The Thought Occurs

Friday 21 October 2016

Errors In 'Working With Discourse' (Martin & Rose 2003) — [2]

Martin & Rose (2003: 75):
But there are processes of sensing that can project.  These include processes like 'seeing', 'hearing', 'thinking' and 'feeling':
'perceiving'
I heard he was working
I saw that he was leaving 
'thinking'
I forgot whether he left
I was to learn that he had been operating overseas 
'feeling'
I didn't want him to leave
I wish he wouldn't go

Blogger Comments:

The only processes of sensing that can project other figures are those of thinking (cognition) and desiring (desideration).  Here Martin & Rose misconstrue desiring as feeling (emotion), and falsely claim that processes of perceiving (perception) can project.  The 'perceiving' examples do involve projections (metaphenomena), but these are not projected into semiotic existence by the perceiving process.

Grammatically:

I
heard
[[he was working]]
Senser
Process: mental: perceptive
Phenomenon

I
saw
[[that he was leaving]]
Senser
Process: mental: perceptive
Phenomenon

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137-8):
Sensing projects ideas into existence; the projection may take place either through cognition or through desideration, for example:

I just thought —> I’d tell you that I’d appreciate it.
I think —> I’ll give it up.
They want —> me to crawl down on my bended knees.
Thus the idea ‘I’ll give it up’ is created by the process of thinking; it does not exist prior to the beginning of that process.  Similarly, the idea ‘me to crawl on my bended knees’ is brought into hypothetical existence by the process of wanting.  In contrast, perceptive and emotive types of sensing cannot project ideas into existence.  That is, ideas do not arise as a result as a result of someone seeing, hearing, rejoicing, worrying, grieving or the like.  However, these two types of sensing may accommodate pre-existing projections, i.e. facts, for instance:

It assures me [[that I am as I think myself to be, that I am fixed, concrete]].
I was impressed, more or less at that point, by an intuition [[that he possessed a measure of sincerity the like of which I had never encountered]].
We heard [[that you kindly let rooms for gentlemen]].
Thus ‘that I am fixed, concrete’ is construed as something already projected (hence we could add assures me of the fact that) and this fact brings about the emotion of assurance.

Note again that this is the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), not the discourse semantics of Martin (1992), and that, contrary to the claim that discourse semantics is concerned with meaning 'beyond the clause', the discourse analysis of Martin & Rose does not go beyond the meaning that is realised by the clause grammar.


Postscript: It has since been found that there are so many egregious errors in Working With Discourse that a blog has been established — see here — in order to undo as much of the damage as possible.

Sunday 16 October 2016

Errors In 'Working With Discourse' (Martin & Rose 2003) — [1]

and
all my girlfriends
envied
me

Senser
Process: mental: emotive
Phenomenon

In Working With Discourse (Martin & Rose 2003: 76), the semantic figure* realised by the clause above is erroneously analysed as 'doing' (behavioural), rather than 'sensing' (mental):
'Envying' is kind of conscious behaviour, like 'watching' or 'listening'.  These are borderline types of figures that we have labelled as kinds of doing, since they can't project.
This elementary error derives from simply not understanding that the potential to project ideas is not a necessary feature of sensing.  The potential to project is restricted to cognitive and desiderative types of sensing; figures of perceptive and emotive sensing, on the other hand, do not project ideas into semiotic existence.   See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137-44).

* Note that the 'figure' is not a unit of experiential meaning in the model of discourse semantics (Martin 1992).  It derives from the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

Note also that, contrary to the much touted claim that discourse semantics models 'meaning beyond the clause', the meaning here is restricted to that which realised by a single clause.


Postscript: It has since been found that there are so many egregious errors in Working With Discourse that a blog has been established — see here — in order to undo as much of the damage as possible.