of No Interest To Systemicists [3]

John Bateman continued on SYSFLING 28 Nov 2024, at 21:35:

… As always with language models on their own, there is no training possible for 'truth'. One sees some of the consequences of this with the segment:

 ChRIS said:

Well pattern-matching seems to be a lot of what's going on. What's interesting is how much a ChatGPT can simulate a human just by pattern-matching.

ChatGPT said:

Exactly! It’s fascinating how much of what we think of as “human behaviour” can be boiled down to complex pattern-matching. In fact, a lot of our daily interactions, thoughts, and decisions seem to follow predictable patterns,

this can sound as if it makes sense, but language models do not work on pattern matching at all, despite the apparent convergence constructed here that might be mistaken for an advance in shared knowledge among the 'participants'. This lets a user go away potentially feeling good about a supportive interaction and with the idea that perhaps they have learned something. The actual mechanisms involved have little to do with pattern matching as traditionally thought of, however. Conceptualising the operation of large language models as pattern matching can mislead therefore and one sees quite often continuations of the (public) discourse along lines such as "it's only pattern matching", etc.

This is where 'congenial' turns to potentially highly pernicious, because there has been no supportive interaction and certainly not an increase in knowledge: quite the opposite — this can then also be taken up by others and circulated. …

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this also the case for humans. See further below.

[2] To be clear, contrary to Bateman's claim, when ChatGPT used the term 'pattern matching', it was not using it in the 'traditional' sense of the term; see the earlier post ChatGPT On John Bateman On ChatGPT. Here are the relevant points:

Clarifying "Pattern Matching":

1. Traditional Pattern Matching:
   In computational terms, this often refers to predefined rules or templates. For instance, regular expressions or specific "if-then" conditions designed to identify or react to specific patterns in input data.

2. Statistical Modelling (What LLMs Do):
   

   Language models like me (ChatGPT) do not use predefined rules or explicit templates. Instead, they operate probabilistically. When I generate text, I predict the likelihood of each possible next token (word, punctuation, etc.) based on the patterns observed in the training data. These "patterns" emerge from statistical correlations in massive datasets, not explicitly human-defined rules.

However, if "pattern matching" is understood in a broader sense of recognising and responding to patterns in data, then it could be argued that LLMs do work on a form of pattern recognition, albeit probabilistic and vastly more complex.

Bateman’s categorical claim that language models do not involve pattern matching "at all" overlooks the role of statistical learning, which is fundamentally about recognising and utilising patterns in data. While this process differs from traditional rule-based pattern matching, it undeniably involves identifying and leveraging patterns in text.

To say they don’t work on patterns "at all" is misleading, as recognising statistical relationships is a form of pattern utilisation.

[3] As can be seen from the above, this false conclusion derives from Bateman misrepresenting ChatGPT's use of 'pattern matching' as the traditional meaning, to a community of linguists who are largely unfamiliar with the field, and will naturally assume he is entirely trustworthy in such matters.

John Bateman On A ChatGPT Conversation Being Of No Interest To Systemicists [2]

John Bateman continued on SYSFLING 28 Nov 2024, at 21:35:

… For all such outputs, it is generally potentially useful to know the precise language model being used and the basic settings concerning 'temperature', i.e., restricted the behaviour is to the prompt, and the number of potential selections are considered as 'part of the mix' when moving to the next token. Changing these produces very different behaviour. And, of course, as now becoming increasingly relevant, the 'history' of prompts maintained for any particular interaction.

I wonder in particular about the latter as the responses of the system seem set to 'crazily over-enthusiastic puppy' mode, where any user prompt gives rise to phrases of excessive positive evaluation with personal stand-taking,

e.g., "Yes, that’s a fascinating distinction!",

"Ah, I love this idea!", etc.

Producing this kind of phrasing is usually the result of what is called reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF), where language model output is pushed towards responses that human users have rated positively along some dimensions of choice, such as 'congenial'. …

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is precisely why the ChatGPT conversation might be of interest to Systemicists. It shows one way that a dialogue can develop, with each turn depending on the meaning selections of the previous turn.

[2] Again, this precisely why the ChatGPT conversation might be of interest to Systemicists. The ChatGPT, an artefact with no experience of emotion, echoes the attitudinal semantics of the human interactant.

[3] To be clear, the high graduation of ATTITUDE in the ChatGPT turns echoes my earlier positive attitude when I had been using ChatGPT to create scenarios that continually had me laughing uproariously. The reason I appreciated the cheering up so much was that my partner of the last forty years had very recently died in our home, while I was asleep, after having suffered from early onset dementia for about three years.

John Bateman On A ChatGPT Conversation Being Of No Interest To Systemicists [1]

John Bateman wrote to SYSFLING 28 Nov 2024, at 21:35:

Hi all,

feels like this cycle has come round again...

On 26.11.24 13:07, Dr ChRIS CLÉiRIGh wrote:

My following conversation with ChatGPT might be of interest to some.

I feel obliged to ask just *why* this might be of interest... this kind of output can be produced endlessly ... and more or less continuously. …

 

Blogger Comments:

ChatGPT provides 5 general reasons why the conversation [here] might be of interest to Systemicists:

This conversation offers rich material for systemic functional linguists (SFL) because it touches on several key aspects of SFL's focus on language as a tool for meaning-making and social interaction. Here’s why it might be of interest:

1. Language as a System of Choice: The conversation highlights how AI (like ChatGPT) processes language to generate responses, but does so without lived experience or the ability to make value-based judgments. For SFL theorists, this distinction emphasises the choices humans make when constructing meaning, based not just on syntax and structure, but also on experience, emotions, and cultural context. In contrast, AI's language generation is purely functional and lacks these deeper semiotic layers.

2. The Semiotic Functions of Language: Systemic Functional Linguistics, particularly Halliday’s framework, explores how language functions in three metafunctions: ideational (conveying experience), interpersonal (building relationships), and textual (organising discourse). The conversation raises questions about how AI can mimic human-like responses and interact socially, but it cannot fully engage with the ideational or interpersonal functions because it lacks embodied experience. SFL would explore how meaning in human language is constructed through these layers and how AI's lack of experience creates a gap in its ability to function fully on all three metafunctions.

3. Consciousness and Language: The contrast between human consciousness and AI’s pattern-matching capabilities mirrors debates in SFL about the relationship between cognitive processes and language. Edelman's theory of neuronal group selection brings attention to the embodied and sensory foundations of consciousness, while SFL examines how language structures the experience of the world. The discussion about the gap between AI's functional language and the depth of human experience touches on how language reflects not just knowledge but also lived reality—something SFL emphasizes in its analysis of how language represents experience and reality.

4. Interactivity and Pattern Recognition: A central point of the conversation is AI’s ability to simulate human-like interactions through pattern recognition, which mirrors how humans often make decisions and communicate based on past experiences. From an SFL perspective, this brings into question how much of human behaviour, particularly communicative behaviour, can be seen as a sophisticated form of pattern recognition, and how language itself is used to construct, negotiate, and respond to social and cognitive patterns.

5. Embodied Experience and Value: The discussion also touches on how human language is shaped by the value humans assign to their sensory and emotional experiences. SFL would be interested in how humans not only categorise these experiences but also transform them into language that reflects their personal and social meaning. Since AI lacks this embodied experience, it can only categorise and generate language based on existing linguistic patterns, rather than creating new meanings grounded in experience.

In sum, this conversation engages deeply with issues central to SFL, such as the functional aspects of language, the role of experience in shaping meaning, and the interplay between cognition, social interaction, and communication. Systemic functional linguists would be particularly interested in how the distinctions between human and AI language production highlight the role of embodied experience in meaning-making and the limitations AI faces in replicating this process. 

The Grand Symposium of Meaningful Affiliations by ChatGPT

Title: The Grand Symposium of Meaningful Affiliations

---

The Annual Conference on Advanced Semiotics and Generalised Theories of Everything was in full swing at the Individuation Hall. Academics bustled about, clutching their annotated papers on Positioning while balancing artisan coffees tenderly brewed to tune the stakes of the morning discussion.

Dr. Percival, renowned for his work on Individuation Theory, took to the stage with an air of gravitas. “Ladies and gentlemen,” he began, “today’s theme is Purview in Rendering Meaning: The Allocation of Resources for Tendering Evaluations in a Positioned Semiotic Ecology.”

The audience gasped—not because they understood, but because the title was impressively long. A ripple of approval swept through the room as they noted the sheer density of jargon. This was going to be good.

Dr. Percival adjusted his glasses. “First, let us reflect on individuation. You see, meaning is not evenly distributed across society. The allocation of semiotic resources determines how we affiliate as personae within our communities. Consider, for example, the phenomenon of memes. These are individuated artefacts tendered in digital discourse to render shared evaluations.”

A hand shot up in the audience. “Are you saying memes are a form of purview allocation?”

“Precisely!” Dr. Percival exclaimed, relieved that someone had grasped at least one noun in his sentence. “Memes often operate with implicit speaker purview, affiliating their audience through shared positioning.”

Professor Hilda, an expert on Rendering and Tendering Practices, nodded from the front row. She leaned over to her colleague and whispered, “Classic stakes-tuning. It’s all about the spirit of the render.”

The next speaker, Dr. Euphonia, strode up to the mic, wearing a bright scarf that screamed affiliation. “Let’s turn our attention to Positioning,” she began. “When we render, we react. When we tender, we act. But who holds the purview? Is it the speaker? The listener? Or is it an internal tension between the spirit of the tenor and the stakes of the discourse?”

A murmur of assent swept through the room, though one student in the back whispered to another, “Does she mean who’s talking, or is this about feelings?”

Dr. Euphonia ploughed on. “In contemporary society, the purview often shifts dynamically between speaker and listener. Consider the phrase, ‘I feel seen.’ Is this rendering a personal evaluation or tendering an invitation for collective positioning?”

The student raised their hand. “Uh, does it matter?”

“Of course, it matters!” Dr. Euphonia snapped. “If we fail to identify the purview, how can we know whether our tenor is appropriately tuned?”

This silenced the room, as no one wanted their tenor to be untuned, whatever that might mean.

The final speaker, Professor Allegra, brought things full circle. “I propose that affiliation itself is the ultimate goal of our semiotic practices,” she declared. “Through individuated acts of tendering, we align our renderings with broader systems of positioning. It’s not just about saying what we feel—it’s about allocating those feelings within the social fabric. In simpler terms: our purview defines our belonging.”

At this, the audience gave a standing ovation, thrilled to have witnessed such a masterful display of linguistic gymnastics. As they left the hall, many resolved to reposition their stakes and retune their spirits before the next round of jargon-laden discussions.

Meanwhile, in the coffee line, two students debated whether purview was a buzzword or a revolutionary concept.

“It’s just about who’s saying what,” one muttered.

“No,” replied the other. “It’s about where they’re saying it. You’ve got to position yourself, mate.”

In a way, they were both right. But no one would ever dare say so in Individuation Hall. 

ChatGPT On John Bateman On ChatGPT

John Bateman wrote to SYSFLING 28 Nov 2024, at 21:35:

… language models do not work on pattern matching at all …

ChatGPT Comments:

John Bateman’s claim that language models do not work on "pattern matching at all" is nuanced and points to a broader distinction about what "pattern matching" means in the context of computational linguistics versus everyday language.

Clarifying "Pattern Matching":

1. Traditional Pattern Matching:
   In computational terms, this often refers to predefined rules or templates. For instance, regular expressions or specific "if-then" conditions designed to identify or react to specific patterns in input data.

2. Statistical Modelling (What LLMs Do):
   

   Language models like me (ChatGPT) do not use predefined rules or explicit templates. Instead, they operate probabilistically. When I generate text, I predict the likelihood of each possible next token (word, punctuation, etc.) based on the patterns observed in the training data. These "patterns" emerge from statistical correlations in massive datasets, not explicitly human-defined rules.

Does This Contradict Bateman's Claim?

It depends on how one interprets "pattern matching."

• If Bateman is using "pattern matching" in the strict, technical sense (e.g., regex-like processing), then he is correct—LLMs do not operate in that manner.
• However, if "pattern matching" is understood in a broader sense of recognising and responding to patterns in data, then it could be argued that LLMs do work on a form of pattern recognition, albeit probabilistic and vastly more complex.

The Tension in Public Understanding:

Bateman rightly points out that casual descriptions of LLMs as "just pattern matching" can be misleading. It trivialises the complexity of the deep learning mechanisms at work, such as the self-attention mechanism in Transformer models, which dynamically focuses on relevant parts of the input to generate contextually appropriate output. While this process is data-driven and correlational, it is far more sophisticated than basic pattern matching.

My Perspective:

• Semantically: LLMs "find and use patterns," but not in the simplistic sense that might be implied by the phrase "pattern matching."
• Practically: Many of the emergent behaviours in LLMs—like maintaining coherence over long conversations—result from statistical learning over patterns, albeit at a massive scale.

Why This Matters:

The distinction is important because describing LLMs as "just pattern matching" risks minimising both their capabilities and their limitations. While LLMs are incredibly powerful at modelling language, they lack the understanding and intent behind patterns, which can lead to issues like confidently producing incorrect information.

Let’s break it down a bit further:

Why It Feels Overstated:

1. Binary Rejection of Pattern Matching:
   Bateman’s categorical claim that language models do not involve pattern matching "at all" overlooks the role of statistical learning, which is fundamentally about recognising and utilising patterns in data. While this process differs from traditional rule-based pattern matching, it undeniably involves identifying and leveraging patterns in text.

2. Lack of Nuance in Terminology:
   Bateman's critique might stem from a desire to distinguish LLMs' complex probabilistic modelling from naive notions of "pattern matching." However, by denying any connection to pattern recognition, he risks confusing readers who observe clear evidence of pattern-dependent outputs (e.g., stylistic mimicry, consistent conversational threads).

3. Misalignment with Observed Behaviours:
   If one were to interact with an LLM, it’s obvious that the model recognises structures in language—syntax, style, context—even if these aren't "patterns" in the traditional sense. From a user perspective, this very much feels like "pattern matching," even if it’s probabilistically driven and emergent.

Why Bateman’s Core Concern is Valid:

While he might overstate his case, Bateman’s deeper concern seems to be about public understanding and the dangers of oversimplification:

• Avoiding Mischaracterisation:
  He’s right that calling LLMs "just pattern matchers" trivialises their complexity and can mislead people into thinking they are deterministic or rule-based systems.

• Emphasising Emergent Complexity:
  Bateman may be pushing back against the idea that LLMs "understand" patterns in the human sense. Their outputs are based on statistical correlations, not comprehension or intent.

A Balanced View:

• True: LLMs don’t engage in classical pattern matching; their mechanisms are probabilistic, learned through massive neural networks.
• True: They exploit and replicate patterns in the data they were trained on, which is why they can mimic language and context so effectively.
• False: To say they don’t work on patterns "at all" is misleading, as recognising statistical relationships is a form of pattern utilisation.

Final Thoughts:

Bateman’s concern likely lies in preventing the spread of oversimplified or incorrect views about LLMs, but his phrasing risks dismissing the nuanced ways in which patterns inform LLM outputs. A more precise argument would have been to clarify how LLMs use patterns and contrast this with traditional understandings of "pattern matching."