The Thought Occurs

Tuesday 26 August 2014

Realisation: Encoding & Decoding

In an identifying relation, the identity either encodes the Value (the higher level of abstraction) by reference to the Token (the lower level of abstraction), or it decodes the Token by reference to the Value (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 230).

So, in the identifying relation: expression realises content
the identity either encodes content by reference to expression,
or it decodes expression by reference to content.

And, in the identifying relation: form realises function
the identity either encodes function by reference to form,
or it decodes form by reference to function.

And, in the identifying relation: structure realises system
the identity either encodes system by reference to structure,
or it decodes structure by reference to system.

Wednesday 13 August 2014

Construing Experience

'A quantum of experience is not defined before it is construed' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 118)

Saturday 9 August 2014

Circumstance Vs Expanding Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 369):
In the creation of text, we choose between augmenting a clause ‘internally’ by means of a circumstantial element and augmenting it ‘externally’ by means of another clause in a complex. The decision depends on many factors; but the basic consideration has to do with how much textual, interpersonal and experiential semiotic ‘weight’ is to be assigned to the unit.

Friday 8 August 2014

Semantic Weight

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111):
… whenever two figures are related in a sequence, they may be either equal or unequal in semantic weight. … The projecting and projected figures may have equal status in the sequence: this relation is that of quoting … . Or they may have unequal status: this relation is that of reporting ….

Wednesday 6 August 2014

Projections Of Meaning & Wording: Ideas & Locutions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 108):
We have suggested that the relation of projection sets up one figure on a different plane of reality — we refer to this as the second-order or semiotic level. This second-order level of reality is the content plane of a semiotic system. That is to say, the projected figure is projected in the form of ‘content’. We have seen that the content plane is stratified into two levels — semantics (the level of meanings) and lexicogrammar (the level of wordings). Consequently, we would expect projections to be located at either or both of these levels, and this is indeed what happens: a projected figure is either a meaning or a wording. […] We will refer to these [i.e. meaning and wording] in the context of projection as ideas and locutions.

Saturday 2 August 2014

Comment Adjuncts

Type
Examples Of Adverbs
propositional
on whole
asseverative
natural
naturally, inevitably, of course
obvious
obviously, clearly, plainly, of course
sure
doubtless, indubitably, no doubt
qualificative
prediction
predictable
unsurprisingly, predictably, to no-one’s surprise
surprising
surprisingly, unexpectedly
presumption
hearsay
evidently, allegedly, supposedly
argument
arguably
guess
presumably
desirability
desirable: luck
luckily, fortunately
desirable: hope
hopefully
undesirable
sadly, unfortunately
on Subject
wisdom
positive
wisely, cleverly
negative
foolishly, stupidly
morality
positive
rightly, correctly, justifiably
negative
wrongly, unjustifiably
speech-functional
unqualified
persuasive
assurance
truly, honestly, seriously (+ tone 1)
concession
admittedly, certainly, to be sure (+ tone 4)
factual
actually, really, in fact, as a matter of fact
qualified
validity
generally, broadly, roughly, ordinarily, by and large, on the whole
personal engagement
honesty
frankly, candidly, honestly, to be honest
secrecy
confidentially, between you and me
individuality
personally, for my part
accuracy
truly, strictly
hesitancy
tentatively


Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 130)

Friday 1 August 2014

Modal Adjuncts



Type
Meaning
Examples
I
probability
how likely?
probably, possibly, certainly, perhaps, maybe
usuality
how often?
usually, sometimes, always, (n)ever, often, seldom
typicality
how typical?
occasionally, generally, regularly, for the most part
obviousness
how obvious?
of course, surely, obviously, clearly
II
opinion
I think
in my opinion, personally, to my mind
admission
I admit
frankly, to be honest, to tell you the truth
persuasion
I assure you
honestly, really, believe me, seriously
entreaty
I request you
please, kindly
presumption
I presume
evidently, apparently, no doubt, presumably
desirability
how desirable?
(un)fortunately, to my delight/distress, regrettably, hopefully
reservation
how reliable?
at first, tentatively, provisionally, looking back on it
validation
how valid?
broadly speaking, in general, on the whole, strictly speaking, in principle
evaluation
how sensible?
(un)wisely, understandably, mistakenly, foolishly
prediction
how expected?
to my surprise, surprisingly, as expected, by chance

(Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 82)